As in previous years, the Constitutional Court participated in the festival. It offered visitors a rich programme composed of three guided tours, during which visitors could explore the building whose history has been closely tied to the protection of constitutionality for the past thirty-five years. The tour, led by Constitutional Court staff, generally followed two themes. The first focused on the building itself, its architecture, and history. The so-called New Provincial House, built in the 1870s as the seat of the Moravian Land Diet, is one of the most important and remarkable buildings in Brno and in Moravia as a whole. The second line of commentary followed the day-to-day operations of the Constitutional Court. Visitors were shown the courtroom where the Constitutional Court pronounces its senate judgments, the Assembly Hall, where, in our day, pronouncements of Constitutional Court Plenary judgments and public oral hearings are conducted, and the recently renovated Grand Council Chamber, dominated by the Constitution of the Czech Republic itself.

The highlight of the program at the Constitutional Court was a discussion with Constitutional Court Justice Jiří Přibáň and hosted by Secretary General of the Constitutional Court Vlastimil Göttinger. Together with them, almost eighty attendees reflected on whether the Constitution needs legal philosophy. The discussion covered imaginary journeys beyond textualism, the search for the meaning of the Constitution, and the eternal tension between law, morality, and politics.

Pavel Dvořák
Head of External Relations and Protocol Department

© Photos: Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic, Jiřina Rittichová

The meeting of judges took place on 9 and 10 March. Koen Lenaerts, President of the CJEU, opened the conference with a welcome speech and moderated the first session dedicated to the ‘Origins, Development, and Future Prospects of the Charter’. Gráinne de Búrca, a professor at the European University Institute in Florence, gave the keynote speech on this topic. The second session focused on the ‘The Link Between the Charter and EU Values’. Thomas von Danwitz, Vice-President of the CJEU, took on the role of moderator, while Elena-Simina Tănăsescu, President of the Romanian Constitutional Court, was the keynote speaker. The third session dealt with the ‘Applicability of the Charter in the National Legal Orders’. This topic was introduced by Maciej Szpunar, First Advocate General of the CJEU, and presented in more detail by Francesco Viganò. Vice-President of the Italian Constitutional Court, and Dineke de Groot, President of the Dutch Supreme Court. Each session was followed by a lively discussion.

The second part of the so-called judges' forum was, as is traditional, divided into three parallel workshops. The first, focusing on the ‘Right to Effective Judicial Protection’, was moderated by Maria Lourdes Arastey Sahún, Judge of the CJEU and President of its Fifth Chamber. Villu Kõve, Chief Justice of the Estonian Supreme Court, explored the topic in greater depth in his presentation. The second workshop covered the ‘Right to Privacy’. Marc van der Woude, President of the General Court, took on the role of moderator, while Christos Ntouchanis, Vice-President of the Greek Council of State, was the keynote speaker. The third workshop, moderated by Savvas Papasavvas, Vice-President of the General Court, focused on ‘Restrictive measures and fundamental rights’. Martin Smolek, a Justice of the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic, gave the keynote speech on this topic. He thus followed in the footsteps of Kateřina Ronovská, Vice-President of the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic, who delivered a speech two years ago at a meeting of judges in Luxembourg, when the CJEU celebrated 20 years since the largest enlargement of the European Union.

The Constitutional Court greatly appreciates the fact that its representatives are repeatedly invited to share their knowledge and experience at such prestigious international forums.

Pavel Dvořák
Head of External Relations and Protocol Department
 

©CJUE 2026. Photos by Carles
 

At the invitation of the President of the Slovenian Constitutional Court, Rok Čeferin, this time a bilateral meeting was held. The delegation of the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic was led by President Josef Baxa, who was accompanied to Ljubljana by Vice-President Veronika Křesťanová, Justice Lucie Dolanská Bányaiová, Justice Zdeněk Kühn, and Secretary General Vlastimil Göttinger. The bilateral meeting, which took place on Tuesday, 3 March, at the seat of the Slovenian Constitutional Court, focused on two topics. These were the assessment of the fairness of criminal proceedings as a whole and the judicial independence and judges' salaries. In addition to these topics, several other issues related to the review and protection of constitutionality were discussed.

The bilateral meeting took place in a warm atmosphere and was substantive and fruitful. Although constitutional courts must first and foremost devote themselves to their decision-making activities, the exchange of knowledge and perspectives is naturally enriching for them and can contribute significantly to deepening the protection of constitutionality and human rights.

Pavel Dvořák
Head of the External Relations and Protocol Department
 

© Photo: Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovenia, Daniel Novakovič/STA 
 

The Ukrainian delegation was led by the Acting Chairman and most senior justice of the Constitutional Court, Oleksandr Petryshyn, and consisted of six other justices. The two-day meeting was opened by the President of the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic Josef Baxa. In addition to welcoming the guests, he devoted his speech to presenting the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic from a historical and contemporary perspective. He then gave the floor to his Ukrainian counterpart, who thanked him for the warm welcome and introduced his Czech colleagues to the role and powers of the Ukrainian Constitutional Court and its functioning in the complex situation of war caused by Russian aggression in Ukraine. 

The working sessions focused on specific issues related to constitutional justice. The topics discussed included the professional ethics of justices and their disciplinary responsibility, recusal of justices from court proceedings and decision-making, the methodology of preparing court decisions, and the relationship between national law and European Union law. On Wednesday afternoon, the Ukrainian delegation also met with representatives of the Constitutional Court´s staff, namely the head of the judicial department, the head of the external relations and protocol department, and the press secretary. They discussed practical issues, specifically case management system and its digitization, the internal structure of the court, and communication with the public and the media.

The working sessions filled almost the entire program of the two-day visit. Nevertheless, the guests toured the Constitutional Court building, including the library, the Assembly Hall where plenary judgments are pronounced, and the court rooms where senate judgments are pronounced.

Pavel Dvořák
Head of External Relations and Protocol Department

The Constitutional Court has rejected a petition seeking to annul certain provisions of the so-called Lex Ukraine VII, which introduced the new criminal offence of unauthorised activity on behalf of a foreign power. The legislative process leading to the adoption of the challenged provisions did not exceed the bounds of constitutionality. The facts of the newly introduced offence can be interpreted in a constitutionally compliant manner. The requirement for clarity and certainty in the definition of criminal offences (nullum crimen sine lege certa) has been met in this instance. The rules of criminal liability, even if contained in broadly formulated norms, may be further refined through subsequent case law. The Constitutional Court also emphasised the importance of the principle of defensive democracy.

The petitioner, a group of 24 Senators, challenged the provisions of the so-called Lex Ukraine VII that established the new criminal offence of unauthorised activity on behalf of a foreign power. The common denominator of the challenged statutory provisions is the amendment to the Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure in connection with the introduction of this new offence, which is incorporated in three variations under Section 318a of the Criminal Code. The group argued that the legislative process was not constitutionally compliant and that the regulation failed to meet the requirements of certainty and predictability expected of a criminal law norm.

The Plenum of the Constitutional Court (Justice Rapporteur Lucie Dolanská Bányaiová) rejected the petition.

While the legislature adopted the new criminal offence, the legislative process was questioned and challenged before the Constitutional Court. According to the Court, although the legislative process was not flawless, it did not step outside the boundaries of constitutionality when viewed in light of existing case law. Consequently, the Constitutional Court proceeded to a substantive review of the constitutionality of the challenged Section 318a of the Criminal Code.

It is up to the legislature to decide which conduct the State wishes to prevent through criminal law and which acts it will criminalise. The formulation of criminal policy is the prerogative of the legislative body, not the Constitutional Court.

The elements of the criminal offence of unauthorised activity on behalf of a foreign power reflect the legislature’s conviction that such conduct cannot be effectively combated (or prevented) through means other than criminal law. According to the explanatory memorandum and the submission report for the amendment, the previous legal framework could only penalise certain aspects of cooperation with a foreign power that are undesirable to the State. Under the regulations in force during the drafting of the challenged provision, “cooperation” was, for instance, punishable only if it coincided with the abuse of power by a public official or the unauthorised handling of personal data. Cooperation with a foreign power does not necessarily entail only intelligence activities aimed at acquiring and transmitting information; it can also take the form of preparatory acts (e.g., building an agent network for a foreign power, mapping decision-making processes in public administration). These can subsequently lead to activities aimed at influencing the decision-making of public authorities, swaying the public through the dissemination of alarming news, or even violent criminal activity. The criminal acts contained in the previous version of the Criminal Code, which might have applied to such resultant conduct, did not provide comprehensive protection for State interests. Therefore, in criminalising this behaviour, the legislature respected the principle of the subsidiarity of criminal repression. Thus, in the view of the Constitutional Court, the new regulation is not unacceptably repressive. As with any criminal offence, only significant acts – those reaching a certain threshold of social harm requisite for a criminal offence – will be prosecuted.

The Constitutional Court highlighted the importance of the principle of defensive democracy. If opponents of democracy and its foundational values are prepared to attack it, the democratic regime must likewise be prepared to defend itself against such assaults. The new criminal offence of unauthorised activity on behalf of a foreign power can serve this very purpose.

The Constitutional Court did not agree with the objection regarding the vagueness of the legislation, which the petitioner claimed reached the level of impermissible unconstitutionality. The Court acknowledged that the rules of criminal liability – even those contained in broadly drafted provisions – may be refined through subsequent judicial practice. Individual facts of criminal offences must be distinguishable from one another so that each specific act can be matched to the facts of a crime that best correspond to it. Simply put, this represents the fundamental constitutional requirement stemming from the nullum crimen sine lege certa principle (the requirement for clarity and precision in defining criminal offences), which has been fulfilled in this case. 

