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HEADNOTES
The
autonomy of the will and individual liberty of action guaranteed on the
constitutional level by Art. 2 para. 3 of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights and Basic Freedoms. Art. 2 para. 3 of the Charter must be
understood in a double sense. In its first dimension it represents a
structural principle, according to which state authority may be asserted
in relation to the individual and her autonomous sphere (including
autonomous manifestations of the will) solely in cases where an
individual’s conduct violates an explicitly formulated prohibition laid
down in law. However, such prohibition must, in addition, reflect
solely the requirements consisting in preventing the individual in
encroaching upon the rights of others and in the attainment of the
public good, provided that such restriction upon the individual liberty
of action is legitimate and proportional. Such principle must, then, be
conceived of as an essential attribute of every democratic law-based
state (Art. 1 para. 1 or the Constitution of the Czech Republic). Art. 2
para. 4 of the Constitution of the Czech Republic has a like content.
In its second dimension, Art. 2 para. 3 of the Charter operates as an individual right to the respect by state authorities of the autonomous manifestation of one’s personhood (including manifestations of the will), which are reflected in a person’s specific conduct, to the extent that such conduct is not expressly prohibited by law.
In its second dimension, Art. 2 para. 3 of the Charter operates as an individual right to the respect by state authorities of the autonomous manifestation of one’s personhood (including manifestations of the will), which are reflected in a person’s specific conduct, to the extent that such conduct is not expressly prohibited by law.
In
its second dimension, in which it operates as an individual fundamental
right, Art. 2 para. 3 must be applied immediately and directly. In
this dimension it does not merely radiate through ordinary law, rather
it is an individual right which operates directly in relation to state
authority. Thus, when state bodies apply ordinary law, they are also
obliged to interpret the norms of that law, in which Art. 2 para. 3 of
the Charter and Art. 2 para. 4 of the Constitution of the Czech Republic
are reflected as objective constitutional principles, in such a manner
that they do not encroach upon the right of the individual to the
autonomy of his will, which is guaranteed by the second dimension of
Art. 2 para. 3.
Such
a conception of Art. 2 para. 3 of the Charter merely expresses the fact
that, in the substantive law-based state, the individual and his
liberty of action always take priority before state power realized in
statutes. Should the individual not have the opportunity directly to
call upon this priority, such priority would be a mere formal
declaration. Such a proclamation of objective principle is then easily
erodible by the legislative activity of the legislative body.
The
free sphere of the individual and its direct constitutonal guarantee in
the form of an enforceable individual right are conditiones sine qua
non of the material law-based state, which is erected upon respect for
the fundamental rights of the individual. The individual’s right to the
respect for his or her autonomous and free sphere actually operates as a
constant placed before the bracket in which are found particular
specified fundamental rights put into positive law form in reaction to
the massive infringement of them by authoritarian or totalitarian
regimes. The need to formulate particular fundamental rights has, as a
historical matter, always been conditioned as a reaction to the massive
infringement in a certain field of individual freedom, from which
specific fundamental right emerged (see Hayek, F. A., Law, Legislation
and Freedom, Part 3, Academia, Prague 1991, p. 96). This fact is
apparent from the evolution of catalogues of fundamental rights;
otherwise, the taxonomy of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Basic
Freedoms is constructed upon the same logic as well.
