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HEADNOTES
1)
In various proceedings before courts of the same state, in a procedural
situation which is, if not identical, very similar (the party to the
proceedings seeks the annulment of an effective court decision on
grounds of incorrect legal evaluation, or asks the highest body in the
court system to address a question which the party to the proceedings
considers to be fundamental and as yet unresolved) the party to the
proceedings can not be treated differently unless reasonable grounds for
such action are evident.
2)
Stating brief reasons on which the Supreme Court based its denial
decision (e.g. citations of the Court’s cases which address the matter
and which the court found no reason to change or deviate from) can not
significantly burden the Supreme Court, and thus they can not
significantly influence the overall length of court proceedings; thus
limiting the rights of a party to appellate proceedings on a point of
law appears to be clearly disproportionate to the aim pursued.
CZECH REPUBLIC
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
JUDGMENT
IN THE NAME OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC
The Plenum of the Constitutional Court, composed of JUDr. František Duchoň, JUDr. Pavel Holländer, JUDr. Dagmar Lastovecká, JUDr. Jiří Malenovský, JUDr. Jiří Mucha, JUDr. Jan Musil, JUDr. Jiří Nykodým, JUDr. Pavel Varvařovský, JUDr. Miloslav Výborný and JUDr. Eliška Wagnerová, ruled on a petition from the minors Jan and Pavel Boukal, represented by their mother, Monika Boukalová, all residing at Višňová 146, legally represented by JUDr. Antonín Janák, attorney with his registered office in Příbram, seeking the annulment of § 243c par. 2 of Act no. 99/1963 Coll., the Civil Procedure Code, as amended by later regulations, with the consent of the parties without conducting oral proceedings, as follows:
The
provision of § 243c par. 2 of Act no. 99/1963 Coll., the Civil Procedure
Code, as amended by later regulations, is annulled as of the day this
judgment is promulgated in the Collection of Laws.
REASONING
In
a petition delivered to the Constitutional Court on 2September 2002
(file no. IV. ÚS 582/02), the complainants, the minors Jan Boukal and
Pavel Boukal, represented by their mother, Monika Boukalová, legally
represented by JUDr. Antonín Janák, seek to have the Constitutional
Court annul the decision of the Supreme Court of the CR of 19 June 2002,
file no. 33 Odo 360/2002-127, the decision of the Regional Court in
Prague of 22 January 2002, file no. 28 Co 11/2002-111 and the decision
of the District Court in Příbram of 17 October 2001, file no. 11 C
165/97-81.
Together with the constitutional complaint, the complainants filed a petition to annul § 243c par. 2 of Act no. 99/1963 Coll., the Civil Procedure Code, as amended (the “CPC” of the CPC).
Together with the constitutional complaint, the complainants filed a petition to annul § 243c par. 2 of Act no. 99/1963 Coll., the Civil Procedure Code, as amended (the “CPC” of the CPC).
The
fourth panel of the Constitutional Court, after stating that
application of the contested provision resulted in one of the facts
which are the subject matter of the constitutional complaint, i.e. that
the conditions provided in § 74 of Act no. 182/1993 Coll., on the
Constitutional Court, have been met, suspended proceedings on the
constitutional complaint and forwarded the petition to annul § 243c par.
2 of the CPC to the Plenum of the Constitutional Court.
The
petitioners consider § 243c par. 2, of the CPC, which permits the
Supreme Court to not give any reasons at all in decisions on appeals on
points of law [“dovolání”] specified therein, to be inconsistent with
everyone’s right to a fair trial, in particular with Art. 6 par. 1 of
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms. In their opinion, this convention is a treaty under Art. 10 of
the Constitution, and thus directly applicable and has precedence
before statutes. In support of their opinion, they argue on the basis of
decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, in particular they
point to the judgment of 21 January1999 in the case of García Ruiz v.
Spain, which clearly states that according to its established case-law
reflecting a principle linked to the proper administration of justice,
judgments of courts and tribunals should adequately state the reasons on
which they are based.” The petitioners also point out that the extent
of this duty may vary according to the nature of the decision and must
be determined in the light of the circumstances of the case (see Ruiz
Torija v. Spain and Hiro Balani v. Spain, 1994, and Higgins and Others
v. France, 1998). Finally, they point to the conclusions of the ECHR
that, although Article 6 par. 1 obliges courts to give reasons for their
decisions, this duty cannot be understood as requiring a detailed
answer to every argument (see Van de Hurk v. the Netherlands, 1994).