Although the basic facts of the new offence [particularly in the variants set out in Section 318a(1)(a) and (c) of the Criminal Code] are formulated rather broadly, it is possible to interpret them in a constitutionally compliant manner. Regarding the perpetrator’s intent, it must be directed towards conduct that is realistically capable of endangering or damaging the protected interest, and it must do so directly, rather than in a merely remote (abstract) way. The Constitutional Court has provided fundamental guidelines for a constitutionally conforming interpretation, drawing upon the structure of the Criminal Code and preparatory works, among other things. The primary limits ensuring the certainty of the challenged regulation and the criminal liability of the offender are the specific intent, the involvement of a foreign power, and the unauthorised nature of the activity (meaning it cannot be a legal activity, such as cooperation with foreign intelligence services within the meaning of the Intelligence Services Act).

If the elements of a criminal offence can be interpreted in a way that makes it clear which conduct can be criminalised, the constitutional requirement for the certainty of a (substantive) criminal norm is met. The Constitutional Court relies on the principle of the constitutionally compliant interpretation and application of legal regulations. In a situation where a statutory provision allows for two different interpretations – one in accordance with the constitutional order and the other not – there is no ground for its annulment. When applying this new criminal offence, it will be the task of public authorities to interpret it in a constitutionally compliant manner. It is now up to the bodies in charge of criminal proceedings to adopt such a constitutionally conforming interpretation; in doing so, they may utilise the guidance provided by the Constitutional Court.

Doc. JUDr. Michal Bartoň, Ph.D. graduated from the Faculty of Law of Palacký University in Olomouc in 1999. In 2005, he successfully completed his doctoral studies at the Masaryk University Faculty of Law in Brno. At the same faculty, he also successfully defended his habilitation thesis on the topic of freedom of speech in 2012 and was appointed an associate professor in constitutional law and theory of state. Freedom of speech and fundamental rights have been the main areas of his professional expertise.

For more than two decades, Michal Bartoň has been the member of the Department of Constitutional Law at the Faculty of Law of Palacky University in Olomouc. In 2024, he became its head. From 2009 to 2024, he served as Chairman of the Academic Senate of the Palacký University Faculty of Law.

From 2008 to 2013, he was a member of the working committee of the Legislative Council of the Government of the Czech Republic. From 2013 to 2023, he was an assistant to the Constitutional Court Justice Milada Tomková. Since 2023, he has been an assistant to the Constitutional Court Justice Daniela Zemanová.

Thanks to his expertise, legal experience and his reputation as a leading expert in constitutional law Michal Bartoň will undoubtedly be of great benefit to the Constitutional Court. We wish Mr. Justice all the best in fulfilling his new important mission.

© Office of the President of the Republic (photo: Tomáš Fongus)

The Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic and the Constitutional Court of Austria have long maintained close and cooperative relations. This is evidenced also by the yesterday´s bilateral meeting in Brno. The Austrian delegation was led by the President of the Court Christoph Grabenwarter, accompanied by Vice-President Verena Madner and Justices Georg Lienbacher, Michael Holoubek, Ingrid Siess-Scherz, Angela Julcher and Stefan Perner. The Czech Constitutional Court was represented at the meeting by President Josef Baxa, Vice-Presidents Veronika Křesťanová and Kateřina Ronovská, and nine other Justices.

Two general topics were chosen for the day-long meeting. These were socially sensitive issues in the case law of constitutional courts and civil law and the constitution. Both Presidents spoke on the first topic, while Justice Stefan Perner and Vice-President Kateřina Ronovská, both professors of civil law, gave presentations on the second. The program also included time for discussion, which was used to its full extent.

Czech and Austrian law have much in common for historical reasons. In addition, both legal systems are currently linked to supranational legal regimes, which are formed by European Union law and the European Convention on Human Rights (and case law of the European Court of Human Rights). It is not only for these reasons that similar legal issues often arise before both constitutional courts. Sharing experiences, knowledge, and perspectives is therefore of great importance, as it helps to improve the quality and efficiency of the decision-making activities of judicial bodies protecting constitutionality.

Pavel Dvořák
Head of External Relations and Protocol Department

© Photos: Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic, Jiřina Rittichová

The intensity of the mutual ties between the two courts is reflected, among other things, in the annual meetings of the plena. While last year's gathering took place in Brno, this year's talks were held at the seat of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic in Košice. The meeting was divided into two sessions. The first took place on Thursday, 13 November, in the afternoon, and the second on Friday, 14 November, in the morning. The general topic of the meeting was the recent case law. Specifically, the discussions focused on criminal law issues in constitutional court decisions (forfeiture of property, lifetime bans), the so-called climate case, the review of pension reform, the review of issues related to political competition (elections), etc.

Constitutional courts have no counterpart on the national level that would have an equivalent position or competence. However, such institutions exist abroad. In the international arena, constitutional protection bodies can share experiences, knowledge and perspectives, thereby contributing to improving the quality of decision-making and deepening the protection of constitutionally guaranteed rights. The Košice meeting once again confirmed the importance of international cooperation.

Pavel Dvořák 
Head of External Relations and Protocol Department

Foto: Ústavní soud Slovenské republiky

The Constitutional Court has rejected the constitutional complaint lodged by the association Klimatická žaloba (Czech Climate Litigation) and other individuals. The complainants had chosen to pursue their claim through an “action against unlawful interference” under the Code of Administrative Justice. However, the respondent ministries – the Ministry of the Environment, the Ministry of Industry and Trade, the Ministry of Agriculture, and the Ministry of Transport – did not, in the manner specified in the complaint, violate the complainants' right to a favourable environment. The ministries were not the originators of the interference with fundamental rights as defined by the complainants. Achieving a substantial reduction in greenhouse gas emissions and attaining climate neutrality in the Czech Republic within approximately three decades requires that obligations be imposed on individuals through legislation. No such legislation currently exists, nor do the constitutional order, statutes, or EU law impose on ministries any duty to set mitigation measures. The administrative courts therefore did not err in rejecting the action against unlawful interference. The Constitutional Court deliberated in plenary session, considering the issue of the impacts of climate change on fundamental rights to be serious and of general societal importance. By its judgment, the Court did not close the door to future climate-related litigation, whether in the field of public or private law.

In 2021, the complainants (together with two other claimants) brought a climate action before the Municipal Court in Prague. Besides the Ministry of the Environment, the Ministry of Industry and Trade, the Ministry of Agriculture, and the Ministry of Transport, they also sued the Government of the Czech Republic. To protect their rights, they opted for an action against unlawful interference under the Code of Administrative Justice. The Municipal Court in Prague initially partially granted the action (while partly rejecting and dismissing it), but after intervention by the Supreme Administrative Court on cassation, it rejected the action in full. Both judgments were challenged by cassation complaints: on the first occasion, the Supreme Administrative Court partly quashed the Municipal Court's judgment (and partly rejected the cassation complaint), and on the second occasion it rejected the cassation complaint entirely. The second stage of the proceedings before the administrative courts concerned solely mitigation measures (aimed at reducing climate change). The first stage had also dealt with adaptation measures (responding to actual or expected climate change, including increasing the resilience of society and the landscape).

The complainants then turned to the Constitutional Court, challenging both decisions of the Supreme Administrative Court and the second judgment of the Municipal Court (insofar as it related to the ministries and mitigation measures). They argued that the administrative courts had failed to examine the autonomous normative content of the State's positive obligations in the area of climate protection, arising from the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms and the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. According to the complainants, the ministries' duty to take the specific steps defined in the complaint derives directly from the constitutional order, and in particular from the fundamental right to a favourable environment.

The Plenum of the Constitutional Court (Justice Rapporteur Veronika Křesťanová) rejected the complaint.

The complainants sought a declaration from the courts that the respondent ministries had interfered unlawfully by failing to determine for themselves specific mitigation measures that would lead to a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions. The individual claims differed only in the degree of specificity or the method of determining the extent of the required reductions. At the same time, the complainants requested that the courts prohibit the respondent ministries from continuing to violate their right to a favourable environment.

The key question in the case was thus whether the respondent ministries themselves bore the duty (or obligation) arising from the complainants' fundamental right to a favourable environment. The Constitutional Court concluded that the respondent ministries could not be the originators of the unlawful interference as defined by the complainants in their action. Since the ministries were not the source of such interference (and therefore had not caused the contested interference), they could not desist from it, nor could they provide the complainants with the relief sought in the action under the Code of Administrative Justice. The administrative courts therefore did not err in refusing the complainants' claims.

At present, there is no statutory framework in the Czech Republic implementing the right to a favourable environment that would impose on ministries the duty to determine specific mitigation measures to reduce emissions. This absence of a “climate law” or comparable legislative framework was, in fact, one of the complainants' arguments. However, the ministries themselves lack the authority to enact such legislation – that power belongs to the legislature. Nor does the constitutional order establish an obligation requiring the ministries to take the measures sought in the complaint, and neither does EU law. Were an administrative court to uphold the complaint, it would in effect be creating a new duty for the ministries, which is incompatible with the nature of an action against unlawful interference, a remedy designed to address the breach of an existing obligation.  

Unlike the European Court of Human Rights, which in the context of climate change assessed the fulfilment of the State's duties as a whole, the Constitutional Court (in line with the procedural strategy chosen by the complainants) considered only the contested acts of the ministries. The ministries, however, cannot be held responsible for failing to adopt mitigation measures when they have no legal basis (or constitutionally imposed duty) to do so.

The Constitutional Court does not dispute the existence of anthropogenic climate change, nor the urgency of the need to respond to it – and neither did the courts below. The Plenum of the Constitutional Court could, however, consider only those issues that were admissible in proceedings before the administrative courts, within the confines of the procedural framework chosen by the complainants. Given the nature of administrative proceedings and the complainants' litigation strategy, the judgment of the Constitutional Court does not address broader questions, such as whether the Czech Republic as a whole is taking sufficient measures to combat climate change and its effects. Nonetheless, achieving a substantial reduction in greenhouse gas emissions and attaining climate neutrality within approximately three decades will require that obligations be imposed on individuals – and such obligations may only be imposed by law.