CZECH REPUBLIC
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
JUDGMENT
IN THE NAME OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC
On 12 May 2004 the Constitutional Court decided in a panel composed of its Chairman, JUDr. František Duchoň, and Justices, JUDr. Eliška Wagnerová and JUDr. Vojen Güttler, in the matter of the constitutional complaint of the commercial company, Home Credit Finance a. s., with its headquarters at Kounicova 284, 602 00 Brno, represtented by JUDr. Vladimír Muzikář, an attorney with his office in Brno, Havlíčkova 13, joined for joint hearing and resolution by the 23 March 2004 ruling of the Plenum of the Constitutional Court, against the rulings of the Regional Court in Brno listed below:
1. resolution of 7. 11. 2003, file no. 28 Co 416/2003,
2. resolution of 7. 11. 2003, file no. 28 Co 388/2003,
3. resolution of 7. 11. 2003, file no. 28 Co 371/2003,
4. resolution of 7. 11. 2003, file no. 28 Co 417/2003,
5. resolution of 6. 11. 2003, file no. 28 Co 168/2003,
6. resolution of 6. 11. 2003, file no. 28 Co 339/2003,
7. resolution of 6. 11. 2003, file no. 28 Co 421/2003,
8. resolution of 6. 11. 2003, file no. 28 Co 215/2003,
9. resolution of 7. 11. 2003, file no. 28 Co 409/2003,
10. resolution of 6. 11. 2003, file no. 28 Co 306/2003,
11. resolution of 7. 11. 2003, file no. 28 Co 381/2003, as follows:
I. The resolutions of the Regional Court in Brno of 7. 11. 2003, file no. 28 Co 416/2003, of 7. 11. 2003, file no. 28 Co 388/2003, of 7. 11. 2003, file no. 28 Co 371/2003, of 7. 11. 2003, file no. 28 Co 417/2003,of 6. 11. 2003, file no. 28 Co 168/2003, of 6. 11. 2003, file no. 28 Co 339/2003, of 6. 11. 2003, file no. 28 Co 421/2003, of 6. 11. 2003, file no. 28 Co 215/2003, of 7. 11. 2003, file no. 28 Co 409/2003, of 6. 11. 2003, file no. 28 Co 306/2003, of 7. 11. 2003, file no. 28 Co 381/2003, constituted an intrusion into the fundamental rights of the complainant under Art. 2 para. 3 and Art. 38 para. 1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Basic Freedoms, and at the same time Art. 1 para. 1 and Art. 2 para. 4 of the Constitution of the Czech republic were infringed.
II. The resolutions of the Regional Court in Brno listed in point I of the statement of judgment (dispositif) are quashed.
REASONING
By
her timely and, as far as other requirements are concerned, duly
submitted constitutional complaints, the complainant contested the
ordinary court decisions listed in the heading. The contested rulings
of the Regional Court in Brno upheld the rulings of the Municipal Court
in Brno, by which the first instance court declared that it was not the
proper venue in the case and transferred the matter to the court which,
according to § 84 of the Civil Procedure Code, was the proper venue (the
ordinary court of the defendant).
In
view of the fact that the constitutional complaints have identical
content and that the parties to the proceeding are identical, the
Constitutional Court Plenum decided in its 23 March 2004 ruling to joint
all constitutional complaints for joint hearing under file no. I. ÚS
167/04.
The complainant is
of the view that the contested rulings of the Regional Court in Brno
violated her constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights, in
particular the right to act in accordance with the principle of
contractual liberty in the sense of Art. 2 para. 4 of the Constitution
of the Czech Republic and Art. 2 para. 3 of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights and Basic Freedoms (hereinafter „Charter“), as well as the right
to equal status in judicial proceedings under Art. 37 para. 3 of the
Charter.
According to the
complainant, the Municipal Court declared in its rulings (about which
the Regional Court in Brno decided in the appellate proceeding) the
invalidity of the parties‘ prorogation agreement , which stipulated the
court in Brno as the proper venue to hear their mutual disputes.
According to the Municipal Court, it is not clear from the agreement
which of the two courts located in Brno should be the proper venue in
the matter (whether the Municipal Court in Brno or the District Court
Brno - Province). For this reason the court considered the agreement to
be indefinite and, thus, invalid under § 37 para. 1 of the Civil Code.
In its rulings, contested in this case, the Regional Court in Brno
subsequently affirmed this conclusion.
The
Regional Court put forward as the cardinal argument in the reasoning of
its decisions that it found there to be a difference between the
formulation „the court that is the proper venue in Brno“, which in its
view designates the court’s seat, and the formulation „the court that is
the proper venue for Brno“, which in the court’s view designates the
courts‘ jurisdiction regardless of its seat.
