2007/02/15 - Pl. ÚS 77/06: Legislative Riders (346 KB, PDF)
HEADNOTES
To
stray from the restricted field reserved for proposed amendments might
be of such a nature as to overstep the actual content of the bill in
question, or of such a nature as to constitute a blatant departure from
the bill’s subject matter. The first type of proposed amendment has
long been designated in American doctrine as „legislative riders“, the
use of which in the U.S. is often and heatedly debated and which,
although considered as undesirable, is nonetheless still considered to
be a constitutionally-conforming form of proposed amendment. It is
necessary to distinguish this first type from a second type, called
„wild riders“. The second type represents a transgression of the
criteria of the test applied on the basis of the „germaneness“ rule,
that is, the rule of the close relation. In other words, it tests the
issue as to whether, in a concrete case, a proposed amendment is proper
or is a proposal which has, in the Czech milieu, been given the
designation, „limpet“. In this case, the technique of proposing
amendments attaches to a bill the legislative scheme from an entirely
different statute, with an unconnected legislative pattern.
The Assembly of Deputies did not recognize that the introduced
amendment cannot be considered as such in the substantive sense. A
constitutionally-conforming interpretation of the provisions governing
the right to introduce amendments to a debated bill requires that the
proposed amendment in actual fact merely modify the submitted legal
scheme, that is in conformity with the requirement of the „rule of close
relation“, according to which the proposed amendment must concern the
same subject as the bill which is under consideration in the legislative
process, if the given proposed amendment is not to stray from the field
reserved for proposed amendments in the form of a blatant departure
from the debated bill’s subject matter. In the Constitutional Court’s
view, this corresponds to a constitutionally conforming interpretation
of the first part of § 63 para. 1 of the Standing Orders of the Assembly
of Deputies. In the Constitutional Court’s view this requirement has
not been met in the given case, however. In consequence, the principle
of the separation of powers, among others, was violated, with
consequences for the principle of the formation of harmonious,
transparent, and predictable law, which the Constitutional Court has
already previously linked to the attributes of the democratic, law-based
state. In addition, the institute of legislative initiative under Art.
41 of the Constitution of the Czech Republic was circumvented, as was
the Government’s right, under Art. 44 of the Constitution of the Czech
Republic, to give its view on bills.
Following
consideration of the content and objective, both of the original bill
and the proposed amendment at issue, the Constitutional Court came to
the conclusion that, in terms of content and objective, they are
fundamentally different. On that ground alone it was necessary to find
that the proposed amendment at issue strays from the restricted field
reserved for proposed amendments. In other words, it is evident that it
was a „proposed amendment“ which could only be considered as such in
the formal sense not, however, in the material sense.
In a substantive law-based state, a statute in the formal sense cannot
be understood as a mere repository of a wide variety of changes made
throughout the legal order. On the contrary, the substantive conception
of the law-based state requires that a statute be, both in terms of
form and substance, a predictable, consistent source of law.
The requirement that the law be predictable, which is a component of
the principle of the law-based state, ceases to be satisfied in the
moment when an amendment to a statute is contained in an entirely
different statute, as understood in the formal sense, the content of
which is in no way connected to the amended statute. Without employing
the instruments of information technology, it is thus becoming entirely
impossible for the addressees of legal norms to orient themselves in the
legal order. At the same time, it is evident that without the
possibility to make use of these systems, people cannot today acquaint
themselves with the legal order of the Czech Republic, and this makes
problematic the application of the general legal principle, ignorance of
the law is no excuse. In this way, law becomes for its addressees
entirely unpredictable.
CZECH REPUBLIC
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
JUDGMENT
IN THE NAME OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC
On 15 February 2007, the Constitutional Court Plenum, composed of judges František Duchoň, Vojen Güttler, Pavel Holländer, Ivana Janů, Vladimír Kůrka, Dagmar Lastovecká, Jiří Mucha, Jan Musil, Jiří Nykodým, Pavel Rychetský, Miloslav Výborný, Eliška Wagnerová (judge-rapporteur) ane Michaela Židlická, on the petition of a group of Senators of the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, represented by an attorney, JUDr. K. Š., proposing the annulment of a portion of Act No. 319/2001 Coll., which became a part of its transitional provisions on the strength of Act No. 443/2006 Sb., in eventum proposing the annulment of Part Two of Act No. 443/2006 Coll., specifically its Art. II and Art. III., with the participation of the parties to the proceeding, the Assembly of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic and the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, decided as follows:
Part
Two, specifically Art. II and Art. III., of Act No. 443/2006 Coll.,
which amends Act No. 319/2001 Coll., which amends Act No. No. 21/1992
Coll., on Banks, as subsequently amended, is annulled as of the day this
Judgment is published in the Collection of Laws.
REASONING
I.
I. A) Summary of the Petition
1.
A group of 23 Senators of the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech
Republic by its petition which was duly submitted (cf. Art. 87 para. 1,
lit. a) of the Constitution of the Czech Republic and § 64 para. 1, lit.
b) of Act No. 182/1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as
subsequently amended (hereinafter „Act on the Constitutional Court“)) on
12 October 2006, sought the annulment of a portion of the transitional
provisions of the above-mentioned Act No. 319/2001 Coll., which, on the
strength of Act, No. 443/2006 Coll., became a part of Act No. 21/1992
Coll., on Banks.
2. By a
submission delivered to the Constitutional Court on 10 January 2007, the
petitioners elaborated upon the request in their petition as follows:
the petitioners propose that the Constitutional Court of the Czech
Republic annul, due to their conflict with the constitutional order of
the Czech Republic, the contested provisions cited in Art. I of their
submission, that is, that portion of Act No. 319/2001 Coll. which became
a part of its transitional provisions on the strength of Act No.
443/2006 Coll., in eventum they propose that it annul Part Two of Act
No. 443/2006 Coll., specifically Art. II and Art. III.
3.
The essence of the objections are summarized by the petitioners
themselves such that the Parliament of the Czech Republic has exceeded
its authority and that the contested provisions, due to non-genuine
retroactivity (albeit the petitioner subsequently objects rather that it
is a case of genuine retroactivity), may constitute a violation of Art.
1 para. 1 and Art. 2 paras. 1 and 3 of the Constitution of the Czech
Republic. Further, they may in consequence result in the ownership and
property rights and the right to judicial protection, that is Art. 11
and Art. 36 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Basic Freedoms
(hereinafter „the Charter“) also being violated; they may as well result
in a violation of the principle, forming one of the maxims of the
substantive law-based state (deduced by interpretation of Art. 1 and
Art. 2 of the Constitution of the Czech Republic, as well as of Arts. 1
and 4 of the Charter), that legal enactments must be of a due and proper
nature and clear; they may also violate the prohibition of arbitrary
conduct in the legislative procedure (deduced from the provisions of
Art. 1 and Art. 2 para. 3 of the Constitution of the Czech Republic and
Art. 2 para. 2 of the Charter, as well as from Art. 37 para. 2, Art. 41
and Art. 44 of the Constitution of the Czech Republic). Last but not
least, in the petitioners‘ view the contested provisions are in conflict
with Directive 94/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
on deposit-guarantee schemes, in consequence of which are violated the
international obligations of the Czech Republic arising from its
membership in the EU and thereby also Art. 1 para. 2 of the Constitution
of the Czech Republic.
4.
According to the petitioners, the contested provisions of the
above-mentioned Act and the legislature’s intent are in conflict with
the principle of the separation of powers, thus, in conflict with one of
the foundational rules of the democratic, law-based state, as the Czech
Republic is defined in Art. 1 para. 1 and in Art. 2 para. 1 of the
Constitution of the Czech Republic, where it is laid down that the
people exercise all state authority through the legislative, executive,
and judicial bodies. According to the Constitution of the Czech
Republic, the legislative power is vested in the Parliament of the Czech
Republic, whereas a statute is a normative legal act which binds an
undetermined class of subjects and regulates situations which will come
to pass in the future. The case of the contested provision was a
situation which had occurred in the past and concerned particularly
known subjects. In this context the petitioners referred to the
judgments (No. Pl. US 24/04 or No. Pl. US 55/2000), in which the
Constitutional Court declared: „Among the foundational principles of
the material law-based state belongs the maxim that legal rules be of a
general character (the requirement of the generality of statutes). The
general character of the content is an ideal, typical, and essential
characteristic of a statute (alternatively, of legal enactments in
general).“ In its decision No. Pl. 12/02, the Constitutional Court
stated, among other things, of a statute which governs a singular case:
„It departs also from one of the fundamental substantive
characteristics of the concept of a statute, which is its general
character. Let us recall that the requirement that a statute be of a
general character is an important element of the principle of the rule
of law and thereby also of the law-based state . . . . A separate
argument against statutes regulating singular cases is the principle of
the separation of powers, that is, the separation of the legislative,
executive and judicial powers in a democratic law-based state.”
According to the petitioners, in this case the Parliament of the Czech
Republic made an exception to the rule for the specific cases of the
clients of banks granted a preference, alternatively for one particular
subject - the Czech Insurance Company, a.s. (Art. III, point 4 of the
contested Act). And if the Parliament of the Czech Republic had already
made an exception to this rule in a prior instance, it did so in a
legislatively purer manner, without providing preferences to specific
individual persons, without qualifying as further examples of the
impugned unconstitutional steps, and at a time when this exception was
socially and morally justifiable (the protection of bank customers as
consumers in the period of becoming accustomed to a market setting).
5.
According to the petitioners, by adopting the contested provisions, the
Parliament of the Czech Republic also violated Art. 2 para. 3 of the
Constitution of the Czech Republic, as it exerted its power in a manner
which neither a statute nor the Constitution of the Czech Republic
provides for or permits; the Parliament of the Czech Republic acted
beyond the bounds of its authority laid down in the Second Chapter of
the Constitution of the Czech Republic.
6.
In the petitioners‘ view, the contested provisions have
unconstitutional retroactive effects and, as such, are in conflict with
the principle of the democratic law-based state, more precisely with the
principle of the protection of citizens confidence in law and with the
principle of the prohibition of genuine retroactivity, that is, with
Art. 1 of the Constitution of the Czech Republic, as the contested
provisions modify the legal consequences which came about, in accordance
with law, long before the day on which the contested provisions came
into effect. The legislature even amended transitional (intertemporal)
provisions to one of the preceding amendments to Act No. 21/1992 Coll.,
on Banks (hereinafter „the Act on Banks“), the effects of which were
meant to be exhausted by the latter amendment. If the legislature
intended to resolve the problem of the transitional provisions to Act
No. 319/2001 Coll., in the petitioners‘ view it should have done so at
the time it was adopted. Since that statute was adopted, the
legislature has carried out several further amendments to the Act on
Banks, each with its own transitional provisions, and now is intervening
retroactively into the transitional provisions several amendments
back. The relations of the depositors of Kreditní banka Plzeň, Plzeňská
banka and Union banka toward these banks, alternatively toward the
Depositor Insurance Fund (hereinafter „Fund“),came into being pursuant
to the Act on Banking in its current wording. In accordance with § 41d
of the Act on Banking, a claim to the payment of compensation comes into
being on the day that the Fund receives a written notification from the
Czech National Bank informing it of a bank’s inability to meet its
obligations toward entitled persons, or in consequence of the receipt of
an analogous written notification relating to the branch of a foreign
bank. Such notification must be sent within a relatively short
time-frame, namely within 21 days of ascertaining that the bank is not
capable of meeting its obligations. Thus, in the petitioners‘ view, the
relations arising from deposit insurance in relation to the three cited
bankrupt banks, alternatively to the Fund, demonstrably came into being
in May, 2003 at the very latest (the bankruptcy of Union banka occurred
on 29 May 2003, the bankruptcy of the two other banks was declared
earlier). The petitioners also referred to the decision of the
Constitutional Court, No. Pl. US 33/01, according to which “genuine
retroactivity has no place in a law-based state in situations where the
legislature already could have ‘had its say’, but did not do so.“ In
the petitioners‘ view, the contested provisions expand the class of
entitled persons, change the procedure, and re-open relations after they
had already been resolved by statute. The enactment allows to come
into being relations between newly-defined entitled persons and the Fund
on the same day in which similar relations arose in favor of entitled
persons under the preceding legal framework (thus, in May, 2003 at the
latest). And according to the petitioners‘, it is precisely in those
aspects in particular that it is unequivocally a case of impermissible
genuine retroactivity.