By today's decision, the Constitutional Court does not in any way prejudge the possible success of other types of actions or climate-related litigation, whether in the field of public or private law. It deliberately confined itself to examining the contested interference at issue, within the limits of the procedural approach chosen by the complainants.

The WCCJ brings together more than 120 constitutional courts, constitutional councils, and equivalent institutions from around the world. The WCCJ was founded in 2009 with the aim of promoting the independence of the judiciary, facilitating the exchange of experiences between constitutional courts, and strengthening international cooperation in the field of constitutional protection. Every three years, a congress is held, focusing on a specific topic that the member courts consider important.

This year's VI Congress was held under the presidency of the Spanish Constitutional Court from 28 to 30 October in the Spanish capital. Its main theme was "Human Rights of Future Generations." The program included plenary sessions, a conference – which, among other things, addressed the constitutional aspects of environmental protection and cultural heritage –and opportunities for informal bilateral meetings. Discussions focused on issues such as judicial independence, the protection of minorities, the impact of new technologies on constitutional law, and strengthening public confidence in the judiciary.

International meetings such as the one in Madrid are not only beneficial but also inspiring. The recently concluded congress offered a rich exchange of views, provided new impetus for constitutional justice, and contributed to the establishment of closer professional relations between courts and their representatives. Although constitutional courts are, in principle, independent institutions, they are not isolated islands – it is international cooperation that enriches their work, oxygenates it, and opens up new horizons. Because the world is changing dynamically, constitutional courts must change with it.

Vlastimil Göttinger 
Secretary General
 

Heads of delegations from WCCJ member courts in a group photo with King Felipe VI of Spain

The VI Congress of the WCCJ was opened by the President of the host court, Cándido Conde-Pumpido Tourón

Vice-President of the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic Kateřina Ronovská with the President of the Constitutional Court of the Kingdom of Spain

Meeting of the General Assembly during the VI Congress of the WCCJ

King Philip VI of Spain during his speech at the closing ceremony of the VI Congress of the WCCJ

VI Congress of the WCCJ

©Photos: Constitutional Court of the Kingdom of Spain

At the beginning of the meeting, Josef Baxa briefly introduced the history of constitutional judiciary in the Czech Republic. He did not forget to mention that the modern system of protection of constitutionality established after 1989 in Czechoslovakia and in the Czech Republic was largely inspired by Germany. The German Federal Constitutional Court was established in 1951 and has since become the flagship of European and, indeed, global constitutional justice. The Bundesverfassungsgericht is also an important partner for the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic. The cooperative relationship between the two institutions was demonstrated by last year's bilateral meeting of representatives of both courts in Karlsruhe. In the second part of yesterday's meeting, the discussion focused mainly on the renewal of the body of Justices at the Constitutional Court. Of the fifteen current Justices of the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic, twelve were appointed between 2023 and 2025. The German Federal Constitutional Court also underwent extensive renewal. During the same period, nine of a total of sixteen Justices were appointed to office. In this context, President Josef Baxa stated that despite the personnel changes, the Czech Constitutional Court had not slowed down its work in any way and appreciated that it had managed to maintain the continuity and smooth running of its activities.

At the end of his visit, His Excellency toured the seat of the Constitutional Court, which is one of the most remarkable buildings in Brno and in Moravia in general. 

Pavel Dvořák
Head of External Relations and Protocol Department

Photo: Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany

JUDr. Martin Smolek, Ph.D., LL.M. graduated from the Faculty of Law of Charles University in Prague in 2000. At the same faculty, he also successfully defended his dissertation thesis on the topic of Implementation and Enforcement of the EU and International Environmental Law in 2004. In 2004, he also graduated from Diplomatic Academy of Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

From 2001 to 2002, he worked in the Approximation of Law Department at the Ministry of Environment. In 2004, he joined the Office of the Agent of the Czech Republic before the Court of the European Communities and the Court of First Instance (now the General Court). In 2008, he was appointed an Agent of the Czech Republic before the Court of the European Union. He held this position until 2025. From 2015 to 2022, he also served as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs for Legal and Consular Affairs. Later he served as Director General at the same Ministry.

Thanks to his many years of professional experience and deep knowledge of EU and international law, Martin Smolek will undoubtedly be of great benefit to the Constitutional Court. We wish Mr. Justice the very best in fulfilling his new important role.

 © Office of the President of the Republic (photo: Tomáš Fongus)

If I had to sum up his personality in a single word, I would simply choose “judge”. I have never met anyone who embodied this profession more completely in their conduct, reasoning and demeanour. Jaromír Jirsa has served as a judge for 33 uninterrupted years. He began his career at the District Court for Prague 8, later became Vice-President of the District Court for Prague 1, and from 2007 served at the Prague Municipal Court, where he went on to once again hold the position of Vice-President. For eight years he was also President of the Czech Union of Judges and became one of the most respected experts in the field of civil procedure. 

His appointment to the Constitutional Court in 2015 therefore came as no surprise. Unlike academics who had to familiarise themselves with the intricate mechanisms of judicial proceedings, Justice Jirsa was in his element from day one. He approached each new case with energy, making notes as he read through it, calling his assistants with instructions on what to prepare, send or research. Thanks to this approach, he decided cases swiftly and did not keep the parties concerned in unnecessary suspense – constitutional complaints assigned to him were resolved on average within 69 days, while the overall average was 50 days longer. What is more, he completed all his assigned cases before the end of his mandate, leaving his successor a clean slate. 

During his time in office he acted as Justice Rapporteur in 2,951 proceedings, 141 of which resulted in judgments. Some of his plenary judgments are well known to the wider public, whether on the taxation of church restitutions (Pl. ÚS 5/19), the collection of telecommunications data (Pl. ÚS 45/17), or surgical intervention as a condition for legal gender recognition (Pl. ÚS 52/23); and there are two dozen more plenary judgments to his name, no less significant.

Amid these “major” rulings of the Plenum, it should not be overlooked that Jaromír Jirsa also played a crucial role in shaping the case law of the Constitutional Court in family matters. His decisions always made clear that he regarded children as the focal point of such disputes, whose best interests must be protected above all else – despite quarrelling parents and despite the mechanical approach sometimes taken by other courts. This is captured beautifully in a sentence from one of his final judgments (II. ÚS 1504/25): “Children are burdened not only by the unreasonable and often selfish conduct of their parents during custody proceedings, but also by the state, which in turn is often unable to guarantee the child's right to prompt and effective proceedings – and let it be emphasised again – in which the principal party is the child (not the parents).”

Jaromír Jirsa was – and remains – a strict judge, who placed the highest demands both on himself and on his colleagues. He had no patience for excuses, laziness or empty theoretical debates, but he always responded readily and swiftly to anyone seeking his help or advice. His insistence on rationality and efficiency in decision-making became a valuable life lesson for all of us who had the honour of working alongside him. And, importantly, he leaves no unfinished cases behind.  

Jaromír Jirsa would often begin his remarks at meetings of the Plenum with the words: “I will be brief…”. Let me try the same: Thank you for ten years in the service of protecting constitutionalism. We will miss your directness (and your English humour).

Vlastimil Göttinger
Secretary General
 

The Constitutional Court has dismissed constitutional complaints lodged by the political party Volt Czechia (Volt Česko), which sought to annul the candidate lists of the movements Stačilo! and Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD) on the grounds of alleged “undeclared” coalitions. Volt also challenged part of the Act on Elections to the Parliament. The Court held that the law defines a coalition in formal rather than substantive terms, and that the approach taken by the regional authorities and the courts was correct. Differential treatment of “declared” and “undeclared” coalitions follows from their distinct legal status and is not unconstitutional. The choice between these forms of cooperation remains a free decision of the parties concerned.

Volt Czechia argued before the administrative courts that the candidate lists of Stačilo! and SPD (as secondary parties to the proceedings) should be annulled, since candidates from other political parties and movements were also standing on them. According to Volt, this amounted to an impermissible “undeclared” coalition, concealed solely to avoid the so-called additive electoral thresholds. Under the law, a coalition of two parties requires 8% of the vote to gain seats, and a coalition of three or more requires 11%, while a single party needs only 5%. In practice, this meant that the secondary parties could enter the allocation of seats with just 5% of the vote instead of the 11% required of a declared coalition. All of Volt's petitions were rejected by the ordinary courts. The majority view was that a coalition exists only where a candidate list is explicitly presented as such (i.e. where the formal statutory requirements are met). Courts are not entitled, the majority held, to investigate whether a candidate list substantively has the character of a coalition and therefore should have been registered as one. Some courts took the opposite view, holding that they could assess such circumstances and that the secondary parties did indeed constitute a coalition in substance, even if they had not declared themselves as such, which led them to the conclusion that the secondary parties had breached their obligation to register as a coalition. Nevertheless, they declined to annul the lists, invoking the principle of minimal interference in the electoral process and the long-standing practice of permitting non-coalition alliances of political parties on candidate lists.

In both constitutional complaints, which were joined for consideration, Volt pointed to the uncertainty and inconsistency in case law on the admissibility of “undeclared” coalition lists. It argued that the secondary parties were in substance a coalition and that the majority judicial approach, which refused to engage with this question, was overly formalistic. Volt further argued that the refusal to annul the lists on the basis of judicial restraint and established practice conflicted with the principle of legal certainty and legitimised illegality.

Volt also sought the annulment of part of Section 31(1) of the Act on Elections to the Parliament, arguing that its wording was ambiguous and had given rise to divergent legal interpretations by the ordinary courts.

The Plenum of the Constitutional Court (Justice Rapporteur Milan Hulmák) dismissed the constitutional complaints.