The
complainant considers that, in this matter, all statutory conditions
for the entry into a „prorogation agreement“ were met. The parties to
the proceeding stipulated as the proper venue the court in Brno that has
subject-matter jurisdiction to hear matters relating to that
agreement. In the complainant’s view, at the present no court other
than the Municipal Court in Brno qualifies as such a court, nor even at
the time when individual actions were filed (§ 11 para. 1 of the Civil
Procedure Code).
In her
constitutional complaints, the complainant further argues that the
title, district, and seat of each court are laid down by law. It is
also stated directly in the law that, in the judicial district of the
City of Brno, the Municipal Court in Brno exercises the jurisdiction of a
district court (§ 9 para. 2 of the Act on Courts and Judges), and that
the seat of the Municipal Court in Brno is the City of Brno (§ 12 of the
Act on Courts and Judges).
The
municipalities that fall within the judicial district of the District
Court Brno-Province are exhaustively enumerated in the appendix to the
Act on Courts and Judges (in the complainant’s view, it must be
emphasized that this list contains neither the municipality nor the City
of Brno); it further provides that the seat of the District Court
Brno-Province is the City of Brno.
In
the complainant’s view, it follows from what has been stated that the
Municipal Court in Brno is the sole court which is related to Brno by
title, judicial district, and seat – that is, which is, in the wording
of the prorogation agreement „in Brno“. It also follows from the above
that the District Court in Brno-Province is not directly related to the
City of Brno; the sole fact that the seat of this court is in Brno is
not capable of establishing any such qualified relation.
In
light of the above-stated arguments, it is the complainant’s view that
the opinion of the Regional Court in Brno, according to which the
formulation, „the court that is the proper venue in Brno“, designates
the court’s seat and the formulation, „the court that is the proper
venue for Brno“, designates the courts‘ jurisdiction, does not hold
muster.
In a situation where
the contracting parties wished to establish, as the proper venue, the
court which hears and decides matters within the territory of the
judicial district of the City of Brno, the complainant considers the
term which was designated in the prorogation agreement for the venue of
the court as the appropriate choice; at the same time, the parties
wished to formulate this agreement in such a way as to cover, as well,
any possible changes that might occur in the future.
The
complainant considers that one can give consideration even to other
terms which might have been used in the text of the prorogation
agreement. For example, one such formulation could be the term, „the
court for Brno which has subject-matter jurisdiction over the matter“.
The complainant considers this formulation to be similar in meaning to
that used in the prorogation agreement. The complainant thus considers
that the term, „court in Brno“ and „court for Brno“ mean practically the
same thing, so that the correct interpretation of them should lead to
the same conclusion as to whether they are definite.
For
these reasons, the complainant considers the conclusions reached by the
ordinary courts as legal formalism and believes that, as a matter of
fundamental constitutional principles, excessive demands concerning the
formulation of a prorogation agreement are unacceptable, as they
demonstrably encroach upon the contractual liberty resulting from the
principle of the priority of the citizen before the State, as laid down
in Art. 1 of the Constitution of the Czech Republic (more precisely,
Art. 1 para. 1 of the Constitution of the Czech Republic) and from the
principle of contractual freedom, in the sense of Art. 2 para. 4 of the
Constitution of the Czech Republic and of the corresponding provisions
of Art. 2 para. 3 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Basic
Freedoms (in this connection, the complainant refers to the
Constitutional Court’s judgment in the matter no. I. ÚS 331/98).
The
complainant further believes that, in addition, her constitutionally
guaranteed right to her lawful judge, under Art. 38 para. 1 of the
Charter, was infringed by the contested decisions, precisely due to the
declaration that the prorogation agreement was invalid. To the extent
that, in a specific case, a court fails to respect a validly concluded
prorogation agreement and decides concerning the proper venue in
disregard thereof, in the complainant’s view it has infringed the right
of the parties to a proceeding to have their case heard by the court
which is the proper venue, and thus also the constitutionally guaranteed
right to one’s lawful judge under Art. 38 para. 1 of the Charter.
