Headnotes:
Arrangements regarding the custody of minors approaching the age of majority which go against the duly established views of the minor – in a situation where there are no specific circumstances reasonably justifying a departure from his or her position – constitute an interference with the private and family life of the child within the meaning of Article 10(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms and also violate the principle of the best interests of the child under Article 3(1) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
Summary:
I. The complainant in the present case was 14 years old. The subject-matter of the proceedings before the ordinary courts were arrangements regarding his custody and the substitution of his mother's consent to enrol him at a different school (in the place of residence of his father). Since 2009, the minor has been in custody of his mother and contact with his father has been regulated by the courts. In February 2022, the complainant decided to stay permanently with his father and, towards the end of a weekend visit, notified his mother thereof. Subsequently, he and his father visited local authority of social-legal protection of children, where the complainant was interviewed by a social worker, without the presence of his parents, about his views on the family arrangements. There the complainant expressed his wish to stay with his father and to change school in that context. On that basis the District Court issued a preliminary injunction, by which the Court placed the complainant in custody of his father and also replaced his mother's consent to enrol him at school in the father's place of residence. The request for preliminary injunction was filed by the complainant's father, but the complainant himself took action against the Court and provided the Court with his contact details. However, the District Court accepted the report of the local authority on the interview of the minor without further investigation of the complainant's position, respected the complainant's views expressed therein and granted the father's request in accordance with the complainant's wishes. The Municipal Court altered the decision and rejected the request. Neither the Municipal Court further investigated the complainant's position. Unlike the District Court, however, the Municipal Court considered that the complainant’s views did not constitute a fundamental guide to the adjustment of family arrangements by the way of preliminary injunction. The Court emphasised that the relevant circumstances and the views of the minor would be ascertained only in the proceedings on the merits. Since the complainant disagreed with the findings of the Municipal Court, he filed a complaint before the Constitutional Court.
II. The Constitutional Court considered the key aspect of the case to be the respect for the views of the complainant, who is a minor approaching the age of majority and is therefore already capable of independently formulating his own views on the courts' decisions about his life and perceiving the consequences of his views. According to the Constitutional Court, the outcome of court proceedings concerning the custody of a minor approaching the age of majority should certainly not be a message that the views of a young person on the organisation of his or her own life are of no weight to the public authorities. The Constitutional Court pointed out that the legal system also regards the complainant, given his age, as a subject of rights and obligations, not as a mere object of judicial decision-making. In a few months' time, the complainant will be able to exercise his legal capacity in employment matters (albeit with some restrictions), will be criminally liable under a special law and will be able to legally start training for a pilot's licence and to obtain a motorcycle licence.
According to the Constitutional Court, the views of a child approaching the age of majority cannot be disregarded in any proceedings before the ordinary courts concerning decisions about his or her life. This also applies to preliminary injunctions. As a general requirement it is reflected in the obligation on the ordinary courts to reliably ascertain the views of a young person. It is also reflected in the obligation of the courts to regard the wishes of a young person as an essential guide in seeking his or her best interests. Lastly, the courts are obliged to respect young person's views, in particular if he or she is able to express his/her views on his/her best interests and to perceive their consequences, if he or she has no educational difficulties and if both parents' capacity to care for him or her is essentially equivalent. The Constitutional Court found that these conditions apply to the present case.
The Constitutional Court noted that both parents had undoubtedly contributed to the escalation of the conflict in the present case. They must now prepare themselves for the fact that, in all proceedings concerning the complainant, the views of the minor, as a young person, will be sought procedurally and given due weight. Undoubtedly, the views of the complainant expressed in the proceedings before the ordinary courts may change in the future. However, approaching majority also brings with it the potential responsibility for the consequences of one's own wrong decision.
In view of the above, the Constitutional Court concluded that the proceedings before the Municipal Court infringed the best interests of the child under Article 3(1) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. In violation of the prohibition of arbitrariness, the Municipal Court’s decision was taken against the established wishes of the minor without sufficient reasons, thereby infringing the complainant's right to a fair trial under Article 36(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms and his right to be protected against unjustified interference with his private and family life within the meaning of Article 10(2) of the Charter. The Constitutional Court therefore upheld the complaint and annulled the contested decision of the Municipal Court.
III. The Justice Rapporteur in the case was David Uhlíř. None of the Justices dissented.