7. In
the petitioners‘ opinion, in the case of the contested provisions the
State first lays down a general rule as to how it should compensate the
customers of bankrupt banks, which balances the protection of consumers
of bank services and the liability of citizens as investors of their
funds, who have the freedom to choose gainful risk investments or to
prefer the safe, but less lucrative, deposit of monetary funds.
Afterwards, however, it dealt with these funds in conflict with the
general rules thus laid down, and to the detriment of safety funds,
which manage money turned over by private persons, in consequence of
which it preferred a certain group or a certain subject over others. In
this they see a violation of the principles of the due functioning of
the substantive law-based state, guaranteed in Art. 1 of the
Constitution of the Czech Republic, consisting in securing the
protection of legitimate confidence in the constancy of the legal order.
8.
The petitioners further emphasized that the contested provisions result
in private monies, paid by banks and taken from bank customers, which
are designated for the compensation of bank customers who contribute to
the Fund, will be made available outside of the framework of the rules
which applied at the time the banks contributed to the Fund, which
interferes with the protection of private property and legitimate
expectations under Art. 11 of the Charter and can be perceived to be
expropriation, in the broad sense of the word. If then the property of
the Fund as such will not be interpreted as the property of a holder of a
fundamental right or basic freedom, this results vicariously in the
limitation of the ownership and the property-related legitimate
expectations of commercial banks contributing to the Fund, as in view of
the consequences expected from the contested provisions, this can
result in an increase of their contribution to the Fund or in injury to
their customers.
9.
According to the petitioners, the Fund, as a creditor, is restricted and
discriminated against in its rights and in the protection of the
property it administers because, in view of the time shift, the Fund
would, in the case of a supplementary payment in accordance with the
contested provisions, be deprived of the possibility to declare itself
as a bankruptcy creditor in the bankruptcy proceedings of the affected
banks. The petitioners stated that the provisions restrict in the same
manner the Fund‘s rights to judicial protection consisting in the
possibility for it to assert, against the bankruptcy debtors, claims
which arose as a result of paying out the compensation. According to §
41h para. 2 of the Act on Banks, which still remains in effect, on the
day that payment of compensation to entitled persons began, the Fund
became the creditor of the bank in the amount of the rights of entitled
persons of the bank to the payment from the Fund. From this follows
also its statutory obligation to assert its claims within a bankruptcy
proceeding which had already (1998 or 2003) been initiated. The
retroactive legislative scheme introduced by the contested provisions
renders ineffective the assertion of this right, as the final deadline
for filing bankruptcy claims against the bank at issue had already
expired. For this reason, this results in the described situation in
the denial of justice - denegatio iustitiae, by which even the Fund’s
rights to judicial protection according to Art. 36 of the Charter are
violated.
10. The
petitioners added, as a further argument, that the contested provisions
are unconstitutional also due to their sharp conflict with EC law, which
can be established at two basic levels. In the petitioners‘ view, the
contested provisions are in conflict with the Directive 94/19/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 on
deposit-guarantee schemes, the objective of which is to ensure a
harmonized minimum level of deposit protection for all deposits in the
Community. The harmonization of the Czech legal arrangements for
deposit protection contained in the amendment to the Act on Banks, No.
319/2001 Coll., anticipates a maximum compensation in the amount of
25,000 Euros, which is higher by 5000 Euros than the amount presumed in
the Directive itself as the minimum level of insurance for all EU Member
States, where by and large the average level of deposits per citizen is
higher than in the Czech Republic. The maximum limit of compensation
in an amount up to 4 million Crowns, such as is introduced by the
contested provisions, goes entirely beyond the framework for the
protection of small depositors and thus misses the meaning of the
Directive. The petitioners further stated that Art. 249 of the Treaty
Establishing the European Community provides that directives shall be
binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to
which they are addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities
the choice of form and methods. The result of the aforementioned
directive should be the protection of small bank depositors and the
restriction of anonymous deposits in connection with the protection from
money laundering. The contested provisions modify the already
introduced harmonized legislative scheme where, by expanding the class
of entitled persons to include also the owners of bearer certificates of
deposit, bearer savings notes, and „guarantors of claims“ and their
legal successors, they make possible the payment of compensation even to
anonymous accounts, which goes directly against the sense of the
directive and is thereby in direct conflict with EC law.
11.
According to the petitioners, its conflict with Directive 94/19/EC is
not the only respect in which the contested provisions violate EC law,
and thereby also the obligations arising from Art. 1 para. 2 of the
Constitution of the Czech Republic. According to the petitioners the
contested provisions breach the existing principle that it is only
injured depositors who can be the beneficiary of compensation from the
Fund. The bill envisages the compensation of the Czech Insurance
Company, a.s., which in the past voluntarily and entirely in conformity
with its commercial plan paid out compensation to depositors of the
Kreditní banka Plzeň in the amount of 1.78 billion Czech Crowns. This
unprecedented preference of a commercial subject violates the principle
of not providing unauthorized state aid in the sense of Art. 87 para. 1
of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, by which the Czech
Republic is bound. State aid is defined as aid granted by a Member
State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts
or threatens to distort competition by favoring certain subjects.
Monies deposited in the Fund are not monies from the state budget; they
are, however, public monies, on the use of which the State decides.
Compensation in the amount of 1.78 billion Czech Crowns, which should be
paid out from the Fund of Czech Insurance Companies, is unauthorized
state aid in the sense of Art. 87 para. 1 of the Treaty Establishing the
European Community, as it cannot come under the exceptions laid out in
para. 2 of the cited Article.
12.
In connection with the above-mentioned line of argument, the
petitioners also referred to the fact that the very preference given to
the Czech Insurance Company, a.s. (as follows from Art. III, point 4 of
the contested provisions) also is not in conformity with the general
principle of equality of conditions for economic competition expressed
in Art. 3 para. 1 lit. q) of the Treaty Establishing the European
Community. The contested provisions unjustifiably give a substantial
preference to a private entrepreneurial subject – the Czech Insurance
Company, a.s. and its private owners.
13.
The petitioners also stated that the contested provisions in many
places are lacking in sense, preventing any sort of interpretation, or
allowing for several possible interpretations. Of fundamental
importance is, for ex., the fact that the contested provisions are not
comprehensible as regards the question of the running of time periods
(it is not clear when such periods begin and end), or that the contested
provisions contain concepts not extant in law („the guarantor of a
claim“ cannot exist, as one can only guarantee obligations). In the
petitioners view, it is very problematic in terms of the
comprehensibility of the text that the contested provisions are an
amendment to the transitional provisions of an act which was adopted
five years previously, whereas those transitional provisions were
exhausted with the respective amendment, and since that time the Act on
Banks has already been amended several times, where individual
amendments each had their own transitional provisions. The amendment to
the transitional provisions repeatedly changes the regime for banks
which already five years previously come within the terms of certain
exceptions from the regime of the Act and, pursuant to the contested
provisions, now come within the terms of a new exception. It is in this
respect that the petitioners see conflict with a characteristic
attribute of the substantive law-based state, not explicitly mentioned
in the Constitution of the Czech Republic nonetheless deduced from
interpretation of Art. 1 and Art. 2 of the Constitution of the Czech
Republic, as well as Art. 1 and Art. 4 of the Charter, which is the
principle of legal certainty, where everybody may have trust in the law
and its transparency and comprehensibility, and thereby also with the
principle of the regularity and clarity of the laws.
14.
The petitioners drew attention to the fact that the rule laid down both
in the Constitution of the Czech Republic (Art. 2 para. 3) and in the
Charter (Art. 2 para. 2), whereby the State (a state body) is limited by
the rules which it itself lays down, is quite fundamental to the
law-based state. It then follows from this rule that, in adopting
statutes, the legislature is obliged to observe certain legislative
rules; and in this vein the petitioners referred to the decision of the
Constitutional Court (No. Pl. US 23/04), according to which: „The
manner in which a statute was passed and promulgated is subject to the
review of the Constitutional Court solely within the confines set out in
the constitutional order (in particular Art. 1, Art. 39 paras. 1 and 2,
Art. 41, Arts. 44 to 48, Arts. 50 to 52 of the Constitution of the
Czech Republic). It is, therefore, the approved text of a statute which
is the object of the Constitutional Court's review; the records from
the chambers‘ discussions serve as the main evidence in evaluating one
component of the tripartite evaluation, i.e. observance of the
constitutionally prescribed manner of adopting a statute.“ In the
legislative procedure, the legislature is thus bound by the Constitution
of the Czech Republic, as well as statutes (for ex., the Standing
Orders of the Assembly of Deputies). If in the course of the
legislative procedure the legislature violates the rules which are
prescribed for it by statute, then, according to the petitioners, that
also qualifies, in consequence thereof, as a violation of Art. 2 para. 3
of the Constitution of the Czech Republic and Art. 2 para. 2 of the
Charter. According to the statute, proposed amendments are limited to
points under debate at the session, whereas the proposed amendment of
Deputy Doktor, on the basis of which the contested provision became a
part of the Act on Banks, had not been placed on the program of that
session of the Assembly of Deputies, whereby the procedure laid down in
Act No. 90/1995 Coll., on the Standing Orders of the Assembly of
Deputies, was violated. According to the petitioners, it is in conflict
with the prescribed procedure, that is, the constitutional rules for
the legislative procedure, to vote on an act in the framework of a point
of the session of the Assembly of Deputies which is devoted to another
act and where it is not indicated in the program that the former act
should be dealt with. In the petitioners‘ view, the substantive and
procedural errors of the legislature in the case of the contested
provisions are so numerous and grave that, taken together in the
aggregate, they can lead to a finding of conflict with the
constitutional order, in particular with the principle of regularity and
clarity of the laws, making up one of the principles of the substantive
law-based state, as well as with the prohibition of the arbitrary
conduct of the legislative procedure.
I. B) The Statements of Views of Parties to the Proceeding
15.
Pursuant to §§ 42 para. 4 and 69 of the Act on the Constitutional
Court, the Constitutional Court sent the petition proposing the
annulment of the contested provisions to the Assembly of Deputies and
the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic.
16.
In its 7 November 2006 statement, the Assembly of Deputies of the
Parliament of the Czech Republic, represented by its Chairman Ing.
Miloslav Vlček, stated that the mentioned bill, No. 443/2006 Coll.,
which also amends Act No. 319/2001 Coll., was submitted by a group of
Deputies. The Assembly of Deputies debated the bill in its 4th
Electoral Term, originally as Assembly Print No. 965. After it was not
approved on its 3rd reading on 21 December 2005, on 19 April 2006 the
bill at issue was proposed to the full Assembly of Deputies, into
Assembly Print No. 1222, on its 2nd reading. The Assembly of Deputies
voted on Assembly Print No. 1222 as a whole in its 3rd reading on 23 May
2006, and by a vote of 156 for the bill (of the 176 Deputies present),
it adopted the bill. On 21 June 2006 the Senate indicated that it did
not intend to deal with the bill. The Chairman of the Assembly of
Deputies signed the bill on 21 August 2006, and the President of the
Republic let expire the 15 day deadline which the Constitution of the
Czech Republic affords him, without returning the Act to the Assembly of
Deputies or signing it. On 8 September 2006, the Prime Minister of the
Czech Republic signed the bill, and it was duly promulgated in the
Collection of Laws.