Thus, in dismissing an appeal, an appellate court may, in principle,
simply endorse the reasons for the lower court’s decision (see Helle v.
Finland, 1997).
The
petitioners believe that in both kinds of cases regulated by the
contested provision, § 243c par. 2 of the CPC, where the Supreme Court
can omit giving reasons, it is not a question of a mere procedural
decision in the matter (e.g. denial on grounds of a late filing or
filing by an unauthorized person), but that the appellate court on a
point of law must preliminarily answer the question concerning the
merits of the matter and conclude that it is not a question of
fundamental legal significance, or that the appeal on a point of law is
clearly groundless. Thus, it must consider the matter in terms of
substantive law. Insofar as it is one of the main tasks of the Supreme
Court to have a unifying effect on the case law of lower courts through
its interpretations of the law in individual cases, then, according to
the petitioners, this role must be fulfilled by a clear, even if only
brief, reference, e.g. to a decision of the Supreme Court in an
analogous matter. However, one can hardly speak of fulfilling this role
in a cases where the appellants are not even informed why there is not a
question of fundamental legal significance, or why the appeal on a
point of law is clearly groundless. Therefore, the petitioners conclude
that if the law permits the court to not give reasons for its decision
at all, although Art. 6 par. 1 of the Convention establishes the right
of every participant in court proceedings to an adequate statement of
the reasons on which a decision is based, it thereby directly violates
the right to a fair trial. An absence of reasons can never be adequate
reasons.
The Constitutional
Court, under § 69 of Act no. 182/1993 Coll., on the Constitutional
Court (the “Act”), requested opinions from the Chamber of Deputies and
the Senate.
…
The Constitutional Court also asked for opinions on the petition from the Ministry of Justice and the Supreme Court of the CR ( § 48 par. 2 and § 49 par. 1 of the Act on the Constitutional Court).
The Ministry of Justice expressed the opinion that the contested provision is an exception from the general framework of providing reasoning for resolutions whereby a court decides a matter on the merits, under § 169 par. 4, or § 157 par. 2 and 4 of the CPC. This exception has its justification in the fact that, in the case of a decision to deny an appeal on a point of law under § 243c par. 2 of the CPC, the reasons for the decision may be merely formal. In its reasoning, the court would basically only repeat the relevant provisions of the law, which provide quite unambiguous criteria for denying an appeal on a point of law– either it is not a question of a decision which has fundamental legal significance for the merits of the matter, or the appeal on a point of law is clearly groundless. The permissibility of an appeal on a point of law, as an extraordinary means of redress in cases under § 237 par. 1 let. c) of the CPC, or its denial as clearly groundless under § 243b par. 1 of the CPC, depend on the consideration of the court. However, this consideration is very narrowly defined. If the contested decision of the appeals court is correct, consistent with case law, and otherwise error-free, a sufficient substantive basis for a reasoning in the scope foreseen by, in particular, § 157 par. 2 of the CPC does not even exist.
…
The Constitutional Court also asked for opinions on the petition from the Ministry of Justice and the Supreme Court of the CR ( § 48 par. 2 and § 49 par. 1 of the Act on the Constitutional Court).
The Ministry of Justice expressed the opinion that the contested provision is an exception from the general framework of providing reasoning for resolutions whereby a court decides a matter on the merits, under § 169 par. 4, or § 157 par. 2 and 4 of the CPC. This exception has its justification in the fact that, in the case of a decision to deny an appeal on a point of law under § 243c par. 2 of the CPC, the reasons for the decision may be merely formal. In its reasoning, the court would basically only repeat the relevant provisions of the law, which provide quite unambiguous criteria for denying an appeal on a point of law– either it is not a question of a decision which has fundamental legal significance for the merits of the matter, or the appeal on a point of law is clearly groundless. The permissibility of an appeal on a point of law, as an extraordinary means of redress in cases under § 237 par. 1 let. c) of the CPC, or its denial as clearly groundless under § 243b par. 1 of the CPC, depend on the consideration of the court. However, this consideration is very narrowly defined. If the contested decision of the appeals court is correct, consistent with case law, and otherwise error-free, a sufficient substantive basis for a reasoning in the scope foreseen by, in particular, § 157 par. 2 of the CPC does not even exist.