The
complainant also considers that, by its contested decisions, the
Regional Court in Brno encroached upon her right, under Art. 37 para. 3
of the Charter, to the equality of parties to a proceeding. A component
of this right is the parties‘ right to give their views on all facts
which are important for the adjudication of the matter. This right then
corresponds to the duty of courts to respond, in a relevant procedural
matter, to all views expressed by the parties. Should the court fail to
respond to their views, procedural error can reach such an intensity as
to result in the infringement of the constitutionally guaranteed right
to the equal status of parties to a proceeding. In the complainant’s
view, such is the case, in particular, when the court entirely
disregards the views expressed by the parties, and the same outcome may
result where the relevant part of the judicial decision is unreviewable
due to a failure to give reasons.
For all of the above-stated reasons, the complainant proposes that the Constitutional Court quash the contested rulings.
At
the Constitutional Court’s request, the opposing party to the
constitutional complaint, the Regional Court in Brno, represented by the
Chairman of Panel 28 Co, responded to the submission of the complaint.
In the statement of views, he declared that without a doubt the
complainant has the right, when entering into a credit contract in
conformity with the object of her entrepreneurial activities, to make
use of the possibility afforded, under § 89a of the Civil Procedure
Code, to parties to a civil court proceeding in commercial law matters.
It does not follows from the contested rulings, however, that the
Regional Court in Brno denied or called into doubt the complainant’s
right under Art. 2 para. 3 of the Charter (everyone may do that which is
not prohibited by law; and nobody may be compelled to do that which is
not imposed upon him by law). In his view, it was up to the parties,
and above all to the complainant, as contracting subjects to realize the
above-stated right in an appropriate manner into the text of the
agreement making another court the proper venue, and to stipulate in
that agreement, in a quite unequivocal and indisputable manner, which
specific court the parties have chosen to decide on their disputes.
Even
though it might be conceded, as a general matter, that such other court
need not be designated in the agreement by the title given it in Act
No. 6/2002 Sb., on Courts and Judges, without a doubt the parties‘
agreement on the selection of such court must designate it in such an
unequivocal manner so as not to give rise to doubts as to which specific
court the parties agreed was to be the proper venue. If the parties
expressly agreed that such court would be „the venue in Brno which has
subject-matter jurisdiction over the matter“, in the Regional Court’s
view, it can be adjudged that courts „in Brno“ refers to, on the one
hand, the Municipal Court in Brno, but also that the District Court
Brno-Province, with its seat in Brno, could be meant, as both courts
have subject-matter jurisdiction in first instance to hear and decide in
the given matter.
To the
objection that the right to one’s lawful judge had been infringed, the
Chairman of Panel 28 Co stated that it is precisely the indefiniteness
of the prorogation agreement that has logical impact even in the sphere
of the lawful judge, and it is precisely for this reason that
prorogation agreements require an entirely unambiguous expression of
intent to select another concrete court as the proper venue. It is
precisely the indefiniteness of the given agreement which gives grounds
for concluded that Art. 38 para. 1 of the Charter has been affected, and
in no sense on the part of the court, rather by the complainant
herself.
As far as concerns
the arguments relating to the violation of the equality of parties to a
proceeding, the Regional Court in Brno stated that, in its view, there
were sufficient and detailed reasons supporting the conclusion that the
prorogation agreement is indefinite (and, in consequence thereof,
invalid). The Regional Court in Brno did not, as the appellate court in
the matter, receive from the complainant any expression of views or of
opinion to which the Court would have had to react (or take a position
upon) in the reasoning of its contested decisions.
With reference to all these grounds, the Regional Court in Brno proposes that the constitutional complaints not be granted.
In
his 9 April 2004 declaration, one of the secondary parties to the
proceeding on the constitutional complaints, Maxmilián Šimonič, waived
this status pursuant to § 28 para. 2 of the Act on the Constitutional
Court, and the other secondary parties did not give their views on the
constitutional complaints in a qualified manner within the period
prescribed by the Constitutional Court.