17. In
the view of those Deputies who submitted the bill, as stated in the
Explanatory Report, the bill ensures a partial equalization of the
rights of those customers of banks in bankruptcy assisted only to the
extent called for in the statute, whereas in other cases persons were
assisted to a greater degree, and thus to mitigate the basic inequality
which arose in consequence of the unsystematic steps taken in the past
when paying out compensation. The requirement of equal treatment of the
customers of all banks in bankruptcy, just as the requirement of equal
adequate compensation of all customers, must be considered as entirely
legitimate. Act No. 319/2001 Coll. introduced a dual system of
compensation, which discriminates against a portion of the customers in
the banking sector. From the perspective of legal certainty, the
foreseeability of law, and the democratic principles of the equality of
citizens of the Czech Republic, such a state of affairs is entirely
undesirable. In the view of those Deputies who submitted the bill, the
principle of the protection of the deposits of bank customers in the
form of contributions by banks into the Depositor Insurance Fund
(hereinafter „Fund“) is founded on the joint liability of all persons on
the banking market. With the bill, these Deputies were thus pursuing a
subsequent curing of the original harshness and non-functionality of
the system for the compensation implemented in relation only to certain
customers of banks presently in bankruptcy, instead of in relation to
all customers of banks presently in bankruptcy, and in the same way the
compensation of persons who played a part, in the Fund’s stead, in
resolving the past crisis situation. In the view of those Deputies who
submitted the bill, it is necessary to preserve and uphold the principle
of joint responsibility of all persons on the banking market in the
Czech Republic and the connected and logically tied in compensation of
participating persons other than banks, participating in place of the
Fund in the resolution of the overall situation. As the conclusion of
its statement, the Assembly of Deputies stated that, in debating and
adopting the bill, the legislative body did so in the conviction that
the adopted bill was in conformity with the constitutional order of the
Czech Republic. It is up to the Constitutional Court to adjudge the
constitutionality of the provisions contested in the petition and to
issue the relevant decision.
18.
In its 7 November 2006 statement, the Senate of the Parliament of the
Czech Republic, represented by its Chairman, MUDr. Přemysl Sobotka,
first described the procedure by which the Senate assessed Act No.
443/2006 Coll. On 25 May 2006 the Assembly of Deputies sent Act No.
443/2006 Coll. to the Senate as a bill, and the Senate’s Organizational
Committee designated it, as Senate Print No. 362 (5th Electoral Term),
for consideration by the Committee for Economics, Agriculture, and
Transportation. On 15 June 2006, this Committee considered Senate Print
No. 362, but it adopted no resolution on the bill. The full Senate
considered the bill contained in Senate Print No. 362 at its 12th
Session on 21 June 2006. Following the Rapporteur’s Report, which
merely incorporated the record of the hearing of the Committee for
Economics, Agriculture, and Transportation asserting that the Committee
had not reached a majority view, it was proposed that the Senate declare
its intention not to deal with the bill. Before the vote on this
proposal, the Chairwoman of the Club of Open Democracy, Senator S.
Paukrtová, spoke and, in view of the dissenting position on the bill of
the Government of the Czech Republic, of the Ministry of Finance
especially, and of the Czech National Bank, called upon the full Senate
to schedule the bill for full debate. Then the Vice-Chairman of the
Senate, Senator P. Pithart, spoke and also requested that the bill be
scheduled for full debate on the grounds that it is „a norm that is, in
its way, retroactive, unjust, and discriminatory against bank houses“.
Nonetheless, in the vote on the bill, of the 69 Senators present 39
Senators voted for (and 18 against) a Senate resolution „not to deal
with the bill“.
19. The
Senate further stated of the group of Senators‘ petition that one cannot
but refer to the fact that the relief requested in the petition
proposing the annulment of the transitional provisions is to a certain
extent imprecise and incomplete. Act No. 319/2001 Coll. is not an act
„on banks“, as is stated in the petition, rather its title reads „an act
which amends Act No. 21/1992 Coll., on Banks, as subsequently amended“;
this fact is in no way changed by the erroneous heading to Part Two of
Act No. 443/2006 Coll. (formally speaking, an act going by the title
„No. 319/2001, on Banks“ does not exist), as the introductory sentences
to Art. II of Act No. 443/2006 Coll. leaves no doubt as to which act was
amended. It is evident that the amending provisions of Art. II of Act
No. 443/2006 Coll. were incorporated into Art. II of Act No. 319/2001
Coll., however, the following Art. III remains as merely a part of Act
No. 443/2006 Coll., and it was not incorporated into some other act; the
amendment of No. 319/2001 Coll. was restricted solely to Art. II of Act
No. 443/2006 Coll. It is necessary to emphasize that, even following
further amendments, Art. III of Act No. 319/2001 Coll. continues to
contain only provisions on its entry into effect; in no case, however,
are the provisions of Art. III of Act No. 443/2006 Coll., separate
provisions of the last-named act, incorporated into Act No. 319/2001
Coll. The Senate has persisted in this view, even in its 19 January
2007 written statement reacting to the 9 January 2007 submission in
which the petitioners stated more specifically the relief requested in
their petition.
20. The
Senate further asserted that it can be conceded that the obligation
adopted by the legislature to compensate customers of certain banks in
the scope stated in Part Two of Act No. 443/2006 Coll., to a certain
extent interferes with the private property, and violates the legitimate
expectations, of interested persons (meaning the banks, or the Deposit
Insurance Fund), as, on the basis of these provisions, private funds,
paid by banks and taken from the customers of those banks, will be paid
out beyond the extent of their previous obligations, all the more so, in
that, in many cases this intervenes into already completed judicial
proceedings, or proceedings already in progress, without it being
possible, due to the passing of deadlines, for new facts to be taken
into account. A broader scope of performance from the Fund could with
great probability, in view of the level of payment into the Fund,
represent increased claims on other banks, in the case that other banks
file for bankruptcy; nonetheless, one cannot disregard the fact that
compensation beyond the bounds of the general legal framework in the Act
on Banks already occurred on the basis of Point 5 of Art. II of Act No.
16/1998 Coll., even if only to a minor extent (and that both in terms
of the persons affected and of the object). In the case of compensation
of savings, this is not by any means an extraordinary manner of
compensating beyond the bounds of the general legal framework: for ex.,
in the sector of deposit insurance concerning cooperative credit banks,
at the time the cooperative credit banks went bankrupt and in contrast
to the then valid legal situation, the compensation was increased on the
strength of Point 1 of Art. II of Act. No. 212/2002 Coll., and to cover
the needs of the Safety Fund for Cooperatives, established on the basis
of Act No. 215/2002 Coll., the State even issued bonds, as there was
not enough money in the Safety Fund to pay the full compensation
provided for by statute.
21.
Beyond the framework of the petitioners‘ arguments, that the contested
provisions suffer from serious legal defects which could make more
difficult or even „make impossible any sort of interpretation“ or allow
for various interpretations, the Senate stated that it is not at all
clear in what terms or relation is the new legal arrangement introduced
in Art. II of Act No. 319/2001 Coll., as amended by points 1 and 2 of
Art. II of Act No. 443/2006 Coll. and the legal arrangement contained in
Art. III of Act No. 443/2006 Coll. Thus, a state of affairs came about
in which two procedures are prescribed for the customers of the same
bank, which are in their very essence separate and partially overlapping
procedures, whereas it is laid down in both legal arrangements that
„neither the depositors of the banks, nor any other persons in
connection with the disbursement of supplementary compensation pursuant
to this transitional provision of the Act, are entitled to any claim
other than those which follow from this transitional provision of the
Act“; in addition, in relation to the customers of Kreditní banka Plzeň
a.s., Plzeňská banka, a.s. a Union banka a.s. (all of which are in
bankruptcy proceedings), this procedure has been valid and in effect
from the same day, that is, from 18 September 2006.
22.
As far as concerns the petitioners‘ objections to the procedure,
specifically to the violation of the prohibition of arbitrariness in the
legislative procedure, the Senate asserted that proposed amendments
submitted in the second reading (and adopted in the third reading), by
which an entirely unrelated amendment is incorporated into the act under
consideration, have been a quite common phenomenon, especially in the
most recent electoral term of the Assembly of Deputies. It is a
phenomenon which does not contribute to the good arrangement of the
legal order or to the legal certainty of the addressees of these
amendments; nonetheless, in strictly formal terms, it is evident that,
in the sense of the Constitution of the Czech Republic, Deputies are not
in any way restricted in attaching proposed amendments.
23.
The Senate further stated that in assessing the petition it is
necessary to take into account additional very serious aspects
consisting, in particular, in the character of the contested provisions,
as not only have new legitimate expectations (to the compensation of
customers of other bankrupt banks beyond the framework of the general
legal arrangements adopted in the past) without doubt arisen on the
basis thereof, but in many cases even new rights came into being after
the Act came into effect. It is up to the Constitutional Court to
adjudge whether the petitioners‘ objections against the contested
provisions are so consequential that it would be appropriate to annul
these provisions, and thereby allow already acquired rights to be lost,
which appears quite problematic especially in the case of those small
depositors of bankrupt banks who are not transferees.
I. C) Statements of amici curie
24.
On 2 November 2006, the Constitutional Court requested the position of
the Czech National Bank and the Czech Bank Association on the issue of
the economic consequences of launching a supplemental compensation for
bank deposits from the Depositor Insurance Fund (hereinafter „Fund“) on
the basis of amendments adopted to the Act on Banks, both in general
terms and in terms of the payment capacity and functioning of the Fund;
it further requested a statement on the issue of whether the adopted
legislative arrangements for supplemental compensation are in conformity
with EC law, when the area of deposit insurance is regulated by
Directive of the European Parliament and Council No 94/19/ES.
25.
In its 20 November 2006 position, the Czech National Bank, represented
by its Governor, Ing. Zdeněk Tůma, stated, in relation to the issue of
economic consequences, that as of 30 September 2006 the financial
reserves of the Deposit Insurance Fund (hereinafter „Fund“) amounted to
approximately 6.3 billion Czech Crowns. The supplementary compensation
of deposits will amount to approximately 3.84 billion Czech Crowns (the
amount will be specified only after each bank submits its documents
demonstrating the right to the payment of compensation). The Fund’s
reserves will thus be lowered to approximately 2.46 billion Czech
Crowns. The effectuation of the supplementary compensation payments
will not have immediate direct impact on the levy upon banks of
contributions to the Fund; nevertheless, in the case that another
insured event were to occur, it very realistically could eventuate in a
situation where the Fund did not have sufficient financial means,
precisely due to the currently statutorily-enshrined payment of
supplemental compensation. In consequence thereof, the amount which
banks would have to pay pursuant to § 41k of the Act on Banks would
double. The payment of above-standard compensation naturally
significantly puts off the moment when the Fund performs at such a level
as to allow to be enacted into law a drop in the rate of contributions
to the Fund, or to entirely end the levy of contributions. It must be
added thereto that the current rate of contributions represents for
domestic banks a significant competitive disadvantage. The rate is
relatively high, especially due to the repeated amendments to the Act on
Banks supplementary above-standard compensation.
26.
According to the position of the Czech National Bank, the amendment to
the Act on Banks, leading to the above-standard compensation, markedly
worsens the Fund’s position as a potential debtor. In § 41i of the Act
on banks is laid down the following provisions: „In the case that the
Fund’s assets do not suffice to pay the statutorily prescribed
compensations, the Fund shall procure the necessary monetary means on
the market. The Fund is obliged to see to it that the monetary means
are provided to it on the conditions most advantageous to it.“ It is
evident that prospective creditors will not be prepared to lend at a low
rate of interest to a debtor whose future financial situation is
unforeseeable in consequence of a genuine danger of Assembly action
leading to repeated exhaustion of its assets. As a potential debtor,
the Fund thus becomes unreadable for investors, and it may not, in
consequence, be accepted as a debtor on the market, alternatively it
will be accepted only in the position of a risk debtor, that is, at a
rate of interest which is markedly increased over that which would be
possible to obtain under normal circumstances. In this connection, it
is necessary to refer to the fact that, after the integration of
oversight over the financial market, the system for the insurance of
claims from deposits, as laid down in the Act on Banks, applies as well
to savings banks and savings and loan associations. It is thus only a
matter of time before demands are heard in the Assembly of Deputies for
four-million compensation for members of savings banks and savings and
loan associations which had previously gone bankrupt.
27.
