Headnotes:
Conditioning state-recognized gender reassignment on a surgical procedure consisting of disabling the reproductive function and transformation of the sexual organs is contrary to the fundamental right of people seeking such reassignment to the protection of their bodily integrity and personal autonomy in conjunction with their human dignity under Article 7(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and Article 1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms.
Summary:
I. The petitioner is a trans man who seeks legal gender reassignment and who wishes to have his officially recorded information reflect how he feels without having to undergo the legally required surgical procedure. At birth, he was officially registered as a female with a female name and birth number format. He is now going through the process of gender reassignment but does not wish to undergo the required surgical procedure of sterilization and surgical genital transformation. The petitioner seeks that the Constitutional Court strike down the statutory provisions that make gender reassignment a condition for undergoing the surgical procedure. He also proposes the annulment of other provisions that regulate the conditions for changing a person's name about his or her sex. The disputed legal provisions, according to the petitioner, violate his human dignity, his right to equality, protection of health, respect for private life, and his right to parenthood.
II. The Plenum of the Court first addressed the question of whether it was appropriate to deal with the substantive aspects of the motion since the Court had already ruled on another person's motion to repeal (partially) identical provisions in the past by its ruling Pl. ÚS 2/20 of 9 November 2021. The Court has now concluded that the new proposal is admissible since in its previous ruling the Court dealt primarily with the constitutionality of the statutory form of the birth number (i.e. Section 13(3) of the Population Registration Act). It did not then assess the constitutionality of the statutory conditions under which gender can be changed, which was the substance of the present case. Thus, there was no case to decide in the present case.
The Court concluded that the statutory regulation of “status” gender reassignment constituted a significant interference with the bodily integrity of trans people (because the state required them to undergo surgical procedures to have the change recognized) and with their right to self-determination and personal autonomy (because they could not perform fully by their seriously perceived identity without undergoing the required surgical procedures).
The Court also acknowledged that it is legitimate for the legislator to ensure legal certainty in preventing arbitrary or purposeful gender changes. The officially registered sex of an individual is a status issue of significance not only for the individual but also for his/her environment and, by implication, for society as a whole. However, the current legal requirements of surgical genital transformation and disabling of reproductive function are disproportionate to the aim pursued and are therefore unconstitutional. According to the Court, it is possible to achieve the objective pursued by more gentle means (e.g. diagnostic opinions of several independent specialist sexologists, etc.). Moreover, according to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, it is contrary to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms for states to make official sex change conditional on the disabling of reproductive function (sterilization).
For these reasons, the Court annulled section 29(1), the first sentence, of the Civil Code, and section 21(1), the first sentence, of the Act on Specific Health Services. It postponed the enforcement of the ruling until 30 June 2025 to give the legislator sufficient time to re-regulate the legal conditions for gender reassignment.
III. The justice rapporteur was J. Jirsa. Justices J. Fiala and M. Hulmák dissented.