In reaching its decision, the Constitutional Court addressed two closely related but distinct questions. The first was whether the regional authorities and subsequently the regional courts had violated Volt's fundamental rights by interpreting the term “coalition” in Section 31(1) of the Act on Elections to the Parliament solely with reference to its formal attributes, and on that basis registering the candidate lists of Stačilo! and SPD as those of individual political parties rather than coalitions. The second was whether the statutory framework itself, on which those authorities relied, is in conflict with Volt's fundamental rights or with the constitutional principles governing political competition.

In considering whether the complainant's fundamental rights had been infringed, the Constitutional Court recalled that under Section 31(1) of the Act on Elections to the Parliament, candidate lists may be submitted by registered political parties and by their coalitions. In the case of coalition lists, the law provides that “a candidate list submitted by a coalition shall be deemed to be one in which all political parties and movements standing jointly clearly designate the list as that of a coalition, state who the members of the coalition are, and set out its name”. The Act on Elections to the Parliament does not otherwise restrict political parties from including on their lists candidates who are not party members or who belong to other parties.

The legislature therefore chose – also in response to previous rulings of the Constitutional Court – to define the concept of a coalition by formal rather than substantive criteria (i.e. as an entity where all the parties and movements standing jointly designate the list as a coalition), contrary to Volt's argument. Electoral courts have consistently endorsed this formal definition. For example, the Supreme Administrative Court has emphasised that in proceedings on the registration of candidate lists, it is essential to apply the clearest possible criteria to determine whether a list represents a coalition or a single party. By contrast, allowing scrutiny of alleged “undeclared” coalitions would, in its view, introduce uncertainty and disputes into the electoral process. Moreover, any complex assessment of whether a candidate list substantively amounts to a coalition would have to be carried out within the registration process at regional authorities, which are not equipped for such an inquiry.

Beyond this, the Constitutional Court stressed that any substantive assessment of whether a candidate list constitutes a coalition would have to be grounded in sufficiently precise, clear and foreseeable legislation – which does not currently exist. Public authorities may exercise state power only in cases, within the limits and in the manner prescribed by law [Article 2(3) of the Constitution, Article 2(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms]. This principle is particularly crucial where the exercise of state power could interfere with fundamental rights – in this case, through the annulment of the candidate lists of Stačilo! and SPD, as sought by Volt.

The Constitutional Court concluded that the regional authorities and the majority of regional courts fully respected these principles and the relevant case law in the contested decisions. Their approach can be regarded as constitutionally compliant, practically the only option available under the current law, and consistent with existing electoral jurisprudence. In the registration proceedings, there was no scope for a substantive assessment of whether Stačilo! and SPD were in fact coalitions, nor whether their candidate lists should have been submitted as coalition lists.

As regards the question of the constitutionality of the Act on Elections to the Parliament itself, Volt argued that the legislation creates unequal opportunities for political entities and disadvantages it in access to elected office. It claimed that free and fair political competition is undermined by the fact that some smaller political parties with limited voter support can, through a joint candidate list, be “carried” into the Chamber of Deputies without having to overcome the additive electoral threshold.

According to the Constitutional Court, the challenged legislation would only be unconstitutional if entities in comparable situations were treated differently, such differential treatment worked to the detriment of one of them, and no legitimate reason existed for the distinction. It must be acknowledged that “declared” coalitions are in some respects disadvantaged in the electoral process compared with candidates from different parties standing together on the list of a single electoral party. The most significant disadvantage lies in the existence of the additive threshold of 8% or 11%. However, coalitions within the meaning of Section 31(1) of the Act on Elections to the Parliament are in a fundamentally different position from political parties that merely agree to place members of other parties on their candidate list. Indeed, a number of these differences work to the detriment of “undeclared” coalitions, particularly in the areas of financing and parliamentary rights.

In the area of financing, the Constitutional Court pointed to contributions linked to mandates, regular state contributions and contributions towards political activity. For example, where political parties decide to stand as a declared coalition, they do not lose the formal link to their “own” candidates, reflected in the fact that they remain entitled to state funding corresponding to the mandates obtained. By contrast, in the case of “undeclared” coalitions, this funding accrues solely to the political party which submitted the candidate list.

In parliamentary terms, the key point is that political parties whose members stand on the candidate list of another political party cannot form a parliamentary group under Section 77(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies. Although members of such parties may form a group under paragraph 2 of that provision, this carries several disadvantages: such a group has no entitlement to proportional or parity representation in bodies of the Chamber of Deputies; it has no entitlement to financial support from the Chamber's budget; and ten deputies are required to form it, whereas only three deputies suffice to form a parliamentary group under paragraph 1.

The decision as to which of these two forms of cooperation parties adopt is simply an expression of their free will. Each option carries specific advantages and disadvantages, the evaluation of which is part of the political calculation of the participating entities. The state, and the contested legislation, by adopting a formal concept of coalitions, does not systematically place any political entity in a worse position or restrict its equal chances of electoral success. It is therefore not contrary to the principle of free political competition. “Declared” coalitions under Section 31(1) of the Act on Elections to the Parliament on the one hand, and “undeclared “coalitions on the other, are in fundamentally different positions, which from a constitutional perspective permits the legislature to treat them differently.

Monday's welcome dinner was followed by a full day of working meetings on Tuesday, which took place at the seat of the Constitutional Court in Brno. The bilateral talks were opened by the President of the host court, Josef Baxa. In his introductory speech he highlighted a number of significant parallels that connect the two courts and presented in more detail the functions and operation of the Czech judicial body responsible for the protection of constitutionality. He then gave the floor to his Spanish counterpart, who thanked the host for the invitation and warm welcome and praised the quality and importance of the mutual relations cultivated at the bilateral as well as multilateral levels. Cándido Conde-Pumpido Tourón further emphasized that both the Czech and Spanish models of constitutional review build on the legacy of Hans Kelsen, and thus the competences and positions of both courts in the legal systems of Spain and the Czech Republic are very similar. He also explained how the Spanish tribunal works and what its particular features are. The second session of discussions focused on the role of constitutional justice in the common legal order of the European Union. A speech on this topic was delivered by the President of the Spanish Constitutional Court Cándido Conde-Pumpido Tourón and by Justice of the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic Zdeněk Kühn. The third session of the meeting was dedicated to the role of constitutional courts in the electoral and parliamentary process. Justice Jan Wintr presented the topic on behalf of the Czech court, and Justice José Ramón Sáez Valcárcel spoke on behalf of its Spanish counterpart.

On Wednesday morning, the program continued with visits to two supreme courts based in Brno. At the Supreme Administrative Court, the President Karel Šimka and the Vice-President Barbara Pořízková received Spanish delegation. Their debate focused on the functioning of administrative justice in both countries and the relationship between national and EU law. The Spanish guests then moved on to the Supreme Court, where the President Petr Angyalossy welcomed them. Given that Cándido Conde-Pumpido Tourón had been a judge at the Spanish Supreme Court for many years, they had a lot to discuss.

Wednesday afternoon was devoted to a cultural program, which concluded with an informal dinner. Throughout the visit, the high quality of the relations between the two constitutional courts was repeatedly confirmed, as was the fact that the notions of democracy, the rule of law, and the protection of human rights have the same meaning and relevance in both Czech and Spanish.

Pavel Dvořák
Head of the External Relations and Protocol Department
 

© Photos: Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic, Jiřina Rittichová

The complainant is a Czech citizen. In June 2021 he married the secondary party, a citizen of both the Czech Republic and the Russian Federation. In November 2021 their daughter was born, and the complainant also adopted his wife's son. The children hold both Czech and Russian citizenship. The family lived in the Czech Republic during the pandemic; in 2022 they travelled to Dubai – according to the complainant it was a holiday, while the mother claimed it was a relocation of the family home. At the beginning of 2023 the complainant signed a document in which he stated that he had no objection to the children's residence in Dubai being registered under his wife, and authorised her to carry out the steps necessary to obtain residence visas for the children. He maintains that he agreed only to a temporary stay in Dubai, but the mother never returned to the Czech Republic with the children. The complainant claims he last saw them in Dubai in March 2023. He therefore initiated guardianship proceedings in which he sought custody of the children.

In July 2023 the complainant filed a criminal complaint against his wife on suspicion of committing the offence of child abduction and abduction of a person suffering from a mental disorder, or alternatively the offence of damaging another's rights. Neither the police nor the public prosecutor's office found a criminal offence. The complainant subsequently learned that the mother had moved with the children to Moscow, where she had initiated guardianship proceedings before a local court in May 2023. In May 2024 the complainant filed a second criminal complaint in relation to the relocation of the children to Russia without his consent, arguing that his consent to their stay in Dubai had been obtained through deceit. The public prosecutor's office, however, discontinued the complaint on the grounds that no offence had been committed and that the matter was a civil dispute: the complainant's wife holds both Czech and Russian citizenship, her family lives in Russia, she does not wish to reside in the Czech Republic, and her work involves travelling abroad for contracts. The complainant had been aware of these intentions before founding a family with her. The marriage has since broken down and divorce proceedings have been initiated. In May 2024 a Russian court in the guardianship proceedings determined that the children's residence was to be with their mother in Moscow and set arrangements for the complainant's contact with them. This decision was upheld on appeal in December 2024. The guardianship proceedings in the Czech Republic were discontinued due to lis pendens, since the Russian proceedings had begun earlier. The complainant's appeal was rejected by the Regional Court. His constitutional complaint against the Regional Court's ruling was dismissed  as inadmissible (Resolution II. ÚS 1390/25), as he had not lodged an appeal on points of law and therefore had not exhausted all available remedies. The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the appeal on points of law that was subsequently filed.

In his constitutional complaint, the complainant criticised the conduct of the public prosecutor's offices as unacceptable. He argued that they had failed to take into account the relocation of the children from Dubai to Russia without his consent and had limited themselves to referring to civil law as the means of resolving parental disputes. Nor had they addressed his claim that the mother's conduct fulfilled the elements of a criminal offence.