On the issue of whether the adopted rules on supplementary compensation
are in conformity with EC law (Directive No 94/19/EC), the Czech
National Bank stated in its position that it sees such nonconformity in
particular in the following:
a) Conflict with Article 11 of the above-mentioned Directive, which provides:
„Without prejudice to any other rights which they may have under national law, schemes which make payments under guarantee shall have the right of subrogation to the rights of depositors in liquidation proceedings for an amount equal to their payments.“ In consequence of the Act‘s retroactive operation, from the Fund’s perspective, all deadlines for making claims in bankruptcy proceedings will be missed. This will result in a violation of Article 11 with negative consequences for the management of the Fund.
b) Conflict with the spirit of the Directive expressed in its Preamble:
„Whereas, on the one hand, the minimum guarantee level prescribed in this Directive should not leave too great a proportion of deposits without protection in the interest both of consumer protection and of the stability of the financial system; whereas, on the other hand, it would not be appropriate to impose throughout the Community a level of protection which might in certain cases have the effect of encouraging the unsound management of credit institutions; whereas the cost of funding schemes should be taken into account; whereas it would appear reasonable to set the harmonized minimum guarantee level at ECU 20 000; whereas limited transitional arrangements might be necessary to enable schemes to comply with that figure . . .“ In the Czech National Bank‘s view, the contested part of Act No. 443/2006 Coll. is in conflict with the sense of the Directive, since its declared objective is not solely the protection of small depositors and the strengthening of the stability of the banking system, but also the fight against „moral hazard“ and imprudent conduct by banks.
c) Conflict with Article 9, which provides in its para. 1:
„Member States shall ensure that credit institutions make available to actual and intending depositors the information necessary for the identification of the deposit-guarantee scheme of which the institution and its branches are members within the Community or any alternative arrangement provided for in Article 3 (1), second subparagraph, or Article 3 (4). The depositors shall be informed of the provisions of the deposit-guarantee scheme or any alternative arrangement applicable, including the amount and scope of the cover offered by the guarantee scheme.“ As follows from the given wording, each depositor must receive information prior to making a deposit, and it must be entirely clear to them in advance what are the conditions of insurance. In consequence of a series of retroactive amendments to the Act on Banks, depositors in the Czech Republic have for a long time not received true information on the functioning of the system of deposit insurance and their prospective investment decision can be made under the influence of information which subsequently proves to be untrue, distorted.
d) Beyond the scope of the query, the Czech National Bank called attention also to the contested provision’s possible conflict with Article 87 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, which reads as follows:
„Save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the common market.“ In the Czech National Bank’s view, the contested provisions concern aid provided to the Czech Insurance Company by the State, although from the Fund’s money. Compensation paid out in this manner has no foundation from the economic perspective, as the previously rendered performance of that insurance company for depositors was in harmony with its entrepreneurial plan of the time (the elimination of reputational risk), follows from its position in the financial group, and was voluntary.
a) Conflict with Article 11 of the above-mentioned Directive, which provides:
„Without prejudice to any other rights which they may have under national law, schemes which make payments under guarantee shall have the right of subrogation to the rights of depositors in liquidation proceedings for an amount equal to their payments.“ In consequence of the Act‘s retroactive operation, from the Fund’s perspective, all deadlines for making claims in bankruptcy proceedings will be missed. This will result in a violation of Article 11 with negative consequences for the management of the Fund.
b) Conflict with the spirit of the Directive expressed in its Preamble:
„Whereas, on the one hand, the minimum guarantee level prescribed in this Directive should not leave too great a proportion of deposits without protection in the interest both of consumer protection and of the stability of the financial system; whereas, on the other hand, it would not be appropriate to impose throughout the Community a level of protection which might in certain cases have the effect of encouraging the unsound management of credit institutions; whereas the cost of funding schemes should be taken into account; whereas it would appear reasonable to set the harmonized minimum guarantee level at ECU 20 000; whereas limited transitional arrangements might be necessary to enable schemes to comply with that figure . . .“ In the Czech National Bank‘s view, the contested part of Act No. 443/2006 Coll. is in conflict with the sense of the Directive, since its declared objective is not solely the protection of small depositors and the strengthening of the stability of the banking system, but also the fight against „moral hazard“ and imprudent conduct by banks.
c) Conflict with Article 9, which provides in its para. 1:
„Member States shall ensure that credit institutions make available to actual and intending depositors the information necessary for the identification of the deposit-guarantee scheme of which the institution and its branches are members within the Community or any alternative arrangement provided for in Article 3 (1), second subparagraph, or Article 3 (4). The depositors shall be informed of the provisions of the deposit-guarantee scheme or any alternative arrangement applicable, including the amount and scope of the cover offered by the guarantee scheme.“ As follows from the given wording, each depositor must receive information prior to making a deposit, and it must be entirely clear to them in advance what are the conditions of insurance. In consequence of a series of retroactive amendments to the Act on Banks, depositors in the Czech Republic have for a long time not received true information on the functioning of the system of deposit insurance and their prospective investment decision can be made under the influence of information which subsequently proves to be untrue, distorted.
d) Beyond the scope of the query, the Czech National Bank called attention also to the contested provision’s possible conflict with Article 87 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, which reads as follows:
„Save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the common market.“ In the Czech National Bank’s view, the contested provisions concern aid provided to the Czech Insurance Company by the State, although from the Fund’s money. Compensation paid out in this manner has no foundation from the economic perspective, as the previously rendered performance of that insurance company for depositors was in harmony with its entrepreneurial plan of the time (the elimination of reputational risk), follows from its position in the financial group, and was voluntary.
28.
On 21 November 2006, the Constitutional Court received the Czech
Banking Association’s statement of position. In its position, the Czech
Banking Association, represented by its Executive Director, Ing. P. Š.,
stated that it supports the view of the group of Senators as formulated
in their submission, as it is of the same view that the provisions of
the contested act are in conflict with the constitutional order of the
Czech Republic, and further in conflict with the rules for deposit
insurance as set down in EC law. Due to its retroactive establishment
of unauthorized public aid, the Act represents a serious violation of
the Treaty Establishing the EC. In its statement of position, it
further described in detail the evolution, from 1994 until the present,
of the insurance of claims from deposits and the higher-than-standard
compensation. In its statement it also drew attention to the relevant
Community law, and the content thereof.
29.
On 12 February 2007, the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic
received an unrequested statement from the Civic Association of the
Customers of Union banka (hereinafter „UB“). It is said in this
statement that, in the case that Act No. 443/2006 Coll. is annulled, it
will result „in an entirely unprecedented violation of fundamental
constitutional rights of members of the Civic Association of the
Customers of UB, who consider themselves to be directly affected by the
petition“. The statement further described the origin of private banks
in the Czech Republic in the era of the formation of the private banking
sector, that is, the era of the transformation of the banking
industry. It stated that first-rate banking oversight did not function
and no first-rate guarantee existed on the creation and maintenance of
equal competitive conditions for the state-held banks, on the one hand,
and for the newly emerging private banks, on the other. On this ground
alone, the position of private banks, as well as the orientation of
depositors on the market for banking services, was very difficult. This
situation, together with the repeated management crises lead to the
situation that private banks got into economic difficulties, in
consequence of which a large number of depositors subsequently lost
their savings. It was a matter of the State’s poor banking and monetary
policy, as well as the State‘s insufficient and inconsistent regulatory
policy in the banking industry; evidently, these were the reasons it
was subsequently decided that the State would provide compensation, up
to 4 million Czech Crowns per depositor, to the depositors of devalued
deposits. First of all, the Czech National Bank and the Ministry of
Finance of the Czech Republic provided compensation, later compensation
was provided to customers of bankrupt banks on the basis of various
statutory schemes. In view of what has been stated, the expectations of
the depositors of Kreditní banka Plzeň, Plzeňská banka and Union banka,
namely that their deposits will be refunded under the same conditions
and in the same amount as applied for previously compensated depositors,
can also be considerable as well-founded. The contested Act thus
eliminates actual discrimination of the depositors of Kreditní banka
Plzeň, Plzeňská banka and Union banka as compared to the depositors of,
for ex., Pragobanka, Universal banka, Moravia banka and others, and is
thus in conformity with the requirement of equality in rights, which
flows from the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Basic Freedoms. In its
statement, the Civic Association of the Customers of UB rejected out of
hand the arguments put forward by the Senators seeking the annulment of
the contested act, which it further reasoned. As its conclusion it
proposed that the group of Senators‘ petition be rejected on the merits.
30.
On 13 February 2007, the Constitutional Court received a submission
from the customers of Union banka, a.s., designated as a statement on
the petition proposing the annulment of a portion of Act No. 319/2001
Coll., as amended by Act No. 443/2006 Coll. I. L. empowered an
attorney, JUDr. P. D., LL.M., Ph.D, to submit the statement, which was
confirmed by the presentation of his power-of-attorney. According to
the constant jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court of the Czech
Republic (for ex. Pl. US 52/03), the group of persons who may be parties
to a proceeding on the annulment of statutes or other legal enactments
is set by statute and this enumeration cannot by expanded by decision of
the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic. The purpose of a
proceeding on the annulment of statutes or other legal enactments is the
protection of the principles and public goods found in the
constitutional order, from which follows that the Constitutional Court
can accept in this type of proceeding the statement of „friends of the
Court“, that is, statements from such persons who are not pursuing
solely their own private interests, rather are able, alone from their
very nature, to take into account the public interest in the form of the
mentioned principles and public goods. Whereas it was possible to find
the indicated characteristics in the case of the Civic Association of
the Customers of UB, which is an association pursuing certain interests,
the same cannot be said of a private person who considers himself to be
directly affected by the Senators‘ petition, and has the status, in
relation to the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic, of a person
asserting merely his private interests. Proceedings on the annulment of
statutes or other legal enactments do not, however, serve this purpose;
therefore, the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic could not
accept the submission of I. L. as a statement of a „friend of the
Court“.
I. D) Evidentiary Material obtained by the Constitutional Court from Public Sources
31.
As one of the bases for its decision, the Constitutional Court also
obtained the stenographic records from the debates of the Assembly of
Deputies, the Senate, and their committees, further their resolutions
and assembly prints, freely accessible in the digital library on the web
pages of the Assembly of Deputies and the Senate of the Parliament of
the Czech Republic at www.psp.cz and www.senat.cz., and also the
transcripts from the 11th, 12th and 13th sessions of the Senate’s
Permanent Commission for the Constitution of the Czech Republic and
Parliamentary procedure accessible at www.senat.cz.
I. E) The Oral Hearing before the Constitutional Court
32.
In their concluding statements given at the oral hearing before the
Constitutional Court, which was held on 15 February 2007, the parties to
the proceedings merely restated and summarized their positions, which
corresponded to the content of the written submissions delivered to the
Constitutional Court.
II. Description of the Legislative Procedure for the Adoption of the Contested Provisions of the Act
33.
From the statements of both chambers of the Parliament of the Czech
Republic, attached appendices, and documents accessible by electronic
means, the Constitutional Court ascertained that the original bill was
submitted to the Assembly of Deputies on 22 December 2005 by a group of
Deputies (Assembly Print No. 1222/0 – Amendment to the Act on the
Annulment of the Fund of National Property), and they proposed that the
bill be debated so as to allow the Assembly to express its approval of
it already on the first reading. On 22 December 2005 the bill was
submitted to the Government of the Czech Republic for it to express is
position on it. On 20 January 2006, it sent to the Deputies its
position along with comments on the bill (Assembly Print No. 1222/1).
On 25 January 2006 the Organizational Committee recommended debate on
the bill, designated a rapporteur, and proposed assigning it to the
Budget Committee for debate. The 1st reading took place on 16 March
2006 at the 54th Session, at which the bill was discussed in general
debate. The Assembly did not agree to the bill being debated so as to
allow the Assembly to express its approval of it already on the first
reading and assigned the bill to the Budget Committee for debate
(Resolution No. 2321). The Budget Committee debated the bill and on 10
April 2006 issued a resolution, delivered to the Deputies as Print No.
1222/2, in which it recommended that the bill be approved. In the 2nd
reading on 19 April 2006 at the 55th Session, the original bill first
went through general debate, after which there was detailed debate,
during which was submitted the contested proposed amendment, which was
contained in Print No. 1222/3. This proposed amendment was distributed
to the Deputies on 21 April 2006. The 3rd reading took place on 23 May
2006 at the 56th Session, where the vote on the contested proposed
amendment was conducted as serial number 16. 142 of the 167 Deputies
present voted in favor of it, with three against. Thereafter the bill
passed (Resolution No. 2470) when the Assembly of Deputies expressed its
approval of it, 156 of the 172 Deputies present voting in favor of it,
and three against.
34. On 25
May 2006, the Assembly of Deputies transmitted the bill to the Senate
as Print No. 362/0. The Organizational Committee assigned the Committee
for Economics, Agriculture, and Transportation as the guarantee
committee, and it debated the bill on 15 June 2006 and adopted
Resolution No. 7, which was distributed as Print No. 362/1. The
petition was debated on 21 June 2006 at the 12th Session of the Senate,
at which was adopted a resolution not to deal with the bill (Resolution
No. 499), where 39 of the 63 Senators present voted for the resolution
and 18 were against, with 6 abstaining.