After
receiving the agreement of the parties to dispense with an oral hearing
pursuant to § 44 para. 2 of Act No. 182/1993 Sb., on the Constitutional
Court, as subsequently amended, the Constitutional Court came to the
conclusion in the proceeding that the constitutional complaints are
well-founded.
The
Constitutional Court has repeatedly, in its judgments nos. I. ÚS 546/03
and I. ÚS 43/04, dealt with the decision-making of the Regional Court in
Brno in the complainant’s matters, in which the complainant, pursuant
to § 89a of the Civil Procedure Code, designated in credit contracts the
proper venue for disputes under those contracts. In consideration of
the fact that the constitutional complaints presently being heard
concern an analogous legal issue, the first panel of the Constitutional
Court continues to adhere to its original opinions, expressed in the
cited judgments.
The
Constitutional Court constitutes the judicial body responsible for the
protection of constitutionalism (Art. 83 of the Constitution of the
Czech Republic). Accordingly, it does not constitute a part of the
ordinary courts, neither is it, in relation to them, a superior
instance. The Constitutional Court’s task is to review the ordinary
courts‘ decisional activity, however, only in the circumstance where, by
their decisions, they have encroached upon constitutionally protected
fundamental rights and basic freedoms of the individual. That means
that the Constitutional Court is not entitled to intervene into the
ordinary courts‘ decisional activity in each case in which there has
been a violation of ordinary legality or of some other incorrect
decision which, in its essence, resides on the plane of ordinary law.
It
follows from the Constitutional Court’s constant jurisprudence, the
circumstances under which it can be considered that the incorrect
application of ordinary law by ordinary courts results in the violation
of fundamental rights and basic freedoms (compare judgment in the matter
. III. ÚS 224/98 in The Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic,
Collection of Judgments and Rulings, Vol. 15, p. 98). The fundamental
rights and basic freedoms operate in the field of ordinary law as
regulative ideas, on account of which the complex of norms of ordinary
law are, by content, intimately bound up therewith. The violation of
certain of these norms, in consequence in particular of arbitrariness
(for example, the failure to respect mandatory norms) or as the result
of an interpretation which is in extreme conflict with the principles of
justice (for example, excessive formalism), then also gives rise to a
greivance respecting fundamental rights and basic freedoms. In other
words, apart from the flagrant disrespect of mandatory norms, excessive
formalism in the interpretation of the norms of ordinary law is also one
of the conditions for the Constitutional Court to intervene into the
decision-making of ordinary courts and the application of ordinary law.
The
Constitutional Court has deduced from the content of certain of these
constitutional complaints that the given case is just such a case;
therefore, it addressed the issue whether the Regional Court in Brno, by
its interpretation and application of ordinary law, encroached upon the
complainant’s constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights.
A
basic attribute of a law-based state (Art. 1 para. 1 of the
Constitution of the Czech Republic) is the protection of individual
fundamental rights, upon which state authorities are entitled to
encroach only in exceptional cases, especially where the individual has
intruded upon the rights of others (including by manifestations of the
will which are reflected in concrete conduct) or to the extent that such
intrusion is justified by a certain public interest, which nonetheless
must result, in specific cases, in a proportionate limitation upon the
fundamental right in question. In other words, a condition of the
proper operation of a law-based State is the State’s respect for the
autonomous sphere of the individual, who enjoys protection on the part
of the State such that, on the one hand, the State ensures such
protection against intervention by third parties and, on the other hand,
the State itself engages in only such actions as would not encroach
upon this sphere, or would do so only in cases where such is warranted
by a certain public interest and where such encroachment is
proportionate in respect of the aim which is meant to be attained.
