I. ÚS 818/24

Residents of a house located near a class II road sought compensation for harm caused by an unlawful decision of the regional public health authority (RPHA) granting a noise exemption. Traffic on this road produces noise levels exceeding statutory noise limits, a fact previously confirmed by administrative courts. A constitutional complaint filed by the first complainant was successful. Unlike the general courts, the Constitutional Court concluded that there was indeed a causal link between the decision granting a noise exemption and the complainant's alleged harm.

The South Moravian Regional Public Health Authority responded to the exceedance of noise limits caused by road traffic by repeatedly granting noise exemptions permitting continued operation. The latest exemption, issued in April 2016, was annulled by the Regional Court in Brno in June 2018. The court stated that the purpose of the noise exemption as a concept was not to permanently maintain an unlawful situation – i.e., prolonged exceedance of noise limits. According to the Regional Court, the public health authority failed to fulfil its obligations concerning public health protection, breached the principle of issuing decisions in accordance with public interest, and inadequately established the facts of the case. These conclusions were subsequently upheld by the Supreme Administrative Court.

Consequently, the complainants sought compensation for harm caused by the unlawful decision of the RPHA granting the noise exemption in April 2016, proceeding under Act No 82/1998 Sb. (on state liability for damage). The harm alleged involved stress, anxiety, risk to and deterioration of health, and an overall decline in quality of life. Therefore, they demanded that the Czech Republic pay each of them CZK 500 000. The District Court for Prague 2 and subsequently the Municipal Court in Prague dismissed their claims, concluding that the complainants lacked active legal standing. However, upon the complainants' appeal, the Supreme Court annulled the decisions of the lower courts in relation to the first complainant, finding that he did indeed have active legal standing.

The District Court then reconsidered the complainant’s case; however, in the judgment now under appeal, the court again dismissed the action because it found no causal connection between the unlawful decision of the public health authority and the complainant's harm. According to the District Court, there was no dispute that the public health authority had issued an unlawful decision, yet the complainant’s harm did not arise as a consequence of that decision. The situation concerning excessive noise, the court reasoned, had not changed before the issuance of the noise exemption, during its validity, or after its annulment. The District Court agreed with the complainant that, had the unlawful decision not been issued, the public health authority would have had to take action. However, it was not possible to conclude with certainty what specific actions would actually have been taken, as the Public Health Protection Act grants the public health authority a broad range of possible responses – from imposing fines or suspending operations to granting another noise exemption. The Municipal Court agreed with the District Court's findings and dismissed the complainant's appeal in the contested judgment. The Supreme Court refused the complainant's subsequent appeal as inadmissible. The married couple thus turned to the Constitutional Court.

The First Panel of the Constitutional Court (Justice Rapporteur Jan Wintr) annulled the general courts' decisions concerning one of the spouses (the husband). The general courts violated the complainant's right to compensation for harm caused by an unlawful decision under Article 36(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms and the right to respect for private and family life, home, and correspondence under Article 8(1) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Moreover, by rejecting the appeal on points of law, the Supreme Court infringed the complainant's right to judicial protection under Article 36(1) of the Charter. The case will now be reconsidered by the district court in his case. The Constitutional Court rejected the other complainant's (the wife) complaint.

Article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms imposes a positive obligation (duty) on the state to protect the peaceful enjoyment of one's home. Excessively intense noise negatively impacts human health and persistently prevents individuals from enjoying the comfort of their homes.

Although it is up to the state to determine the system of protection for individuals from excessive noise, it must strike a fair balance between conflicting interests and ensure that measures chosen by the state are genuinely effective. One instrument used by the state to balance these competing interests is setting fixed noise limits within which produced noise levels must remain. According to the Constitutional Court, if a state authority unlawfully tolerates breaches of noise regulations and uses temporary exemptions to effectively legalise the unlawful exceedance of noise limits, it acts contrary to its positive obligations arising from the right to respect for private and family life, home, and correspondence under Article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

The complainant argued that statutory noise limits had long been exceeded at his place of residence, and that the excessive noise led to a general deterioration in quality of life, including stress, anxiety, and overall worsening of health. The Constitutional Court reiterated that three conditions must be met for state liability to arise: an unlawful decision, occurrence of harm, and a causal link between the unlawful decision and the harm.

The existence of an unlawful decision by the RPHA was undisputed in the proceedings. The general courts did not address the second condition – the occurrence of harm – as all three conditions for state liability must be fulfilled concurrently, and, in the view of the courts, the third condition – the causal link between the harm and the unlawful decision granting the noise exemption – was clearly not met.

However, unlike the general courts, the Constitutional Court concluded that there was a causal link between the harm and the unlawful decision of the public health authority. The duty of the public health authority – in this case, the RPHA – is to oversee compliance with obligations arising from the Public Health Protection Act. Had it not been for the unlawful decision of the RPHA granting the noise exemption, both the RPHA and the road authority (administrator) would have been obliged to actively address the exceedance of noise limits. The harm alleged by the complainant, consisting of excessive noise, would thus not have occurred (or would have been lessened). Even if measures taken by the RPHA had not succeeded in reducing noise below statutory limits, liability could have arisen for the operator of the noise source due to non-compliance with obligations under Section 30(1) of the Public Health Protection Act. Consequently, the unlawful decision of the RPHA extended the unlawful situation by at least two years, during which neither the RPHA nor the road authority needed to adopt the noise mitigation measures they would otherwise have been required to implement under the Public Health Protection Act, had the unlawful decision not been issued. The general courts erred in assessing causation, thereby violating the complainant's fundamental right to compensation for harm caused by an unlawful decision of a public authority.

The rule of law requires the state to assume responsibility for the actions of its authorities. It is now up to the general courts to re-evaluate the complainant's claim for compensation and to reassess whether all three conditions for state liability have been met. The ruling of the Constitutional Court does not anticipate the results of evidence-taking or subsequent legal assessments concerning the alleged harm. Nevertheless, the legal opinion expressed in the Constitutional Court's judgment is binding upon the courts.