35.
On 21 August 2006 the Act was delivered to the President of the
Republic for his signature. The President did not sign the Act by the
prescribed deadline, nor did he return it to the Assembly of Deputies.
On 11 September 2006, the adopted Act was then delivered to the Prime
Minister for his signature. The Act was promulgated on 18 September
2006 in the Collection of Laws, in Part 144, as No. 443/2006 Coll. and
it entered into effect on the day of its promulgation.
III. The Considerations Applicable for the Adjudication of the Petition
III. A) The Principle of the Law-Based State and the Democratic Legislative Process
36.
In its decision No. Pl. US 21/01, the Constitutional Court stated: „the
situation where several statutes bearing absolutely no direct
substantive relation to each other are amended by a single act, must be
designated as an undesirable phenomena, and one not corresponding to the
purpose and principles of the legislative process. Such a situation
comes about, for example, due to the speeding up of the legislative
process, in part in the form of submitted proposed amendments. (As the
most blatant such example can clearly be given the adoption of Act No.
170/2001 Coll., on the State Bond Program for the Settlement of
Obligations arising from Treaties among the Governments the Czech
Republic, Slovak Republic, and the Federal Republic of Germany, on
amendments to Act No. 407/2000 Coll., on the State Bond Program for the
Partial Defrayment of the Damage suffered by Agricultural Subjects in
the Drought of 2000, and on amendments to Act No. 424/1991 Coll., on
Association in Political Parties and Political Movements, as amended,
into which the amendments to Act No. 424/1991 Coll. were quite
unsystematically included.) Such a manner of proceeding, thus, does not
correspond to the basic principles of a law-based state, among which
belong the principle that laws should be foreseeable and comprehensible,
and the principle that they should be internally consistent. If then
the substantive content regulated in several statutes is affected by a
single statute (in the formal sense), and these affected statutes do
not, either by content or systemic considerations, have any connection
with each other, then a quite murky legal situation immediately emerges
which does not respect the principles of foreseeability,
comprehensibility or internal consistency.“ (Collection of Judgments and
Rulings of the Constitutional Court, Volume No. 25, Judgment No. 14, p.
97, No. 95/2002 Coll.).
37.
The normative principle of the democratic law-based state is contained
in Art. 1 para. 1 of the Constitution of the Czech Republic, which
expressly designates the Czech Republic as a democratic state governed
by the rule of law, founded on respect for the rights and freedoms of
man and of citizens. Respect for the rights and freedoms of the
individual also without doubt constitutes one of the principles of the
law-based state, as is meant by the Preamble of the Constitution of the
Czech Republic, alternatively one of the objectives of the functioning
of the State and state power. The same objective is expressed in Art. 2
para. 3 of the Constitution of the Czech Republic, according to which
state authority may be asserted only in cases, within the bounds, and in
the manner provided for by law.
38.
What follows therefrom is that neither the Parliament, nor its two
chambers may conduct themselves in an arbitrary manner, but are bound by
the law. When engaging in legislative activity, they are bound first
and foremost by the Constitution of the Czech Republic and the standing
orders interpreted in conformity therewith, also by the settled practice
of the parliamentary chambers and their bodies which, owing to
long-term repetition, can be considered as an unwritten part of the
legislative procedure, that is, if they can be found to be in harmony
with the higher values of law formation, of the democratic political
system, etc. Adherence to the procedural rules contained in the
mentioned sources of law must be demanded due to the fact that, although
the addressees of these norm are not private persons, the
non-observance of them may, in the final outcome, meaningfully affect
fundamental rights of private persons. There is no doubt that the
addressees of a legal norm have the right legitimately to expect that
any limitation upon their fundamental rights carried out by law will be
by a statute which is the result of a discourse conducted across the
political spectrum, namely a discourse in which all participants had the
opportunity elaborately to acquaint themselves with the matter under
consideration and to give their informed view upon it. It is also
proper that such a process make possible an open discussion between the
proponents of competing views, including minority views. Therefore,
those procedures enter into prominence which ensure, on the one hand,
the hearing of the parties and, on the other, the formal quality of the
legislative work. From this perspective, the legislative procedure
becomes „the actual source of a statute’s legitimacy“.
39.
The requirement that the law be predictable, which is a component of
the principle of the law-based state, ceases to be satisfied in the
moment when an amendment to a statute is contained in an entirely
different statute, as understood in the formal sense, the content of
which is in no way connected to the amended statute. Without employing
the instruments of information technology, it is thus becoming entirely
impossible for the addressees of legal norms to orient themselves in the
legal order. At the same time, § 13 of Act No. 309/1999 Coll., on the
Collection of Laws and on the Collection of International Agreements,
envisages that territorial self-governing units have the obligation to
make it possible for everyone to look into the Collection of Laws. The
law is silent on the obligation to afford everyone access to an
informational system containing the full wording of legal enactments in
electronic form. At the same time, it is evident that without the
possibility to make use of these systems, people cannot today acquaint
themselves with the legal order of the Czech Republic, and this makes
problematic the application of the general legal principle, ignorance of
the law is no excuse. In this way, law becomes for its addressees
entirely unpredictable. While the mentioned principle is a necessary
condition of the effectiveness of every system of valid law, it cannot
be interpreted solely to the detriment of the addressees of the law, but
also as an obligation of public authorities to make the law cognizable,
because it is only to such law that people can conform their conduct. A
related problem is also the prospective nature of law, as it is only
possible to conform one‘s future conduct to the law.
40.
Following the example of the right to good administration, it also
makes sense in this context to speak of the „right to good legislation“,
which legal scholarship, and not solely Czech, connects to the
principles of the democratic law-based state (Čebišová, T.: The Right to
Good Statutes (?), in: Vostrá, L., Čermáková, J. (eds.): The Issues of
Law Formation in the Czech Republic, the Polish Republic and the Slovak
Republic, Plzeň, Aleš Čeněk 2005, p. 84 and foll.).
41.
According to L. Fuller, judicial proceedings and voting in the
framework of a representative body belong among the basic models of
decision-making in a democracy (Fuller, L, The Morality of Law, Prague
1998 [Translator’s Note: This refers to the Czech translation of the
English original], cited according to Kysela, J.: The Legislative
Process in the Czech Republic as a Form of Rational Legal Discourse?,
Právník [The Lawyer], No. 6/2005). Parliamentary decision-making
concerns general cases, in favor of which sounds the reservation of
fundamental decisions adopted in parliamentary procedure, which ensures
that political parties, which represent the organized interests of the
civic public, participate in the consideration of the subject which is
being decided upon. A statute, the end-product of parliamentary
deliberation, is a compromise between interests, into which is projected
societal consensus, a fact which must be considered as a criterion of
the acceptance of the statute. Each of the institutions forming or
applying law is defined by formal attributes, among which are the
procedures which serve the effectuation of the objective of the given
institution. The procedures also effect the form in which the
Parliament conducts its business, as well as the division of labor
between its bodies, and should guarantee democracy, the legitimization
of authority, the rationality of legislation, procedural justice
(hearing of parties, debate), etc. Kysela, J.: The Legislative Process
in the Czech Republic as a Form of Rational Legal Discourse?, Právník
[The Lawyer], No. 6/2005). For that matter, parliamentary procedures
also constitute a significant component in establishing the form of the
separation of powers and of the conditions for political competition in
the State (Kabele, J.: From Capitalism to Socialism and Back,
Theoretical Examination of the Transformations of Czechoslovakia and the
Czech Republic, Prague, Carolinum 2005, p. 205).
42.
From the historical perspective, democratic legislation can be
explained also as the transposition of the notion of the judicial
process to the political process in the form of the creation of
statutes. As is known, the English Parliament had historical roots in
the Curia Regis, that is, in a body which had the function of a
judicature and the function of development of law. Its legislative
function was always conceived of as the development of law in broader
contexts (Court of Parliament). The legislature thus discharged the
role of an „accelerator“, „regulator“, and „director“ of further law
formation. Common law existed as judicial law even prior to statutes,
and alongside them. Political power was thus obliged to settle
conflicts, concerning power, opinion, and interests, in a procedurally
regulated discourse, which resulted in a binding decision (Kriele, M.:
The Democratic Principle in the Basic Law [Das demokratische Prinzip im
Grundgesetz], VVDStRL 29, WdeG Berlin 1971, p. 50 and foll.).
43.
Finally, for C. Schmitt parliamentarianism was a form of government by
open argumentative discourse, in which differences and opinions confront
each other - political power is thereby forced to engage in a
discussion which allows for oversight by the public (Schmitt, C.: The
Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, London 1994, as cited in Kysela, J.:
The Legislative Process in the Czech Republic as a Form of Rational
Legal Discourse?, Právník [The Lawyer], No. 6/2005).
44.
Similarly as in judicial decision-making, parliamentary decision-making
also requires the idea of a „just decision“, which is an immanent
aspect of the law-based state, the observance of the natural-law maxim
to hear all parties. Whereas the parties to a dispute are before a
court, in parliament it is a matter of the opportunity to hear the
representatives of all political parties participating therein.
Transparency of the hearing of parties representing the public conduces
to their identification with the result of the decision-making process,
in this case with statutes. That is also the main reason for the
preference for parliamentary legislation rather than the adoption,
within the executive, of acts with the force of a statute.
45.
Next to substantive quality, however, formal quality also constitutes
an element of „correct“ or „good“ law. This concerns the „formal
values“ of law which, although they do not determine the content of
legal enactments, they should ensure the existence, acceptance, and
applicability of law: the values of order, foreseeability, freedom from
arbitrariness, legal equality or legal certainty (Summers, R. S.,
Essays in Legal Theory, Dordrecht – Boston – London: Kluwer Publishing,
2000, p. 30). N. MacCormick speaks in a similar fashion on the ethics
of legalism, of which regularity, foreseeability, certainty, constancy,
and unity are characteristic (as cited in Přibáň, J., Dissidents of Law,
Prague 2001). The essence of these considerations is the recognition
that a condition of the effective operation of law is its development
subordinate to certain principles, which should ward off even possible
attacks by the legislature; that is, they should bind it. In this
connection, Czech legal scholarship emphasizes the requirement of no
contradiction, that is, the harmony and unity of the legal order (Šín,
Z., The Formation of Law and its Rules, Olomouc 2000).
46.
Otherwise Czech legal scholarship also draws attention to the
importance of the adherence to parliamentary procedure, all the more so
as its preponderant part has the character of statutory rules. The
starting point for this perspective is the proposition of V. Knapp:
„Neither a statute nor any other legal enactment can come into being in
an unlawful manner“, whereas one of the examples of unlawfulness is the
violation of mandatory enactments on the creation of law (Knapp, V., The
Theory of Law [Teorie Práva], Prague C. H. Beck 1995, p. 107). If the
legislative process is a legal process with precisely formally defined
rules, then, in view of the consequences, it is necessary to insist upon
their strict observance; „it merits consideration that the insistence
upon the rules of parliamentary procedure is far less internalized than,
for example, the judicial procedural codes, although the outcome of the
legislative process (a statute) has far more serious impact on the
society as a whole than has procedural error in the issuance of
individual judgments.“ (Filip, J., Repeated Voting by the Assembly as a
Constitutional Problem, or a Parliamentary Majority Is not Permitted to
Do Everything not Expressly Prohibited by the Standing Orders, The
Journal of Legal Scholarship and Practice [Časopis pro právní vědu a
praxi], No. 4/2001, p. 343). The Constitutional Court has also
expressed its view on the necessity of adherence to procedural rules for
the purpose of reaching a regular (constitutionally conforming)
decision, namely in its Judgment No. Pl. US 5/02, where it said: „In a
number of its judgments concerning the review of decision-making by
public bodies, the Constitutional Court repeatedly laid out principles
for which – in terms of the attributes of a law-based state, among other
things - respect for procedural rules is essential; in brief: the
settled decision-making practice of the Constitutional Court concluded
that only in a procedurally flawless process (a constitutionally
conforming proceedings) can a legal and constitutionally conforming
result (decision) be achieved, so that increased attention must be paid
to the procedural integrity of the decision-making process (proceedings)
and it must be provided considerable protection. If these principles
relate to the constitutionality of proceedings before public bodies and
to decision issued in them (to the legally-prescribed procedure under
Art. 36 para. 1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms),
there are no reasonable grounds to diverge from these principles in
matters of review of the legislative process and enactments (legal
norms) adopted therein, because, although the legislative
decision-making process differs to a certain extent from decision-making
processes in proceedings before other public bodies - and in that sense
it can be understood as a decision making process sui generis - the
guiding principles of decision-making in which a final result is reached
are, in both cases, identical. Moreover, one cannot lose sight of the
fact that the consequences arising from legislative acts are, due to
their society-wide effect, certainly more significant than in cases of
individual (defective) decisions by other public bodies. Requirements
upon which rests the law-based state, and correlatively the life of
citizens in it, gain in prominence in the legislative process, namely
the requirements of the constancy, persuasiveness and indispensability
of legal enactments; however, such enactments, and the attainment of the
necessary authority of legislative bodies, can not be achieved
otherwise than by respect for the rules (the principles of legislative
activity), which the Assembly of Deputies, the prominent bearer of the
legislative power, has otherwise provided by statute for its own
activity.“ (Collection of Judgments and Rulings of the Constitutional
Court, Volume No. 28, Judgment No. 117, p. 25, No. 476/2002 Coll.).