The Fourth Panel of the Constitutional Court (Justice Rapporteur Zdeněk Kühn) rejected the constitutional complaint.

The issue before the Constitutional Court was whether the public prosecutor's offices had violated the father's right to an effective investigation, arising from the right to respect for family life, by (allegedly) failing to adequately investigate the mother's relocation of the children to the Russian Federation. The Constitutional Court held that the constitutionally guaranteed right to an effective investigation can be successfully invoked through a constitutional complaint only in cases of truly serious interferences with the right to respect for private and family life protected under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The alleged abduction of the children by their mother does not constitute such an interference with the father's rights.

In the present case, the complainant is not entitled to the constitutionally guaranteed right to an effective investigation enforceable before the Constitutional Court. The relocation of the children described by the complainant does not reach the threshold of seriousness necessary to establish a constitutionally guaranteed positive obligation of the state to conduct an effective investigation, enforceable through a constitutional complaint. The mother's conduct does not attain the level of seriousness required by the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. This does not mean that the complainant cannot seek criminal prosecution for the minor offence of child abduction and abduction of a person suffering from a mental disorder under Section 200 of the Criminal Code, or for the minor offence of damaging another's rights under Section 181 of the Criminal Code. However, it is not for the Constitutional Court to “supervise” the legality of the procedures of bodies in charge of criminal proceedings in cases of such minor offences. While the Constitutional Court does not underestimate the harm caused to the complainant by the relocation of his children to Russia (significant obstacles to caring for them, maintaining contact, and exercising parental rights and responsibilities), nothing in the challenged procedures indicates any arbitrary or otherwise unacceptable conduct on the part of the bodies in charge of criminal proceedings.

The role of the Constitutional Court is to protect constitutionally guaranteed rights. The protection of statutory rights is provided by the public prosecutor's offices and, where appropriate, by the criminal courts. The Constitutional Court cannot usurp the constitutional authority of the prosecutor's offices to represent public prosecution in criminal proceedings. Nor is it a supreme overseer of the legality of criminal investigations, empowered to intervene at will in preliminary proceedings and substitute its own assessments for those of the competent authorities in all matters falling within criminal law.

The case as a whole appears primarily to be the result of long-term disputes between the parents regarding the family's place of residence, in this instance with an international dimension, as both public prosecutor's offices had already observed. Their conclusions are consistent with the approach that so-called parental child abductions are, first and foremost, a matter for civil law. Judicial practice likewise views parental abductions through this lens, traditionally adopting a reserved stance towards the criminal prosecution of parents.

Even in the present case, the relocation of the children must be addressed primarily through civil law instruments. Two parallel guardianship proceedings were conducted (in Russia and in the Czech Republic), and the disagreement between the parents regarding the children's residence and care was dealt with by the courts. The complainant's path before the Czech guardianship courts has not yet been entirely closed. Proceedings on the appeal on points of law in the guardianship case are still ongoing. Before the lower courts, the complainant's wife at least participated online and did not obstruct the proceedings.
 

Pavel Dvořák
Head of the External Relations and Protocol Department

© Constitutional Court of Bulgaria

The Constitutional Court has addressed the issue of additional investigative duty in its judgment. The parents of victims of the shooting at the Faculty of Arts of Charles University had unsuccessfully sought access to information from the General Inspectorate of Security Forces (GIBS) regarding possible failings by responding police officers. One of the parents lodged a constitutional complaint. The Constitutional Court clarified that the right to an effective investigation is not limited to the state's duty to apprehend an offender. It also encompasses a right to a subsequent effective investigation into whether, even indirectly, errors were made by the officers involved in the intervention. In this case, the Court concluded that the complainant's rights had been violated and ordered the Inspectorate to grant the father of a murdered student access to the file concerning the conduct of the police.

The complainant is the father of one of the victims of the gunman who attacked the Faculty of Arts of Charles University on 21 December 2023. He applied to GIBS for access to the file relating to the inquiry into the actions of the Police of the Czech Republic during the intervention in the faculty building. His request was refused on the grounds that no criminal proceedings had been opened, and that the matter was being dealt with by GIBS under its statutory remit. The police referred the complainant to the criminal proceedings conducted into the shooting, which were discontinued because the perpetrator had committed suicide.

The complainant appealed to the Municipal Public Prosecutor's Office, arguing that the procedure of GIBS was unlawful and that, in the proceeding led by GIBS, he had the standing of an injured party. This, he argued, entitled him to demand access to files, including those where no criminal proceedings had been initiated. The Municipal Prosecutor's Office informed him that it had examined the GIBS file and found no grounds to suggest a reasonable suspicion of a criminal offence by persons subject to the Inspectorate's remit. The High Public Prosecutor’s Office reached the same conclusion, confirming that GIBS had not identified any suspicion of a crime. It stated that the state's positive obligation to conduct an effective investigation had been fulfilled by the criminal proceedings led by the police, in which the complainant had exercised his rights as an injured party. It upheld GIBS's refusal to grant him access to the file, noting that inquiries conducted by GIBS under the GIBS Act are not public, and that the prosecutor is not an authority that can review the refusal of access in cases where GIBS is not investigating suspected criminal conduct.

The complainant therefore brought his case before the Constitutional Court. His constitutional complaint concerned the decisions and conduct of GIBS and the prosecution authorities in relation to the investigation of possible failings by police officers during the intervention against the gunman.

The Second Panel of the Constitutional Court (Justice Rapporteur Jiří Přibáň) upheld the constitutional complaint in part.
By refusing to grant access to the file relating to the investigation of the police intervention at the Faculty of Arts on 21 December 2023, GIBS had violated the complainant's fundamental right to an effective investigation. The Court further prohibited GIBS from continuing to violate the complainant's fundamental rights, ordering it to provide him with access to the file concerning the investigation of police conduct.

Traditionally, the right to an effective investigation is understood as the right of victims (and their families) to have the state make efforts to identify and prosecute the perpetrator. Procedurally, this entails a range of rights, including the possibility of gaining access to information from the investigation under conditions prescribed by law. This case, however, is different. The police had discontinued their investigation of the shooting because the perpetrator had died and criminal proceedings could not therefore be brought against him. The police inspectorate took the view that the right to an effective investigation did not extend to a review of the conduct of the police. The Constitutional Court – in line with the European Court of Human Rights – held that such an approach is impermissible.

According to the Constitutional Court, the complainant, as the father of a victim, has the right to an additional effective investigation. The purpose of such an investigation is to determine whether negligence or omissions by the police in planning and conducting the operation may have contributed, even indirectly, to his daughter's death. The Constitutional Court interprets the concept of “investigation” consistently with the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. This additional investigative duty does not necessarily need to take the form of criminal proceedings; in cases of negligence, civil or disciplinary proceedings may suffice. It is therefore irrelevant that in this case no investigation of individual officers took place and that no criminal proceedings were initiated against them.

Any additional effective investigation must meet certain qualitative requirements. It must be effective, independent, prompt, thorough, proper, and transparent, and it must ensure the adequate involvement of the victims' relatives. The latter condition is reflected particularly in granting access to the inspectorate's investigation file – that is, the file relating to possible failings by the officers directly involved.

Throughout, the father of the murdered student sought only transparency in the investigation – regardless of its outcome – to be achieved precisely through access to the GIBS file. This request was not fulfilled. Neither the deliberations of the Security Committee of the Chamber of Deputies nor the generally accommodating stance of GIBS resulted in the desired outcome of file access.  

By refusing him access to the file concerning the investigation of the police intervention during which his daughter was killed, the Inspectorate, in the Court's view, violated the complainant's fundamental right to an effective investigation arising from the right to life. The Constitutional Court added that the complainant's right of access to the file is not unlimited: for example, classified information protected under special legislation need not be disclosed. It is for GIBS to determine whether certain parts of the requested file fall under such exceptions and, if necessary, to take measures to protect them. Beyond that, however, the Inspectorate must provide the complainant with access to the file.
 

The Federal Supreme Court celebrated its 150th anniversary with a symposium and a ceremony held on 15 and 16 May. In addition to the highest ranking officials of the Swiss Confederation and current and former judges of the Court, the event was attended by leading representatives of the judiciary from many European countries, members of the academic community, and other legal professionals. The Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic was represented in Lausanne by its President Josef Baxa.

Pavel Dvořák
Head of External Relations and Protocol Department
 

© Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland
 

Before conducting an on-site inspection, the Office for the Protection of Competition (the Office) is obliged to properly assess complaints received from competing entities, as well as anonymous submissions that suggest a breach of competition law. It must also record in the administrative file – in a way that allows for review – indications that sufficiently justify the necessity of carrying out the inspection. This also applies to indications in the form of information known to the Office from its own official activities.

In March 2019, the Office carried out an on-site inspection at the complainants' business premises in connection with a suspected breach of competition law. The Office suspected that the complainants and the company FORTUNA GAME a.s. had formed a cartel of betting operators and committed a total of six anti-competitive infringements, allegedly taking place since at least 2013. The inspection was based primarily on a submission from SAZKA, a.s. – a competitor of the complainants – which the company later supplemented. The complainants subsequently challenged the on-site inspection by filing an action for protection against unlawful interference. They primarily argued that the inspection constituted a disproportionate interference with their constitutionally guaranteed rights. According to them, the Office did not have sufficient indications to justify the on-site inspection. The materials at the Office's disposal could not, in their view, give rise to reasonable suspicion warranting the inspection in the scope in which it was carried out. The Regional Court found that the on-site inspection as a whole constituted unlawful interference and ordered the Office to refrain from using the contents of the documents obtained during the inspection. The Office lodged a cassation complaint against this judgment. The Supreme Administrative Court upheld the cassation complaint and, by the judgment now challenged by constitutional complaint, quashed the decision of the Regional Court and returned the matter for further proceedings. The Regional Court, bound by the legal opinion expressed in the cassation judgment, issued a new ruling and dismissed the complainants' action. The complainants then filed a second cassation complaint against this new ruling, which the Supreme Administrative Court rejected. It stated that it was bound by its original legal opinion expressed in the first judgment and that the remainder of the complainants' arguments lacked merit.