The
ministry also pointed out, that an appeal of a point of law is an
extraordinary means of redress, which is permissible only if provided by
statute (it is not based on the principle of universality, unlike an
ordinary appeal) and its purpose is, apart from deciding individual
matters, to have a unifying effect on case law. If the appellate court
concludes that an appeal on a point of law is not permissible under §
237 par. 1 let. c) of the CPC, because the contested decision does not
have fundamental legal significance, or that the appeal on a point of
law is clearly groundless under § 243b par. 1 of the CPC assumes that
the decision of the appellate court is correct, and that even in terms
of its reasons the appellate court has not reason to add anything. The
fact that it does not give reasons for its decision to deny an appeal on
a point of law can not be inconsistent with the right to a fair trial,
because stating reasons for the decision of the appellate court [on the
point of law] could only point to the correct conclusions of the
appellate court [on the ordinary appeal]. Therefore, it is not
procedurally economical to give the reasons for such a decision, because
the [first] appellate court resolved the dispute correctly, and the
reasons of the appellate court [on the point of law] can bring no
benefit either to the parties or for purposes of unifying case law. For
these reasons, the Ministry of Justice is convinced that § 243c par. 2
of the CPC, which does not required the court to give reasons for its
decision, can not be considered a violation of the right to a fair trial
under Art. 6 par. 1 of the Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms.
In its
opinion of 28 March 2003, the Supreme Court relied in part on the
statement submitted in the proceedings on a constitutional complaint by
the chairwoman of the panel which decided on the appeal on a point of
law in the particular matter, and which holds the opinion that the
contested provision of the CPC does not deny the party’s right to a fair
trial under Art. 6 par. 1 of the Convention. The contested provision of
the CPC, providing that reasons are not given in decisions to deny an
appeal on a point of law in designated cases, was established in the
Civil Procedure Code in the interest of speeding up and shortening
proceedings in appeals on points of law before the Supreme Court. It is
necessary to see that these proceedings are proceedings on an
extraordinary means of recourse, so they do not in any way interfere
with the principle of two levels of civil court proceedings (The Supreme
Court is a third level in this case), and that the European Union, or
the majority of its states, considers two court levels to be quite
adequate. One can not assume that the contested provision interferes
with the party’s constitutional right to a fair trial, as it meets the
requirement for speeding up court proceedings and making them more
economical in those cases where decisions on appeals on points of law
(of a more or less trivial nature), weighed down by unnecessary giving
of reasons, take away from the Supreme court’s capacity to unify court
practice and make decisions on matters of fundamental importance. The
complainants’ arguments, relying on the particular case law of the
European Court of Human Rights, apply to the ordinary appellate court,
not the appellate court handling the appeal on a point of law.
In
conclusion, the Supreme Court’s statement says that these opinions are
also consistent with the trend toward efficiency in civil proceedings in
Germany and other states of the European Union.
After
reviewing the arguments presented by the petitioners and after weighing
the abovementioned opinions and statements, the Constitutional Court
concluded that there were grounds for the petition. It based this on the
following considerations.
We can agree with the objections of both houses of Parliament, as well as the Ministry of Justice, that the petitioner’s arguments overlook the fact that, through the promulgation of constitutional Act no. 395/2001 Coll., priority of application of international treaties was enshrined in the legal order of the CR with effect as of 1 June 2002, and as result their reference to the original wording of Art. 10 of the Constitution. Likewise, one can agree with the Supreme Court that the particular cases of the European Court of Human Rights, to which the petitioners point are concerned rather with the requirements imposed on the reasoning of decisions by first-level or appellate courts. However, these arguments do not in themselves make the petition groundless.
We can agree with the objections of both houses of Parliament, as well as the Ministry of Justice, that the petitioner’s arguments overlook the fact that, through the promulgation of constitutional Act no. 395/2001 Coll., priority of application of international treaties was enshrined in the legal order of the CR with effect as of 1 June 2002, and as result their reference to the original wording of Art. 10 of the Constitution. Likewise, one can agree with the Supreme Court that the particular cases of the European Court of Human Rights, to which the petitioners point are concerned rather with the requirements imposed on the reasoning of decisions by first-level or appellate courts. However, these arguments do not in themselves make the petition groundless.
It is
evident from the opinions of both houses of Parliament, as well as the
expert opinions of the Ministry of Justice and the Supreme Court, that
the main aim of adding the contested provision into the CPC by the
amendment performed by Act no. 30/2000 Coll. is removing unnecessary
delays in the activity of courts, in particular easing the situation of
the Supreme Court, that is, meeting the requirements of Art. 38 par. 2
of the Charter, or Art. 6 par. 1 of the Convention, as regards court
decision making in an appropriate and reasonable time. That aim is
undoubtedly legitimate, but the means of attaining it should not come
into conflict with the right of a party to court proceedings to fair and
equal treatment which prevents arbitrariness.