47.
From the principle of the substantive conception of the law-based state
follows also the requirement of the separation of powers, which has the
character of a value. The separation of powers is, at the same time,
also a structural element of the Constitution of the Czech Republic.
The Constitutional Court outlined the following characteristics of the
separation of powers in its Judgment No. Pl. US 7/02, where it stated:
„In this state the people, in the sense of Article 2 of the
Constitution, is the source of all state authority, which is asserted
through the bodies of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches.
As can be deduced from this prefatory statement, this enshrined
principle of the separation of powers is the very foundation of our
constitutional system. It is a principle ensuing from the idea that the
tendency toward the concentration of and abuse of power is rooted in
the very nature of man, which became a guarantee against the arbitrary
exercise and the abuse of state authority and, in essence, also a
guarantee of liberty and the protection of the individual, a principle
which is the outcome of, and reaction to, the then attained historical,
intellectual, and institutional developments for which in the modern era
such notable figures as John Locke and Charles Montesquieu played their
role, as did institutions such as the British Parliament and the
British justice system. It is not the Constitutional Court's task, in a
situation that can be considered as given, to further concern itself
with the causes of the rise or the evolution of this principle.
Nonetheless, it considers it essential briefly to assert that at the
very foundations of the given principles lies the conviction that it has
never been possible to attribute to human thought and societal
occurrences a solely rational character, for they include as well an
evidently irrational component, and moreover the rationality of thought
has never fully coincided with the rationality of action. As the
expression of an already existing state of affairs, the phrase, the
‚government of all‘, is a mere ideological formulation often times
masking the completely opposite social condition. In a social situation
marked by the internal and external inadequacies of the individual as
well as the entire society, basic human needs can be satisfied, while at
the same time at least maintaining momentum in the direction of a goal
such as democracy represents, solely by the route of a conflictual
settling of individual interests.“ (Collection of Judgments and Rulings
of the Constitutional Court, Volume No. 26, Judgment No. 78, p. 273, No.
349/2002 Coll.). The separation of powers, conceived of from this
perspective, also constitutes a grounds for the constitutional
delimitation of concurrent action by individual powers, in the given
case the executive and the legislative powers in the course of the
legislative process (Art. 41 para. 2 and especially Art. 44 para. 1 of
the Constitution of the Czech Republic, see below).
48.
The inadequacy of the collaboration between the Government and the
Parliament in the course of the legislative process is felt very acutely
in the case of the adoption of legal norms which have impact on the
state budget. It is without doubt the Government’s responsibility to
see to the observance of the state budget, the key instrument for
governing; and if the Government is to meet this obligation, it must
have an effective instrument to prevent subversive conduct by the
Parliament. This requirement is closely related precisely with the
separation of powers and with the due performance of their function by
particular constitutional bodies within its framework. Merely at the
margin of the issue, the Constitutional Court alludes to the fact that
in other states this specific requirement is resolved in its
constitution or by the standing orders of the respective parliament. As
examples can be given the FRG and Spain, where the Government must give
its consent to all bills which have impact on the state budget.
III. B) The Principle of the Constitutionally Conforming Interpretation of Sources of Law Governing the Legislative Process
49.
The distinction between the terms, „proposed amendment“ and „bill“, is
decisive for the resolution of this case. Whereas bills are referred to
in various contexts by the Constitution of the Czech Republic (Art. 41,
Art. 42, Art. 44 – Art. 48), if we disregard the relations between the
two chambers of Parliament as governed by the Constitution of the Czech
Republic (in this connection, the Constitution of the Czech Republic
refers to „proposed amendments“ – see Art. 46 para. 2, Art. 47 para. 2, 3
and 4, Art. 50 para. 2), proposed amendments are referred to solely in
Act No. 90/1995 Coll., on the Standing Orders of the Assembly of
Deputies, as subsequently amended (hereinafter „SOAD“). The
introductory clause of § 63 para. 1 of the SOAD provides that in the
course of the debate a Deputy may submit proposals „on the matter under
consideration“. These proposals should relate „to a certain matter of
the point under consideration“. The provisions of § 63 para. 1, point 5
of the SOAD authorizes Deputies to submit proposed amendments which
omit, expand upon or modify certain parts of the original bill. The
right to submit proposed amendments to bills in the course of
parliamentary debate is derived from the right of legislative
initiative, nonetheless it is not identical to it, as it naturally
restricted by the sphere reserved precisely for the exercise of the
right of legislative initiative. Alone due to the need to distinguish
the legislative initiative from proposed amendments, for the sake of
observance of the increased constitutional demands on the former, one
can deduce that a proposed amendment should in fact only amend the
submitted legal scheme, thus it should not even modify, nor expand upon,
it in any fundamental manner, much less should it move beyond the
subject of the legislative initiative, or the bill (similarly, Schorm,
V., Easy Rider, Administrative Law [Správní právo], No. 2/2000, p. 65
and foll.)
50. To stray from
the restricted field reserved for proposed amendments might be of such a
nature as to overstep the actual content of the bill in question, or of
such a nature as to constitute a blatant departure from the bill’s
subject matter. The first type of proposed amendment has long been
designated in American doctrine as „legislative riders“, the use of
which in the U.S. is often and heatedly debated and which, although
considered as undesirable, is nonetheless still considered to be a
constitutionally-conforming form of proposed amendment.
51.
It is necessary to distinguish this first type from a second type,
called „wild riders“. The second type represents a transgression of the
criteria of the test applied on the basis of the „germaneness“ rule,
that is, the rule of the close relation. In other words, it tests the
issue as to whether, in a concrete case, a proposed amendment is proper
or is a proposal which has, in the Czech milieu, been given the
designation, „limpet“. In this case, the technique of proposing
amendments attaches to a bill the legislative scheme from an entirely
different statute, with an unconnected legislative pattern. It is
evident that even the breadth of the changes contained in a limpet, even
if it is submitted in relation to a connected bill (in that case, it
would not of course be a classic limpet, rather more a proposed
amendment that strays due to its breadth), might, in and of itself,
present a problem which is of course not resolved in the process of
adopting a „limpet“ proposed amendment, as in the third reading in the
process of adopting statutes there is no space for this type of
debating. This would merely multiply and expand the danger of the use
of limpet-type techniques.
52. The rule of close relation (the germaneness rule) has been applied by the American Congress since 1789 and is today contained in the Congress‘ standing orders (similarly, the classic handbook, Mason´s Manual of Legislative Procedure, 1989, Art. 402 /Amendments Must Be Germane/, pp. 264-265). This rule expressed the requirement, according to which a proposed amendment must concern the same subject as the bill which is just then being considered in the legislative process. It is based on the idea that, at any given time, an assembly may consider solely one substantively delimited matter. Its objective is to ensure a proper procedure, in the sense of duly informed and substantively prepared debate, and to ensure the versatility and effectiveness of the assembly’s actions. If the proposed amended that is put forward is in conflict with this rule, then another member of the chamber can object to this fact. The burden of proof in demonstrating the proposed amendment’s conflict with the rule is upon the person who makes the objection. After one raises the objection that an amendment is in conflict with the rule, the chair of the body must first assess the nature and objective of the provision of the bill under consideration and then the relation to that provision of the proposed amendment objected to. It follows from this rule that the proposed amendment must closely relate to objective of the specific provision, or part thereof, of the bill under consideration. Among the assessment criteria rank, in particular, the following criteria, whereas in order to establish that a proposed amendment conflicts with the rule, it is sufficient if only one of them is satisfied:
- proposed amendments must relate to the subject of the bill under consideration;
- the fundamental objective of a proposed amendment must have a close-fitting relation to the fundamental objective of the bill under consideration;
- rules concerning a specific subject must not be amended by provisions of a general character;
- general subjects may be modified by specific proposals;
- if a proposed amendment contains permanent changes in a bill envisaging only temporary or provisional changes in the law, it cannot be considered as a proposal having a close-fitting relation.
52. The rule of close relation (the germaneness rule) has been applied by the American Congress since 1789 and is today contained in the Congress‘ standing orders (similarly, the classic handbook, Mason´s Manual of Legislative Procedure, 1989, Art. 402 /Amendments Must Be Germane/, pp. 264-265). This rule expressed the requirement, according to which a proposed amendment must concern the same subject as the bill which is just then being considered in the legislative process. It is based on the idea that, at any given time, an assembly may consider solely one substantively delimited matter. Its objective is to ensure a proper procedure, in the sense of duly informed and substantively prepared debate, and to ensure the versatility and effectiveness of the assembly’s actions. If the proposed amended that is put forward is in conflict with this rule, then another member of the chamber can object to this fact. The burden of proof in demonstrating the proposed amendment’s conflict with the rule is upon the person who makes the objection. After one raises the objection that an amendment is in conflict with the rule, the chair of the body must first assess the nature and objective of the provision of the bill under consideration and then the relation to that provision of the proposed amendment objected to. It follows from this rule that the proposed amendment must closely relate to objective of the specific provision, or part thereof, of the bill under consideration. Among the assessment criteria rank, in particular, the following criteria, whereas in order to establish that a proposed amendment conflicts with the rule, it is sufficient if only one of them is satisfied:
- proposed amendments must relate to the subject of the bill under consideration;
- the fundamental objective of a proposed amendment must have a close-fitting relation to the fundamental objective of the bill under consideration;
- rules concerning a specific subject must not be amended by provisions of a general character;
- general subjects may be modified by specific proposals;
- if a proposed amendment contains permanent changes in a bill envisaging only temporary or provisional changes in the law, it cannot be considered as a proposal having a close-fitting relation.
53.
The presidential system in the USA is nonetheless distinguished by a
high degree of autonomy of the Congress, separated from the executive
power. It is thus more inspirational to review the circumstances of
parliamentary or semi-presidential systems. For ex., rules concerning
the way in which proposed amendments are dealt with in France are very
subtle, (Schorm, V., The Legislative Process in France, post-graduate
thesis defended at the Law Faculty of the Masaryk University in Brno,
2000, p. 124 and foll.). It follows therefrom that the amendment
(proposed amendment) must have some connection to the discussed text of
the bill (accessorial relation: change of the content, elaboration,
tying it in with other related provisions of the legal order). In the
case of a clash in terms of ideas, it would be an impermissible
„legislative rider“, that is, a heterogeneous provision. The Conseil
constitutionnel began as far back as the 1980’s independently to adjudge
the relation between legislative initiative and the right to submit
proposed amendments, and that regardless of how one or the other chamber
assessed the permissibility of the proposed amendment. It was
motivated to do so by the especially large growth in the number of
proposed amendment, by which Deputies and Senators wished to circumvent
the conditions of the legislative process (speed up, avoid attention,
etc.).
54. In New Zealand
the conditions for proposed amendments are clearly laid down partly by
distinguishing them from the motion to reject the bill, partly and above
all by the criterion of relevance (relation to the matter which should
be modified – the point is given by inclusion in the agenda, thematic
restriction on both speakers and proposers) (McGee, D., Parliamentary
Practice in New Zealand, Wellington, 3rd ed. 2005, esp. pp. 216-217).