The complainants filed a constitutional complaint seeking the annulment of the two judgments of the Supreme Administrative Court and one judgment of the Regional Court concerning the on-site inspection carried out by the Office. They argued that these rulings had violated their constitutionally guaranteed rights to the inviolability of the home, the confidentiality of correspondence, and judicial protection.

The Fourth Panel of the Constitutional Court (Justice Rapporteur Zdeněk Kühn) upheld the constitutional complaint and annulled the judgments of the Supreme Administrative Court of 29 November 2023 (Ref. No 7 As 199/2022-61), of the Regional Court in Brno of 31 May 2022 (Ref. No 31 A 70/2019-290), and of the Supreme Administrative Court of 26 January 2022 (Ref. No 7 As 438/2019-56).

The key issue in the case was the constitutional assessment of the on-site inspection. The case concerned the obligation of the Office to assess complaints submitted by competitors of the undertakings under investigation or anonymous submissions. The complainants denied that the Office had had sufficiently serious indications of possible anti-competitive conduct to justify the inspection. In their view, the Office was obliged to assess the complaint received from SAZKA, as well as the anonymous submission, and this assessment should have been clearly reflected in the administrative file.

The Constitutional Court agreed with the complainants that the on-site inspection, in its entirety, represented a disproportionate interference with their constitutionally guaranteed rights. The Court found that the Office did not have sufficiently serious indications of potential anti-competitive behaviour to justify conducting an on-site inspection at the complainants' premises.

The Office had only unverified complaints submitted by competitors (and supplements thereto), along with two newspaper articles, which related to just one of the five suspicions. It relied predominantly on the two aforementioned complaints, the contents of which were either not verified at all or assessed in a procedurally flawed manner, rendering the Office's actions unreviewable. The references to knowledge acquired from the Office's own official activity were wholly vague.  These submissions therefore could not serve as a sufficient basis for such a broad on-site inspection at the complainants' premises. In this respect, the Office failed to meet the requirements imposed on it by the constitutional order, and its inspection was thereby rendered unreviewable.

Justice Milan Hulmák dissented. 

The main reason for the meeting was to deepen the discussion among the highest representatives of the judiciary on the current challenges framing the contemporary legal and political culture in Central European countries. Constitutional courts must respond to new developments, such as the growing amount of disinformation in the public sphere, communication through social networks and the existence of artificial intelligence tools in the contemporary world.

The geographical, cultural, historical and legal proximity of the four above-mentioned countries provides a basis for sharing very similar values. There was therefore a spirit of consensus among the presidents. Although they emphasised the importance of continuity in case law, it is clear that the law – and the case law – must reflect changes in society and evolve alongside it. Among other things, the debate focused on constitutional review of the legislative and electoral process or on new perspectives on judicial protection of freedom of speech.

President of the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic emphasized in his speech, that in today's multitude of information and disinformation, it is extremely important that constitutional courts are not isolated islands, but communicate openly and comprehensibly with the public. According to Josef Baxa, public trust is a tool that can protect the independence of constitutional courts more effectively than even the best legal regulations. All those present agreed with him. 

At the end, Josef Baxa, Christoph Grabenwarter, and Rok Čeferin thanked host Ivan Fiačan for initiating the thought-provoking meeting and expressed their desire to continue this form of cooperation in the future.

  © Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic

This year's festival took place on the weekend of 17 an 18 May. The program at the Constitutional Court included eight guided tours. Due to the great interest from the public, the capacity was increased again this year. Two hundred and forty people visited the premises of the Constitutional Court with commentary from its employees. Among other things, the tour guides took the visitors to the courtroom where judgments of the Constitutional Court panels are pronounced, to the carriage entrance through which Queen Elizabeth II entered the building in 1996, the newly renovated Grand Council Room, dominated by the Constitution of the Czech Republic itself, and the Assembly Hall, which today serves as the venue for public oral hearings of the Constitutional Court and the pronouncements of its plenary judgments.

The building, which has housed the Constitutional Court since its foundation in 1993, was built between 1875 and 1878 as the seat of the Moravian Diet (Zemský sněm/Landtag). It was designed in the historicist Neo-Renaissance style by the renowned Viennese architects Robert Raschka and Anton Hefft. J. Schönfeld, A. Loos Sr. and J. Tomola, the prominent artists of their time, decorated the facades and interiors. It is one of the most remarkable buildings not only in the city of Brno but also in Moravia in general. It is significant for its history, its architecture and the institution that has been seated here for over thirty years. The interconnectedness of city and place, art and knowledge, past and present is rarely as fascinating as in this house.

Pavel Dvořák
Head of External Relations and Protocol Department

Photo: Jiřina Rittichová

The appellate court violated the right to a fair trial of a non-Czech-speaking father by failing to provide adequate interpretation at a crucial stage of the proceedings, despite his evident language limitations and inability to respond to the mother's claims either directly or through his legal counsel. Furthermore, the appellate court did not properly justify its decision to award custody solely to the mother.

The mother and father (the complainant, whose primary language is French) have not shared a household since July 2023. Contact between the parents and their children was based on a mutual agreement and took the form of so-called asymmetrical care, amounting to approximately 18:12 split of days per month in the mother's favour. In May 2024, the guardianship court awarded the minor children into alternating custody, with an evenly structured weekly rotation between the parents. The court concluded that the children had established full relationships with both parents, that each parent had created appropriate living conditions for the children, and that both were communicating with and properly caring for them. The minors would not need to adjust to a new regime, as alternating custody – albeit asymmetrical – had already been taking place. By the contested judgment, the appellate court overturned the first-instance decision and awarded custody to the mother, granting the father so-called extended contact in a ratio of roughly two-thirds to one-third. It concluded that the guardianship court had insufficiently assessed the essential criterion of parental communication, which, in this case, was so poorly established that the parents were unable to reach agreements regarding the children's basic needs. Additionally, the father had not paid outstanding maintenance, and a significant share of both the practical care and financial provision for the daughters rested on the mother.

In his constitutional complaint, the father sought the annulment of the above decisions. He primarily argued that the appellate court, contrary to the best interests of the children, awarded custody to the mother and, during the hearing, violated his fundamental right to an interpreter.

The First Panel of the Constitutional Court (Justice Rapporteur Jaromír Jirsa) partially granted the constitutional complaint and annulled the contested judgment. The Panel addressed two key issues: first, whether the appellate court had ensured the complainant's full and effective participation in the proceedings when it conducted the hearing without the presence of an interpreter, even though he did not have sufficient command of Czech; and second, whether the same court had provided constitutionally adequate reasoning as to why it was not in the best interests of the daughters to be placed in alternating custody between both parents.

As to the first issue, the Constitutional Court stated that the guarantees of the right to a fair trial imply that when court proceedings are conducted in the presence of a person seeking judicial protection, conditions must be ensured that allow the person to participate meaningfully. For the right to an interpreter to be practical and effective, it cannot be confined solely to the initial phase of the proceedings – such as when the court appoints an interpreter or when the party declares that they understand the language, thereby waiving the right to an interpreter. It is the judge's responsibility, where an objectively ascertainable need exists, to communicate sufficiently with the party and to ensure that their right to use a language they understand is genuinely fulfilled throughout the entire proceedings. In such cases, the judge must ensure that, where objectively necessary, the absence of a court-appointed interpreter does not prevent the party from fully engaging in the hearing – especially through their legal counsel – if such engagement is necessary for the exercise of the party's fundamental rights. Put simply: the inability of a present party to participate effectively in proceedings through their legal counsel due to language barriers may, in certain circumstances, lead to a breach of the principles of fair trial.

In the present case, the Constitutional Court found no constitutional fault with the initial procedural approach taken by the appellate court, which had to respond to an unexpected situation caused by the absence of a duly summoned interpreter. The presiding judge reacted flexibly and reached an agreement with the complainant's legal counsel that she would interpret the proceedings for the complainant with the assistance of a member of the panel who understood and spoke French. On the basis of this arrangement, the appellate court ensured the father's effective and full participation in most of the hearing. According to the Constitutional Court, however, a constitutionally problematic moment occurred later, when the appellate court engaged in direct communication with the mother. For approximately twelve minutes, she presented a series of assertions concerning, in particular, the father's ability to care for the children, the nature of contact during the summer, the parents' ability to communicate, and financial matters. At this stage of the hearing, the complainant's counsel explicitly stated that she was unable to interpret the mother's statements in real time and that, as a result, the complainant was unable to respond to them. In view of the Constitutional Court, the appellate court failed to respond in a manner consistent with constitutional requirements. Once the legal counsel had expressly informed the panel that she could no longer adequately interpret the mother's factual statements to the father, the appellate court was obliged to provide sufficient procedural space to remedy the situation. This was an objectively ascertainable indication that the complainant's fundamental right to interpretation was no longer being fulfilled in practice (in material terms).

Regarding the second issue under consideration – namely, the reasoning behind the decision to award custody of the daughters to the mother – the Constitutional Court based its assessment on the constitutional principle of the equality of parental rights and on long-established case law identifying alternating custody as the default model. While the equal involvement of both parents in the care of a child can generally also be achieved through sole custody with so-called extended contact for the other parent, guardianship courts are constitutionally obliged to consider the possibility of so-called asymmetrical alternating custody. For the parent with more limited contact, such a model may carry significant symbolic value. If a guardianship court opts for sole custody by one parent combined with extended contact for the other, it must also provide a fundamental indication as to whether, and under what specific conditions, a future transition to alternating custody would be feasible. In the present case, the appellate court did not adhere to these principles: it overturned the decision of the guardianship court and awarded custody to the mother, granting the father extended contact in a ratio of approximately two-thirds to one-third, without providing constitutionally sound reasoning for its decision.