The
individual right to the autonomy of the will, that is in consequence of
the liberty of the individual, is one of the expressions of, and
institution guarantees of, these principles. To the extent it aspires
to be an authority with the attributes of a law-based State, it is
encumbent upon state authority to recognize the autonomous
manifestations of individual will, as well as the conduct corresponding
thereto, if such conduct filfills the above-described conditions (above
all, the nonintrusion upon the rights of third persons). In such cases,
state authority must respect or approve such manifestations of the
individual only to the extent that such conduct might possibly call into
being further legal consequences.
The
autonomy of the will and individual liberty of action guaranteed on the
constitutional level by Art. 2 para. 3 of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights and Basic Freedoms. Art. 2 para. 3 of the Charter must be
understood in a double sense. In its first dimension it represents a
structural principle, according to which state authority may be asserted
in relation to the individual and her autonomous sphere (including
autonomous manifestations of the will) solely in cases where an
individual’s conduct violates an explicitly formulated prohibition laid
down in law. However, such prohibition must, in addition, reflect
solely the requirements consisting in preventing the individual in
encroaching upon the rights of others and in the attainment of the
public good, provided that such restriction upon the individual liberty
of action is legitimate and proportional. Such principle must, then, be
conceived of as an essential attribute of every democratic law-based
state (Art. 1 para. 1 or the Constitution of the Czech Republic). Art. 2
para. 4 of the Constitution of the Czech Republic has a like content.
In
its second dimension, Art. 2 para. 3 of the Charter operates as an
individual right to the respect by state authorities of the autonomous
manifestation of one’s personhood (including manifestations of the
will), which are reflected in a person’s specific conduct, to the extent
that such conduct is not expressly prohibited by law.
Such
a conception of Art. 2 para. 3 of the Charter merely expresses the fact
that, in the substantive law-based state, the individual and his
liberty of action always take priority over state power realized in
statutes. Should the individual not have the opportunity directly to
invoke this priority, such priority would be a mere formal declaration.
Such a proclamation of objective principle is, after all, easily
erodible by the legislative activity of the legislative body, which is
otherwise substantiated, for example, by the French Declaration of the
Rights of Man and Citizens, which on the European continent was the
ideological model for the enactment of human rights into positive law,
V. Klokočka („The entire profundity of the Declaration, contained in the
introductory text, which gives a vivid picture of ‚natural,
inalienable, and sacred human rights‘, was eclipsed by the competence of
parliament“, compare Klokočka, V., Constitutional Systems of European
States, Linde Publishers, Prague 1996, p. 273).
The
free sphere of the individual and its direct constitutonal guarantee in
the form of an enforceable individual right are conditiones sine qua
non of the material law-based state, which is erected upon respect for
the fundamental rights of the individual. The individual’s right to the
respect for his or her autonomous and free sphere actually operates as a
constant placed before the bracket in which are found particular
specified fundamental rights put into positive law form in reaction to
the massive infringement of them by authoritarian or totalitarian
regimes. The need to formulate particular fundamental rights has, as a
historical matter, always been conditioned as a reaction to the massive
infringement in a certain field of individual freedom, from which
specific fundamental right emerged (see Hayek, F. A., Law, Legislation
and Freedom, Part 3, Academia, Prague 1991, p. 96). This fact is
apparent from the evolution of catalogues of fundamental rights;
otherwise, the taxonomy of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Basic
Freedoms is constructed upon the same logic as well.
State
authorities thus also commit an infringement of this right to the
extent that, by a formalistic interpretation of the the norms of
ordinary law, they deny the autonomous manifestation of intent of
parties to a contract the consequences which, by that manifestation, the
contractual parties intended to bring about in their legal spheres.
After
assessing all circumstances of the case, the Constitutional Court came
to the conclusion that the given case concerns such a legal situation
where the ordinary court interpreted in an excessively formalistic
manner the provisions of the Civil Code concerning the rules for
interpreting legal transactions and also engaged in formalism in
interpreting the relevant provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, which
gave rise to further legal consequences for the status of the
complainant and the secondary party as regards access to the courts.