The issue is similarly dealt with in the Australian Senate, where by a
proposed amendment is meant the omission of a word, replacement of a
word by another, or the addition of a new word, of course while
respecting the principle of the proposed amendment’s relation to the
modified bill (Evans, H. (ed.), Odgers´ Australian Senate Practice,
Canberra, 11th ed. 2002, pp. 184-185). Also German theory devotes
comparable attention to this problem, including the critique of the
„concealed statutes“ (Geheimgesetzgebung), which are the outcome of
unrelated amendments proposed by Deputies, which are not reflected in
the title of the act. Such a practice violates the principle of the
transparency of law creation and the right of initiative, and both
Deputies and addressees of the right have this right (Klein, E.,
Legislation without Parliament? [Gesetzgebung ohne Parlament?], Berlin,
De Gruyter Recht, 2004, pp. 16-17). Proposed amendments should be
prepared primarily by expert committees, should modify only the
submitted bill, alternatively have a direct nexus with it, as
„additions“ to a statute should only result from legislative initiative
(Schneider, H., Legislation [Gesetzgebung], Heidelberg: C. F. Müller, 2.
ed. 2002, p. 84).
55. As
was stated above, the Constitution of the Czech Republic regulates to a
certain extent questions surrounding bills, namely in Chapter Two, which
deals with the legislative power. It is thus evident, that the
institute of the bill or proposed act should be governed by the
principles which apply for the exercise of legislative power. These
principles must be looked for in connection with the functions of this
power, as was indicated above. The defining characteristic of a
parliament is the free, equal, universal election of its members, their
freedom in carrying out their mandate, further the principle,
fundamentally adhered to, that statutes are to be debated publicly, as
well as the principle that decisions are made by the majority. The
public debate principle is directed both internally, within the
parliamentary chamber, and externally. Its internal operation serves
the free formation of opinions of the parliamentary chamber’s members;
its external operation serves to inform the public. And however much
scholarly literature tends to draw attention to the sterility of
parliamentary debate, such debate must be preserved, if only due to the
fact that through it the public is informed.
56.
In a parliament is also reflected the idea of pluralism, which is both
the foundation and a characteristic feature of each free society. In
parliamentary debate, and naturally also in the work of individual
parliamentary committees, the opposition is also given the floor, and in
that way it also accomplishes the monitoring which can be seen as one
of the basic characteristic features of the law-based state. Often it
is only in parliament that „weak“ interests, that is, interests of such
societal groups which do not have at their disposal the means to
implement their program, are given the opportunity to express their
views. It is precisely these characteristics of parliamentary debate
which indicate the parliament’s special role in the accommodation and
integration of interests. All of these principles need to be taken into
account when creating the legal framework for, and putting into
practice, the procedure pertaining to parliamentary bills, all the more
so that pertaining to the interpretation of what must be considered a
bill.
III. C) Safeguards of the Constitutionally Conforming Exercise of the Legislative Process
57.
In the first place it is necessary to consider the Chairman of the
Assembly of Deputies, or the presiding officer, as the guarantor of the
observance of the rules of parliamentary procedure. In the debate on
bills in the appropriate legislative phase, all proposals, including
proposals designated as proposed amendments, are delivered to these
persons. Without a doubt these persons have the authorization, even the
obligation (even if not asserted), to assess whether a proposal
designated as a proposed amendment genuinely is one in the substantive
sense, in the way described above. As properly interpreted, § 59 para. 4
a § 63 para. 1 of the SOAD without doubt authorize the presiding
officer to take this step. In the view of legal science, „if a proposed
amendment is a proposal which would change the content or the outward
form of the bill, the chair should not even permit a vote on the
substantively unconnected, that is, merely apparent, proposed
amendment. The Government should, in the case of „comprehensive“
proposed amendments, insist upon its right, under Art. 44 of the
Constitution of the Czech Republic, to give its views on the bill, since
in actuality it is a disguised new legislative initiative.“ (Kysela,
J., Law Formation in the Czech Republic: A Tragedy with a Happy Ending?,
Legal Reporter [Právní zpravodaj], No. 7/2006).
58.
The debate on a bill in the second chamber of Parliament, that is, in
the Senate, represents a safeguard, the task of which is, among other
things, to expose errors in the legislative process and, in relation to
them, to take the appropriate action within the confines of the
possibilities which the Senate is granted, albeit it is evident that,
regrettably, they are limited possibilities
59.
The President of the Republic’s exercise of his right to return adopted
acts to the Assembly of Deputies, as is foreseen in Art. 50 para. 1 of
the Constitution of the Czech Republic, constitutes a further safeguard
in the sense of the monitoring of the proper legislative process.
Within the bounds of the legislative process, the President’s function
is certainly not a political one, as the function of the President of
the Republic does not consist in the formation of competing policies in
relation to the Government. In the Constitution of the Czech Republic,
the President of the Republic is conceived of as a non-party
constitutional organ. In terms of the conception of the Constitution of
the Czech Republic, irrespective of reality, he is predestined by this
specific characteristic to monitor the observance of the
constitutionality of the legislative process with the help of the means
entrusted to him by the Constitution of the Czech Republic, that is, by
the exercise of the presidential veto.
60.
Should the foregoing, above-designated safeguards miscarry, the
Constitutional Court may gain the floor, if it is addressed by means of a
petition duly submitted by a petitioner with standing, as § 68 para. 2
of the Act on the Constitutional Court obliges the Constitutional Court,
when deciding on the conformity of a statute with the constitutional
order, to ascertain, among other things, whether the contested act was
adopted and issued in the constitutionally-prescribed manner. This
provision obliges the Constitutional Court to adjudge the
constitutionality of the legislative procedure with the implication of
derogational conclusions, which the Constitutional Court has made use of
in the past – see Judgment No. Pl. US 5/02. In this Judgment, the
Constitutional Court stated, among other things: “In the legislative
process, requirements upon which rests the law-based state, and
correlatively the life of citizens in it, gain in prominence, namely the
requirements of the constancy, persuasiveness and indispensability of
legal enactments; however, such acts, and the attainment of the
necessary authority of legislative bodies, can not be achieved otherwise
than by respect for the rules (the principles of legislative activity),
which the Assembly of Deputies, the prominent bearer of the legislative
power, has otherwise provided by statute for its own activity.“
IV. Actual Review
61. The Constitutional Court considers it necessary, in the first place, to circumscribe, in the matter under adjudication, the manner and extent of constitutional review. In the first place, the Constitutional Court observes that the petitioners called into doubt not only the merits of the contested provisions of the Act, but also the manner in which they were adopted. In a norm control proceeding under Art. 87 para. 1, lit. a) of the Constitution of the Czech Republic, in the sense of the provisions of § 68 para. 2 of the Act on the Constitutional Court, the Constitutional Court is obliged, apart from the assessment of the content of statutes in terms of their conformity with constitutional acts, to review whether a statute was adopted and issued within the confines of the powers set down in the Constitution, and further whether it was issued in the constitutionally-prescribed manner. Since in the matter under consideration, it was also called into doubt whether the contested provisions of Act No. 443/2006 Coll. had been adopted in the constitutionally-prescribed manner within the framework of this trio (constitutional conformity of the content, the competence, and the procedure), the Constitutional Court had first of all to deal with the constitutionality of the procedure for adopting the Act. It is evident that one cannot deduce from the wording of the provisions of § 68 para. 2 of the Act on the Constitutional Court the sequence of the aspects of review stated therein, as they are not logically interconnected steps. In place of a grammatical interpretation, or the literal wording of this provision, it is necessary to employ a logical interpretation, which first of all requires the review of the competence, then the procedure and finally the content of the contested provision.
62.
The Constitutional Court had no doubts as to the competence of the
Parliament of the Czech Republic, so that it was possible to proceed
directly to the procedure for adopting the contested provisions.
63.
For the review of the constitutionally-prescribed manner of the
adoption and issuance of the contested provisions of the Act, the Court
must concern itself with the course of the legislative process which
preceded the adoption and issuance of the Act, of which the contested
provisions forms a part. As has already been described in detail (see
Point II.), on 21 December 2005, Deputies M. Hašek, M. Kraus and J.
Dolejš submitted to the Assembly of Deputies a bill for the issuance of
an act which amends Act No. 178/2005 Coll., on the Annulment of the Fund
of National Property of the Czech Republic and on the Competence of the
Ministry of Finance in the Privatization of the Property of the Czech
Republic (Act on the Annulment of the Fund of National Property)
(Assembly Print No. 1222/0). As follows from the stenographic record of
the 55th Session of the Assembly of Deputies from 19 April 2006, during
the consideration of the cited bill, in the detailed debate part of the
second reading, Deputy M. Doktor put forth a proposed amendment which
contained the contested provisions. The Deputy submitting this proposed
amendment himself stated, as follows from the stenographic record of
the 55th Session as well as from the Appendix, which the petitioners
attached to the petition in this case, that a bill that was identical in
content with the proposed amendment had already at least once been
submitted to the Assembly of Deputies as a separate bill and had been
discussed as Assembly Print No. 965 – the Amendment of the Act on
Banks. However, after the Government had on 26 May 2005 issued a
negative position on it, this separate bill was not approved in its
third reading at the 51st Session of the Assembly of Deputies.
64.
The proposed amendment under review was put forward by Deputy M. Doktor
in the second reading and included in Print No. 1222/3. This proposed
amendment supplemented the title of the original bill with the words, „ .
. . and Act No. 319/2001 Coll., which amended Act No. 21/1992 Coll., on
Banks, as subsequently amended“. Further, it inserted into the bill,
following Article I, a new Part Two, which read as follows (the heading
included): „PART TWO – The Amendment of Act No. 319/2001 Coll., on
Banks“, and which contained the contested provisions, which amend and
supplement the legislative scheme on the disbursement of supplementary
compensation from the Depositor Insurance Fund. The vote on the
contested proposed amendment was then held in the 3rd reading, on 23 May
2006 at the 56th Session, as serial number 16, when 142 of the 167
Deputies present voted in favor of its adoption, with three against.
Thereafter the amended bill was approved by the Assembly of Deputies
(Resolution No. 2470).
65.
Afterwards, on 25 May 2006 the Assembly of Deputies transmitted the bill
to the Senate (Print No. 362/0). The bill was debated by the Senate on
21 June 2006 at its 12th Session, at which was adopted a resolution not
to deal with the bill (Resolution No. 499). As is seen from the
stenographic record of the 12th Session of the Senate, in the course of
action, the Deputy Chairman of the Senate, Senator P. Pithart, put
forward a proposal to bring the bill under consideration up for general
debate, as it was a serious matter. He also said the following: „That
which was stuck onto (the original bill) is against good morals, not
only against the rules of correct banking . . . Most unfair of all is
the timing of this limpet, which resembles extortion.“ This statement
by the Deputy Chairman of the Senate must be applied to the fact that
the election to the Assembly of Deputies was held on the 2nd and 3rd of
June 2006, so that it was evident that, if the Senate returned the
entire bill to the Assembly of Deputies with proposed amendments, the
bill would not be adopted, since the Assembly of Deputies in its
original composition was no longer able to meet prior to the election.
Art. 47 para. 1 of the Constitution of the Czech Republic is interpreted
both by scholars (K. Klíma and Collective, Commentary to the
Constitution and the Charter, Plzeň, 2005) and in practice such that the
discussion of a bill is tied to the particular electoral term of the
Assembly of Deputies, which functions on the basis of the principle of
discontinuity between individual electoral terms, according to which, if
discussion of a bill is not completed, it ends. If the Senate (and
analogously, the President of the Republic) returns a bill to the
Assembly of Deputies, its ruling has the consequence of a „pocket veto“,
as the new Assembly of Deputies may not vote on the bill. The same
would apply if the Senate had rejected the bill or returned it prior to
the expiration of the Assembly of Deputies‘ electoral term, but the
Assembly did not gather again before the election.
66.
In adjudicating, in the given case, the constitutionality of the
legislative procedure for the adoption of the contested provisions, it
is crucial for the Constitutional Court to assess the issue of whether
the Deputy M. Doktor’s proposal, designated as a proposed amendment and
included in Assembly Print No. 1222/3, genuinely was one in the
substantive sense, as was explained above (Point III. B); that means, to
assess whether the proposed amendment at issue in the given case
overstepped the bounds of the restricted field reserved for proposed
amendments, that is, whether it was a case of impermissible extension in
interpreting the issue of what constitutes a proposed amendment. In
making this interpretation, the Constitutional Court, for the reasons
given in Part III of this Judgment, that is, on the grounds of
considering the applicable constitutional criteria defined in that Part,
dealt with it also in terms of the „rule of the close connection“
(germaneness rule) (Point III. B).