The Constitutional Court concluded that the appellate court had violated the complainant's right to equality of arms in the proceedings, in connection with his fundamental rights to an interpreter and to have the case heard in his presence, as enshrined in Articles 37(3) and (4) and Article 38(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms. It also found a violation of his fundamental right to judicial protection in conjunction with his right to care for and raise his children, as guaranteed by Articles 36(1) and 32(4) of the Charter. The appellate court will therefore have to decide the case anew, taking into account all the constitutional principles repeatedly emphasised in the case law of the Constitutional Court.

The European Court of Human Rights currently has 46 judges, grouped into five sections. These sections are further divided into Chambers and Committees.

Kateřina Šimáčková became a judge at the Strasbourg Tribunal 13 December 2021. Before that, she served as a Justice of the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic for more than eight years. Congratulations, Madam Judge.  

Pavel Dvořák
Head of External Relations and Protocol Department

Foto: Vladimír Novotný

The Czech Constitutional Court was represented by its President, Mr. Josef Baxa. In addition to organizational issues, including discussions on the topic of the upcoming congress, the selection of invited organizations, and the deadlines for submitting national reports, the key topic of the meeting was the application of the Constitutional Court of Kosovo for CECC membership. Not all states whose constitutional courts are members of this organization recognize Kosovo as an independent state.

It is therefore positive news that a large majority of the courts present admitted the Constitutional Court of Kosovo as a member of the CECC. It became its 41st member.

Vlastimil Göttinger
Secretary General

Photo: © Constitutional Court of Albania
 

Residents of a house located near a class II road sought compensation for harm caused by an unlawful decision of the regional public health authority (RPHA) granting a noise exemption. Traffic on this road produces noise levels exceeding statutory noise limits, a fact previously confirmed by administrative courts. A constitutional complaint filed by the first complainant was successful. Unlike the general courts, the Constitutional Court concluded that there was indeed a causal link between the decision granting a noise exemption and the complainant's alleged harm.

The South Moravian Regional Public Health Authority responded to the exceedance of noise limits caused by road traffic by repeatedly granting noise exemptions permitting continued operation. The latest exemption, issued in April 2016, was annulled by the Regional Court in Brno in June 2018. The court stated that the purpose of the noise exemption as a concept was not to permanently maintain an unlawful situation – i.e., prolonged exceedance of noise limits. According to the Regional Court, the public health authority failed to fulfil its obligations concerning public health protection, breached the principle of issuing decisions in accordance with public interest, and inadequately established the facts of the case. These conclusions were subsequently upheld by the Supreme Administrative Court.

Consequently, the complainants sought compensation for harm caused by the unlawful decision of the RPHA granting the noise exemption in April 2016, proceeding under Act No 82/1998 Sb. (on state liability for damage). The harm alleged involved stress, anxiety, risk to and deterioration of health, and an overall decline in quality of life. Therefore, they demanded that the Czech Republic pay each of them CZK 500 000. The District Court for Prague 2 and subsequently the Municipal Court in Prague dismissed their claims, concluding that the complainants lacked active legal standing. However, upon the complainants' appeal, the Supreme Court annulled the decisions of the lower courts in relation to the first complainant, finding that he did indeed have active legal standing.

The District Court then reconsidered the complainant’s case; however, in the judgment now under appeal, the court again dismissed the action because it found no causal connection between the unlawful decision of the public health authority and the complainant's harm. According to the District Court, there was no dispute that the public health authority had issued an unlawful decision, yet the complainant’s harm did not arise as a consequence of that decision. The situation concerning excessive noise, the court reasoned, had not changed before the issuance of the noise exemption, during its validity, or after its annulment. The District Court agreed with the complainant that, had the unlawful decision not been issued, the public health authority would have had to take action. However, it was not possible to conclude with certainty what specific actions would actually have been taken, as the Public Health Protection Act grants the public health authority a broad range of possible responses – from imposing fines or suspending operations to granting another noise exemption. The Municipal Court agreed with the District Court's findings and dismissed the complainant's appeal in the contested judgment. The Supreme Court refused the complainant's subsequent appeal as inadmissible. The married couple thus turned to the Constitutional Court.

The First Panel of the Constitutional Court (Justice Rapporteur Jan Wintr) annulled the general courts' decisions concerning one of the spouses (the husband). The general courts violated the complainant's right to compensation for harm caused by an unlawful decision under Article 36(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms and the right to respect for private and family life, home, and correspondence under Article 8(1) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Moreover, by rejecting the appeal on points of law, the Supreme Court infringed the complainant's right to judicial protection under Article 36(1) of the Charter. The case will now be reconsidered by the district court in his case. The Constitutional Court rejected the other complainant's (the wife) complaint.

Article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms imposes a positive obligation (duty) on the state to protect the peaceful enjoyment of one's home. Excessively intense noise negatively impacts human health and persistently prevents individuals from enjoying the comfort of their homes.

Although it is up to the state to determine the system of protection for individuals from excessive noise, it must strike a fair balance between conflicting interests and ensure that measures chosen by the state are genuinely effective. One instrument used by the state to balance these competing interests is setting fixed noise limits within which produced noise levels must remain. According to the Constitutional Court, if a state authority unlawfully tolerates breaches of noise regulations and uses temporary exemptions to effectively legalise the unlawful exceedance of noise limits, it acts contrary to its positive obligations arising from the right to respect for private and family life, home, and correspondence under Article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

The complainant argued that statutory noise limits had long been exceeded at his place of residence, and that the excessive noise led to a general deterioration in quality of life, including stress, anxiety, and overall worsening of health. The Constitutional Court reiterated that three conditions must be met for state liability to arise: an unlawful decision, occurrence of harm, and a causal link between the unlawful decision and the harm.

The existence of an unlawful decision by the RPHA was undisputed in the proceedings. The general courts did not address the second condition – the occurrence of harm – as all three conditions for state liability must be fulfilled concurrently, and, in the view of the courts, the third condition – the causal link between the harm and the unlawful decision granting the noise exemption – was clearly not met.

However, unlike the general courts, the Constitutional Court concluded that there was a causal link between the harm and the unlawful decision of the public health authority. The duty of the public health authority – in this case, the RPHA – is to oversee compliance with obligations arising from the Public Health Protection Act. Had it not been for the unlawful decision of the RPHA granting the noise exemption, both the RPHA and the road authority (administrator) would have been obliged to actively address the exceedance of noise limits. The harm alleged by the complainant, consisting of excessive noise, would thus not have occurred (or would have been lessened). Even if measures taken by the RPHA had not succeeded in reducing noise below statutory limits, liability could have arisen for the operator of the noise source due to non-compliance with obligations under Section 30(1) of the Public Health Protection Act. Consequently, the unlawful decision of the RPHA extended the unlawful situation by at least two years, during which neither the RPHA nor the road authority needed to adopt the noise mitigation measures they would otherwise have been required to implement under the Public Health Protection Act, had the unlawful decision not been issued. The general courts erred in assessing causation, thereby violating the complainant's fundamental right to compensation for harm caused by an unlawful decision of a public authority.

The rule of law requires the state to assume responsibility for the actions of its authorities. It is now up to the general courts to re-evaluate the complainant's claim for compensation and to reassess whether all three conditions for state liability have been met. The ruling of the Constitutional Court does not anticipate the results of evidence-taking or subsequent legal assessments concerning the alleged harm. Nevertheless, the legal opinion expressed in the Constitutional Court's judgment is binding upon the courts.
 
 

The complainant, Milion Chvilek, z. s., submitted a constitutional complaint seeking the annulment of the Supreme Court's resolution and the judgment of the High Court in Prague. The general courts relied on previous case law that examined whether, in accordance with Section 135 (2) of the Civil Code, as effective from 1 January 2014, a legal entity could successfully seek satisfaction for non-pecuniary harm caused by unlawful interference with its reputation. Given that the legislator did not include unlawful interference with a legal entity's reputation among the expressly defined instances entitling the entity to compensation for non-pecuniary harm under Section 2894 (2) of the Civil Code, the Supreme Court concluded in this case that legal entities do not possess such a right under the “new” Civil Code.

The complainant argued that the courts' conclusion – namely, that it, as a legal entity, did not have the right to seek satisfaction for non-pecuniary harm caused solely by unlawful interference with its reputation – was unconstitutional. The First Panel of the Constitutional Court referred the case to the Plenum, which has now examined whether the applied provisions of Sections 135 and 2894(2) of the Civil Code comply with the constitutional order.

The Constitutional Court (Justice Rapporteur Jaromír Jirsa) rejected the proposal to annul Sections 135 and 2894(2) of the Civil Code (statement I). However, the Constitutional Court simultaneously held that effective protection of a legal entity's reputation, constitutionally guaranteed under Article 10 (1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, requires the analogous application of the same remedies available for protection against unfair competition under Section 2988 of the Civil Code, including the option to seek appropriate satisfaction (statement II).

Legal entities have the right to protect their reputation. Article 10 (1) of the Charter guarantees everyone the right to have their human dignity, personal honour, reputation, and name protected. Although certain rights, such as human dignity and personal honour, are inherently exclusive to natural persons, this does not imply that the protection of reputation (and name) cannot also be constitutionally guaranteed to legal entities. Legal entities are not merely artificial legal constructs for their own sake; rather, they primarily serve as instruments through which individuals can pursue their interests. Reputation plays a critical role in how legal entities participate in legal relationships and fulfil the rights of the individuals associated within them. Unlawful interference with reputation can cause legal entities both pecuniary damage and non-pecuniary harm.