Under
§ 35 para. 2 of the Civil Code, legal transactions expressed in words
shall be interpreted not only in accordance with their verbal
formulation, but also particularly with regard to the intention of the
person who performed the legal transaction, provided that such intention
is not inconsistent with the expressed wording. Under § 37 para. 2 a
contrario a legal transaction is invalid if it is not made definitely
and comprehensibly. Then § 89a of the Civil Procedure Code enables the
parties to legal relations to agree, by the expression of their intent,
that the proper venue to hear their disputes will be an ordinary court
other than the court designated by the fixed rules of the Civil
Procedure Code for those parties.
It
is evident that the above-stated principle of the autonomy of the will,
in accordance with which individuals must be granted space in which
they alone designate the extent of their rights and duties, radiate into
all of the cited provisions; further, their expression of intent must
be given priority over the mandatory wording of statutes.
In
its second dimension, in which it operates as an individual fundamental
right, Art. 2 para. 3 must be applied immediately and directly. In
this dimension it does not merely radiate through ordinary law, rather
it is an individual right which operates directly in relation to state
authority. Thus, when state bodies apply ordinary law, they are also
obliged to interpret the norms of that law, in which Art. 2 para. 3 of
the Charter and Art. 2 para. 4 of the Constitution of the Czech Republic
are reflected as objective constitutional principles, in such a manner
that they do not encroach upon the right of the individual to the
autonomy of his will, which is guaranteed by the second dimension of
Art. 2 para. 3. In other words, in interpreting the above-cited
provisions of ordinary law, the ordinary court must do so in such a
manner that they do not, by means of a formalistic interpretation of
legal norms, encroach upon the right of the individual to do anything
which he is not by law expressly prohibited from doing and to not be
compelled to do that which is not expressly imposed upon him by law.
This applies as well for norms governing the interpretation of the
manifestation of individual will, where formalism in the interpretation
of the legal norm itself can be deduced from formalism consisting in the
mere interpretation of the contractual text without regard to the aim
of the transaction consisting in the intent of the parties to the
contractual relation, which the court puts into effect when
interpretating an individual‘s legal transaction.
In
the instant case, the Regional Court in Brno interpretated the
expressed intent of both the complainant and the secondary party such
that, without even affording the parties the opportunity to give their
views on the matter, it designated their intent as indefinite. It found
the cause of the indefiniteness in the fact that there are two courts
in Brno having subject-matter jurisdiction in the case (the Municipal
Court in Brno and the District Court, Brno-Province). In the ordinary
court’s view, an intent expressed in such an indefinite manner gives
rise to the invalidity of the prorogation clause, in consequence of
which it declined to recognize the outcome which, by their expressed
intent, the parties wished to bring about.
As
the Constitutional Court has ascertained from a copy of the credit
contracts entered into by the complainant and the secondary parties, the
parties to the contracts agreed that in the resolution of any disputes
arising between them in connection with the credit contracts, including
disputes which would emerge in consequence of claims arising on the
basis of the termination of a credit contract, „the proper venue“ shall
be „the court in Brno which has subject-matter jurisdiction over the
matter“. In the Constitutional Court’s view, it is evident therefrom
that the contracting parties intended to derogate from the relevant
provisions of the Civil Procedure Code on ordinary court venue and
designate a different court as the proper venue, such that the court
with venue would be the court situated in Brno. This means that the
parties were aware of the fact that any disputes between them would be
heard by the court in Brno having subject-matter jurisdiction. In other
words, the parties agreed upon designating the court in Brno as the
proper venue. Such manifestation of intent can also be interpreted in
such a way that both parties to the contractual relations were aware of
the fact that they had designated the proper venue for the hearing of
disputes between them in such a manner that it would always be the
complainant’s ordinary court, regardless of whether, in any particular
dispute, she would be the plaintiff or defendant.
As
the Constitutional Court has already held in its judgments I. ÚS 546/03
a I. ÚS 43/04, it does not agree with the formalistic approach of the
Regional Court in X, the main aim of which is evidently to eliminate for
the future the situation where it would be the proper venue and proper
instance to hear all disputes arising from the complainant’s loan
agreement, or for any appeal in such matters. The Constitutional Court
does not regard it as essential to distinguish between the formulations
“the court having venue in Brno” and “the court having venue for Brno”.