67.
For this purpose, it was necessary first of all to assess the content
and objective of the original bill and the content and objective of the
proposed amendment under adjudication. The Constitutional Court
ascertained that, as follows from Assembly Print No. 1222/0 and from the
Explanatory Report attached to this bill, the content of the original
bill was the adoption of a statute which amends Act No. 178/2005 Coll.,
on the Annulment of the Fund of National Property of the Czech Republic
and on the Competence of the Ministry of Finance in the Privatization of
the Property of the Czech Republic (Act on the Annulment of the Fund of
National Property). The Deputies submitting the bill sought, by its
adoption, to obtain funds in the amount of two billion Czech Crowns with
the aim of transferring those funds to the Ministry of Work and Social
Affairs for the construction of a home for seniors. The proposed
legislative scheme was thus intended to correct, at least partially, the
problem of the lack of space in these homes.
68.
The Constitutional Court further ascertained that the content of
Assembly Print No. 1222/3, into which was included the wording of the
proposed amendment under adjudication, was an amendment to Act No.
319/2001 Coll., which amends Act No. 21/1992 Coll., on Banks, and which
specifically modifies and supplements the rules concerning the subjects
and the manner of disbursement of supplementary compensation for
deposits from money of the Depositor Insurance Fund (hereinafter „the
Fund“). In view of the fact that this was a proposed amendment, no
explanatory report was attached to it. Nonetheless, as follows from the
above-described findings made by the Constitutional Court, this
proposal was identical in content to a separate bill debated by the
Assembly of Deputies as Print No. 965, to which an explanatory report
was naturally attached. As follows from the wording of that bill, the
purpose of this amendment, or rather of the addition to the statutory
provisions in question, was to ensure the equal enjoyment of rights by
those customers of banks which are currently in bankruptcy, whose claims
against the banks had, in the past, been remitted only in the amount
set by law, whereas in the case of other banks the remittance of
depositors‘ claims also occurred beyond the statutory framework.
Further, that the objective of this amendment was to provide the Fund
with the certainty that persons, their legal successors, or transferees
of claims arising from the satisfaction of such claims which in certain
cases were secured by the remittance of claims of bank depositors,
instead of by the Fund, will not raise against it any claims other than
claims to the remittance of those funds which these persons used to pay
the supplementary compensation of bank depositors up to the amount of 4
million Czech Crowns. Last but not least, the objective of this
amendment was to provide the Fund with the certainty that, by satisfying
the depositors of banks listed in the proceeding provision, those
depositors‘ claims against the banks will be satisfied in full and that
these depositors will not be able to raise any further claims against
the Fund. The purpose of this amendment was also to guarantee the Fund
that payment of supplemental compensation to depositors of banks relate
only to cases from the past, where the purpose thereof is to eliminate
the above-described inequality between depositors of individual banks,
whereas in the case of other banks their depositors will not be
authorized in the future to claim from the Fund remittance of
compensation in an amount beyond the statutory framework.
69.
Following consideration of the content and objective, both of the
original bill and the proposed amendment at issue, the Constitutional
Court came to the conclusion that, in terms of content and objective,
they are fundamentally different. On that ground alone it was necessary
to find that the proposed amendment at issue strays from the restricted
field reserved for proposed amendments. In other words, it is evident
that it was a „proposed amendment“ which could only be considered as
such in the formal sense not, however, in the material sense.
70.
The Constitutional Court is obliged to observe that Deputy M. Doktor’s
proposed amendment does not relate to the subject of the original bill
(that is, the transfer of funds to support the reconstruction of a
seniors‘ home) nor does its fundamental objective (that is, ensuring
equal rights to all customers of banks currently in bankruptcy, whose
claims against the bank had in the past been reimbursed only in the
amount laid down in a statute, further to provide the Depositor
Insurance Fund with security against certain claims and situations that
arise due to its providing supplementary compensation) bear any close
relation to the fundamental objective of the debated bill (that is, the
effort to resolve the shortage of places in a senior home). Both
proposals under adjudication bear no direct substantive relation to each
other, as a result of which, following the approval of the bill thus
amended, a statute was issued (No. 443/2006 Coll.) which amends statutes
which bear absolutely no direct substantive relation to each other (Act
No. 178/2005 Coll., on the Annulment of the Fund of National Property,
and Act No. 319/2001 Coll., which Amends Act No. 21/1992 Coll., on
Banks), which, for the reasons laid out in Part III of this Judgment,
represents a violation of the sub-principles flowing from the principle
of the democratic law-based state (the separation of powers, the
democratic nature of the legislative process, etc.). As was stated
above, in it Judgment No. Pl. US 21/01, the Constitutional Court
characterized, in the following manner, the situation where several
statutes bearing absolutely no direct substantive relation to each other
are amended by a single act, moreover, often precisely in the form of
submitted proposed amendments: „[It is] an undesirable phenomena, one
not corresponding to the purpose and principles of the legislative
process. . . . Such a manner of proceeding, thus, does not correspond
to the basic principles of a law-based state, among which belong the
principle that laws should be foreseeable and comprehensible, and the
principle that it should be internally consistent. If then the
substantive content regulated in several statutes is affected by a
single statute (in the formal sense), and these affected statutes do
not, either by content or systemic considerations, have any connection
with each other, then a quite murky legal situation immediately emerges
which does not respect the principles of foreseeability,
comprehensibility or internal consistency.” The Constitutional Court
would add thereto that in a substantive law-based state, a statute in
the formal sense cannot be understood as a mere repository of a wide
variety of changes made throughout the legal order. On the contrary,
the substantive conception of the law-based state requires that a
statute be, both in terms of form and substance, a predictable,
consistent source of law. It cannot be permitted for the communicatory
nature of statutes, as a source of law, to disappear, with all the
above-mentioned negative consequences. The jurisprudence of the
European Court of Human Rights sounds in a similar spirit, which imposes
comparable requirements on the quality of statute (accessible,
foreseeable, precise), although the mentioned court declared its views
in connection with hearing complaints in specific legal matters (cf.,
for ex., Berger, V., The Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human
Rights, IFEC 2003, pp. 455-6; para. 4 of Kruslin v. France, Huvig v.
France, pp. 502-503, para. 4 of Autronic AG v. Switzerland).
71.
If under the above-mentioned circumstances the Assembly of Deputies
adopted a resolution (of 23 May 2006, No. 2470), by which it expressed
its consent with the bill thus amended, that is, if it burdened the
legislative process, to the extent of the „proposed amendment“, with a
defect which cannot be overlooked, this fact is projected into the
assessment of the constitutionality of the entire legislative
procedure. It is a situation which is all the more serious in that it
is not an aberration, but is becoming an unpropitious practice, of which
moreover the Members of Parliament are aware, to which fact is
attested, for ex., the critical Senate Resolution No. 303 from 25
January 2006, in which is stated, among other things: „the unceasing
amendment of statutes that have already been amended numerous times and
the technique of effecting them by attaching them to bills with an
unrelated content, makes more difficult or even rules out the
stabilization of awareness of that which applies as law.“ The
literature has already for years drawn attention to it, in part as a
violation of the Act on the Standing Orders of the Assembly of Deputies,
in part as a circumvention of the right of the Government, under Art.
44 of the Constitution of the Czech Republic, to give its view on every
bill, which can also be understood as the right of other participants in
the legislative process to know the Government’s opinion. (Hujer, M.,
The Deputies‘ Proposed Amendments Are often not Related to the Bill
Being Debated, Parliamentary Reporter, No. 8-9/2001; Kysela, J., in
Klíma, K. and collective, Commentary to the Constitution and the
Charter, Plzeň, 2005, p. 236; Voříšek, V., The Sins of the
Father-Lawgivers, Legal Perspectives [Právní rozhledy] No. 16/2006). To
this should be added a reference to the fact that proposed amendments
lack an explanatory report, whereas it applies that the absence of
substantiation for a decision always indicates a heightened risk of
arbitrary conduct. In the specifically adjudicated case, contemplation
on the issue of arbitrariness otherwise makes evident that the separate
bill was first rejected so that it could subsequently be adopted in the
period just before the election in the form of an unrelated proposed
amendment.
72. The
legislative process in the Czech Republic generally also suffers from
other defects (the increasing number of cases where statutes are
approved with the date of entry into effect set prior to the day of
adoption), which the Constitutional Court could not deal with in the
specific case; nonetheless, it could not fail to take into account as
evidence the circumstances in the formation of statutes, especially as
far as concerns the merely limited functionality of the supervisory
mechanisms internal to the legislative process. Naturally that
increases pressure on the operation of external control, represented in
relation to constitutionalism by the Constitutional Court (see also
Filip, J.: Legislative Technique and Constitutional Court Jurisprudence,
Journal for Legal Scholarship and Practice, No. 3/2005, writing of
„legislative mischief or barbarity“).
73.
The Assembly of Deputies did not recognize that the introduced
amendment cannot be considered as such in the substantive sense. A
constitutionally-conforming interpretation of the provisions governing
the right to introduce amendments to a debated bill requires that the
proposed amendment in actual fact merely modify the submitted legal
scheme, that is in conformity with the requirement of the „rule of close
relation“, according to which the proposed amendment must concern the
same subject as the bill which is under consideration in the legislative
process, if the given proposed amendment is not to stray from the field
reserved for proposed amendments in the form of a blatant departure
from the debated bill’s subject matter. In the Constitutional Court’s
view, this corresponds to a constitutionally conforming interpretation
of the introductory clause of § 63 para. 1 of the Standing Orders of the
Assembly of Deputies. In the Constitutional Court’s view this
requirement has not been met in the given case, however. In
consequence, the principle of the separation of powers, among others,
was violated, with consequences for the principle of the formation of
harmonious, transparent, and predictable law, which the Constitutional
Court has already previously linked to the attributes of the democratic,
law-based state. In addition, the institute of legislative initiative
under Art. 41 of the Constitution of the Czech Republic was
circumvented, as was the Government’s right, under Art. 44 of the
Constitution of the Czech Republic, to give its view on bills.
74.
Accordingly, nothing remains but for the Constitutional Court to find
that the contested provisions of Act No. 443/2006 Coll., which amends
Act No. 319/2001 Coll., which amends Act No. 21/1992 Coll., on Banks, as
subsequently amended, were not adopted by the Assembly of Deputies in
the constitutionally-prescribed manner. This is enhanced by the fact
that the President of the Republic did not sign it, which – with the
legal exception of the overriding of a veto – should be, in accordance
with Art. 51 of the Constitution of the Czech Republic, and according to
the views of theory, the certification of the due completion of the
legislative process.
75. The
Constitutional Court proceeded to derogate the statutory provisions
after it had in its previous jurisprudence (see in particular Judgment
No. Pl. US 21/01) made an emphatic appeal to the Parliament of the Czech
Republic, calling upon it to observe the principles of
comprehensibility, transparency, and clarity of the legal order, which
rank among the components of the law-based state, as does respect for
the democratic principles in the legislative process (Art. 1 of the
Constitution of the Czech Republic). In this matter it proceeded to
annul Part Two, namely Art. II and Art. III of Act No. 443/2006 Coll.;
it thereby opened grounds pro futuro, especially for derogation under
Art. 1 para. 1 of the Constitution of the Czech Republic. The
Constitutional Court has in the past tied the potential assessment of
similar violations of the principles of the legislative process with the
test of proportionality in conjunction with the protection of citizens‘
justified confidence in the law, legal certainty and acquired rights,
alternatively in connection with further principles protected by
constitutional order, fundamental rights, freedoms, and public goods.
76.
This conclusion, in and of itself, makes impossible the constitutional
review, in terms of the substantive objections of unconstitutionality,
of individual provisions of the Act under adjudication. Thus, the
Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic does not, in this Judgment,
prejudge the question of what would be a constitutionally conforming
solution to the issues governed by the annulled provisions.
Notice: Decisions of the Constitutional Court may not be appealed.
Notice: Decisions of the Constitutional Court may not be appealed.
Brno, 15 February 2007