Protection of constitutionally guaranteed rights must not be theoretical or illusory but practical and effective. Denying legal entities the possibility to seek appropriate satisfaction for non-pecuniary harm constitutes a statutory limitation on their fundamental right to reputation protection, as it deprives them of the opportunity to remedy non-pecuniary harm suffered. Moreover, alternative measures cannot be considered sufficiently effective remedies.

Such a limitation of access to effective protection is disproportionate. Although the legislator's restrictive approach to compensating non-pecuniary harm suffered by legal entities may aim to prevent excessive or abusive claims, this goal could also have been achieved through less restrictive measures, particularly through judicial decision-making practice (furthermore, a fixed lump-sum compensation, as applied to infringements of intellectual property rights, could have been considered).

Above all, the current legislative approach leads to inconsistent distinctions in protecting the reputation of legal entities and compensating for the non-pecuniary harm they suffer. While the set of cases allowing compensation for non-pecuniary harm is indeed the outcome of legislative policy considerations, such choices must not be arbitrary when they concern constitutional rights and limitations to their effectiveness. Inconsistent approaches weaken the systematic coherence of legal protection, potentially resulting in injustice and divergent resolutions of similar cases without reasonable justification. Furthermore, cases involving compensable non-pecuniary harm predominantly relate to legal entities' commercial relationships or interferences with protected interests of primarily pecuniary nature, which can usually be remedied through damages. This particularly disadvantages non-profit legal entities, which are more likely (sometimes exclusively) to suffer harm of a non-pecuniary nature.

According to the Constitutional Court, legislation preventing legal entities from claiming appropriate satisfaction for non-pecuniary harm caused by damage to their reputation is unconstitutional. However, the most suitable method to rectify this unconstitutional situation is not to annul the reviewed provisions or parts thereof but rather to develop the law through analogy, for which the necessary conditions are fulfilled. Thus, the same remedies applicable to unfair competition under Section 2988 of the Civil Code, including the option to claim appropriate satisfaction, must apply by analogy in protecting legal entities' reputations.

The Constitutional Court further declared that the right to protect reputation should not be misused, for instance, by initiating strategic litigation against public participation (SLAPP). The purpose of such strategic lawsuits is to restrict or penalise the exercise of freedom of expression on matters of public interest and related political rights – typically targeting journalists, trade unions, academics, civic activists, and whistleblowers. The consequence of such lawsuits can be a weakening of free public debate and civil society, which are explicitly endorsed in the preamble to the Constitution, and which form an important safeguard of democracy and the rule of law. It is primarily the responsibility of the courts, in individual cases, to differentiate legitimate exercise of rights deserving protection from harassment and abuse of rights, which do not merit protection. In specific cases, courts must carefully balance the right to reputation protection against the rights to freedom of expression and information under Article 17 of the Charter.
 

JUDr. Dita Řepková, Ph.D. was born in 1975. She graduated from the Masaryk University Faculty of Law in Brno. She successfully completed her doctoral studies at the Charles University Faculty of Law of in Prague in 2021 by defending her dissertation on the topic of protective treatment and secure detention.

From 2002 to 2008, she was an assistant to the Constitutional Court Justice Eliška Wagnerová. In 2006, she passed the judicial exam and in 2008, she was appointed a judge. She first worked at the Brno Municipal Court, then at the Regional Court in Brno from 2019. At both courts she dealt with criminal cases. She also has experience in the international legal environment. She did internships in the UK, the USA, the Netherlands and most recently in 2023 at the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. 

We wish Madam Justice the very best in her new important role and we welcome her warmly to the Constitutional Court.
 

Pavel Dvořák
Head of External Relations and Protocol Department
 

Photo: Zuzana Bönisch, KPR

Vlastimil Göttinger
Secretary General 
 

Photo: Vladimír Novotný

The Constitutional Court ruled on “Lex Babiš II,” an amendment tightening rules regarding media ownership by politicians and the receipt of subsidies by government members and their business entities. The Court annulled the amendment to the extent that it was affected by the unconstitutional rider introduced by deputy Jakub Michálek. The decisive factor was a constitutionally significant procedural error in the legislative process. This ruling is significant as it protects not only the rights of the current opposition but also those of all potential political minorities in the future.

The movant, a group of 70 members of the Chamber of Deputies represented by Alena Schillerová, challenged the process of adopting the amendment, specifically Act No 253/2023 Sb., amending Act No 424/1991 Sb., on association in political parties and movements, as amended, and other related acts. According to the movant, the original bill was intended only to amend the organisational structure and governance of the Office for the Supervision of Political Parties and Political Movements (the Office). However, an amendment proposal by deputy Jakub Michálek incorporated into the amendment a stricter prohibition on media ownership by politicians and the receipt of subsidies and investment incentives in the Conflict of Interests Act, including similar changes in two other acts. The movant argued that this amendment proposal constituted an unconstitutional rider. They also claimed that parliamentary debate was unconstitutionally curtailed, as the discussion in the third reading was closed even though there were still registered speakers left.

The Plenum of the Constitutional Court (Justice Rapporteur David Uhlíř) upheld the opposition deputies’ motion. The Constitutional Court annulled the amendment in provisions resulting from the unconstitutional rider. This derogation will revive the original legal provisions of the Conflict of Interests Act. However, the Court did not agree with the claim that the parliamentary debate in the third reading was unconstitutionally restricted.

A rider, in general terms, is an amendment that lacks a close connection to either the purpose or content of the original bill and does not achieve broad consensus in the Chamber of Deputies. For such riders, it is necessary to assess the extent to which they infringe constitutional rules and principles, which may vary between cases. The Constitutional Court then evaluates whether other, opposing constitutional values outweigh the violated rules and principles, justifying a decision not to annul the law in question. 

The specific amendment proposed by deputy Jakub Michálek (Document of the Chamber No 312/3) constituted an unconstitutional rider. The amendment lacked a close connection to either the purpose or the content (subject matter) of the original bill, and no broad consensus in favour of its adoption was achieved in the Chamber of Deputies. The substantive changes introduced by the amendment were not closely related to the content of the original bill, which concerned the reorganisation of the internal structure of the Office. While the original bill aimed to reorganise the Office and introduced one (essentially marginal) new competence to publish reports on the activities of the administrative authority, the amendment proposal neither sought to enhance the Office’s internal efficiency nor to improve public awareness of its activities. Instead, the amendment proposal aimed to establish oversight of media ownership by politically active individuals, their relatives, legal persons, and businesspersons. Of the 154 deputies present, 83 voted in favour of the amendment proposal, while 80 voted against. In the final vote on the bill as a whole, 86 deputies out of 165 present voted in favour, while 65 opposed it. Therefore, a qualified majority was not achieved.

The rider violated the requirements for transparency, clarity, and rationality in the legislative process, principles derived from the democratic rule of law [Article 1(1) of the Constitution]. It represented an abuse of the right to submit amendment proposals in order to circumvent the legislative initiative process [Article 41(2) of the Constitution]. The aim of the amendment proposal was to insert into the government’s bill provisions that should have been presented as a standalone legislative proposal, which, at the time, had indeed already been submitted to the Chamber of Deputies as a separate bill (Document of the Chamber No 110). Furthermore, it was revealed during the oral hearing before the Constitutional Court that the submitting deputy had used the amendment with the intention of surprising the opposition and limiting its ability to respond effectively. 

At the same time, the Constitutional Court did not find that any conflicting constitutional rules and principles outweighed those violated in this case. The Court specifically addressed the argument raised by deputy Jakub Michálek that the opposition had been determined to obstruct the consideration of the proposal until the end of the electoral term, leaving the issue of accumulating media and political power unresolved. According to the Constitutional Court, obstruction should not lead to the paralysis of the legislative activities of the Chamber of Deputies, as this would prevent the majority from expressing its will through free voting. If the activities of the Chamber of Deputies are already being blocked, unlimited obstruction can be constitutionally terminated at any stage of the legislative process, even if such an option is not explicitly provided for in the Rules of Procedure. Paralysing obstruction constitutes an abuse of rights by a political minority, which is not protected by constitutional law. Despite the difficulties that obstruction by a political minority may cause for the functioning of the Chamber of Deputies, the use of riders is not an appropriate means of addressing such issues. The parliamentary majority has other constitutionally compliant tools to ensure that the Chamber’s activities are not obstructed. 

The protection of legal certainty did not outweigh the reasons for annulling the amendment in the parts that resulted from the unconstitutional rider. The amendment was challenged before the Constitutional Court shortly (less than a month) after its promulgation in the Collection of Laws and International Treaties. The annulment of the contested provisions is not in conflict with the values of the material rule of law, legal certainty, or the effective protection of constitutionality. Even the government acknowledged during the oral hearing that the legislative process concerning the rider was flawed. The Constitutional Court found that this flaw was of a constitutional nature.

The Constitutional Court emphasised that the current state of the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies and their application is unsustainable in the long term. Therefore, in its ruling, it called on deputies across the political spectrum to work towards reforming the Rules of Procedure to ensure that the proceedings of the Chamber of Deputies comply with constitutional principles, namely the principle of majority decision-making through free voting and the principle of minority protection.

Public trust in laws is partially built on trust in the legislative process, which must involve open, transparent, and unambiguous procedures. A law must be the result of discourse conducted across the political spectrum. A proper legislative process is one that enables open discussion between proponents of competing views, including minority opinions. The Constitutional Court oversees adherence to the legislative process. 

Today’s decision by the Constitutional Court protects not only the rights of the current opposition but also those of all potential political minorities in the future.

The joint dissenting opinion (disagreement with the verdict and the reasoning) was filed by Justices Milan Hulmák, Veronika Křesťanová, Tomáš Langášek, Kateřina Ronovská, Jan Wintr and Daniela Zemanová.