In the Constitutional Court’s view the decisive factor is, above all,
the fact that, with this formulation, the parties to the contract
referred to the venue, which is always determined by the appropriate
judicial district, and not by the place in which a court is located.
Further, as indicated above, the parties expressed their intent to
construe the term, proper venue, such that it would always be the
complainant’s ordinary court. However, the Constitutional Court sees no
point in repeating the approach used by the ordinary court, when
interpreting the expressed intent of the parties to the credit contract,
with the aim of refuting the interpretation supported thereby, for that
is not the Constitutional Court’s task.
By
means of the interpretation which the ordinary court espouses and which
is strictly a grammatical interpretation, the ordinary court
incorrectly applied the provisions of ordinary law (§ 35 para. 2 of the
Civil Code and § 89a of the Civil Procedure Code), which implement and
institutionalize the operation of the autonomy of the individual will,
in consequence of which it encroached upon the complainant’s rights
guaranteed by Art. 2 para. 3 of the Charter. The Regional Court in Brno
committed such an infringement due to the fact that it did not
sufficiently take into consideration the jointly-expressed intent of the
subjects of a legal relation, which it interpreted merely formally from
a grammatical interpretation of the text of the contractual arrangement
(§ 35 para. 2 of the Civil Code), and also by an interpretation of §
89a of the Civil Procedure Code which restricted the impact of the
autonomy of the will in determining the ordinary court that will be the
proper venue in a civil proceeding.
As
a subsidiary argument, the Constitutional Court cites the facts which
emerge from statistical data which it had already requested from the
Chairwoman of the Municipal Court in Brno when hearing constitutional
complaint no. I. ÚS 546/03. It emerged therefrom that on 17 December
2003 that court issued in the complainant’s matter 8001 payment orders
(Register Ro), 4478 of which have become final. In the context of
hearing the actions (Register C), the court, as the proper venue
pursuant to § 89a of the Civil Procedure Code, decided on 99 actions (40
of them finally) and on 190 further actions by declaring it was not the
proper venue.
As the
Constititonal Court has already stated, in no sense does it call into
doubt the principle of the independence of courts and judges;
nonetheless, it is of the view that it is in accord with the principle
of legal certainty for the same court to proceed in the same manner even
in different matters having, however, an identical legal basis
(prorogation clause pursuant to § 89a of the Civil Procedure Code). In
the Constitutional Court’s view, any possible threatened increase in the
number of matters coming into being in the case of a particular party,
who entered into, with a large number of subjects, contractual relations
in which the proper venue for the matter was agreed upon identically in
a manner departing from the fixed rules laid down in the Civil
Procedure Code, cannot be resolved at the price of intruding upon an
individual’s fundamental rights as a party to a judicial proceeding.
By
its infringement of the fundamental right under Art. 2 para. 3 of the
Charter, the ordinary court gave rise, in addition, to an encroachment
upon the right to one’s statutory judge, under Art. 38 para. 1 of the
Charter. In consequence of the fact that the court withheld its
approval of the autonomous manifestation of the will agreeing upon court
venue pursuant to § 89a of the Civil Procedure Code, it also intruded
upon the right to one’s statutory judge.
For
the above-stated reasons, the Constitutional Court, due to the
infringement of Arts. 2 para. 3, 38 para. 1 of the Charter, and Arts. 1
para. 1 and 2 para. 4 of the Constitution of the Czech Republic, has
granted the constitutional complaints pursuant to § 82 para. 2 lit. a)
of Act No. 182/1993 Sb., on the Constitutional Court, as subsequently
amended, and, pursuant to § 82 odst. 3 písm. a) of the cited Act,
quashed the contested decisions of the Regional Court in Brno.
Notice: A Constitutional Court decision may not be appealed.
Brno, 12 May 2004
Notice: A Constitutional Court decision may not be appealed.
Brno, 12 May 2004