The
Constitutional Court has already stated the requirements which must be
imposed on the decision-making of the general courts in a number of its
decisions. Primarily, it stated that the independence of decision-making
by general courts is implemented in a constitutional and statutory
framework of procedural and substantive law. The procedural law
framework means primarily the principles of a proper and fair trial, as
arising from Art. 36 et seq. of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and
Freedoms, and from Art. 1 of the Constitution of the Czech Republic. One
of these principles, which is a component of the right to a fair trial,
as well as of the concept of a state governed by the rule of law (Art.
36 par. 1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, Art. 1 of
the Constitution of the Czech Republic) and which rules out
arbitrariness in decision-making, is the obligation of courts to give
reasons for their verdicts. (judgment file no. III. ÚS 84/94, Collection
of Decisions of the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic, volume
3, no. 34, p. 257). In judgment file no. III. ÚS 176/96 (Collection of
Decisions of the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic, volume 6,
no. 89, p. 151) the Constitutional Court expressed the opinion that if
one of the purposes of court jurisdiction is to be met, that being the
requirement of “education aimed at preserving the law … at respect for
the rights of fellow citizens” (§ 1 of the Civil Procedure Code), it is
completely necessary that the decisions of the general courts not only
conform to the law in the merits of the matter, and be issued with full
observance of procedural norms, but also that the reasoning of issued
decisions, in relation to the cited aim, meet the criteria given by §
157 par. 2 in fine, par. 3 of the Civil Procedure Code, because only
substantively correct decisions (fully consistent with the law) and
decisions which are properly justified, i.e. in the legally required
manner, meet – as an inseparable component of the “designated
procedure”– the constitutional criteria arising from the Charter of
Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (Art. 38 par. 1). Similarly as in the
area of facts, likewise in the area of inadequately analyzed and
justified legal arguments there are analogous consequences which lead to
decisions being incomplete and, in particular, unconvincing, which is
of course inconsistent not only with the aim of court proceedings but
also with the principles of a fair trial (Art. 36 par. 1 of the Charter
of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms), as the Constitutional Court
understands them.
Also of
significance for the present matter is judgment file no. III. ÚS 206/98
(Collection of Decisions of the Constitutional Court of the Czech
Republic, volume 11, no. 80, p. 231 et seq.), in which the
Constitutional Court stated that part of the constitutional framework of
the independence of courts is their obligation to observe equality in
rights arising from Art. 1 of the Charter. Equality of rights in
relation to the general courts thus establishes, among other things, the
right to the same decision-making in the same matters, and at the same
time rules out arbitrariness in application of the law.
On
the other hand, the Constitutional Court has also said in its case law
that the right to an appeal on a point of law is not constitutionally
guaranteed, and this extraordinary means of redress, which the law makes
available to parties in civil and criminal proceedings, thus goes
beyond the framework of constitutionally guaranteed procedural
entitlements (decision file no III. ÚS 298/02, Collection of Decisions
of the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic, vol. 26, no. 18, p.
381).
Although the
constitutional order does include an entitlement to file an appeal on a
point of law, or another so-called “extraordinary” means of redress, the
Constitutional Court considered it key to review the question of
whether the procedure chosen by the legislature sufficiently eliminates
possible arbitrariness in application of the law, which is indisputably
one of the elements of a state governed by the rule of law. In other
words, whether the fact that a particular procedural process goes beyond
the framework of constitutional requirements is, in itself, sufficient
grounds to conclude that the criteria arising from the existing case law
of the Constitutional Court need not be applied to the reasoning of a
decision about such procedural process, or that it is not necessary to
apply these criteria even commensurately. Another question which the
Constitutional Court had to answer was whether limiting the right of the
appellant on a point of law to learn ( in certain cases) on what
grounds the Supreme Court denied the petition is commensurate with the
aim pursued, or whether it can even serve this aim at all.
The
background report for § 243c par. 2 of the CPC states that as the
reason why the Supreme Court is denying an appeal on a point of law is
obvious, it is not necessary to state a reasoning for the decision. The
opinions from both houses of Parliament and the opinions of the Ministry
of Justice and the Supreme Court of the CR were in the same spirit.
However, the Constitutional Court believes that these arguments are
unconvincing, because the “obviousness” of the reason is de facto
expressed only by reference to the text of the relevant provisions of
the CPC, which is actually a kind of circular argument. The appellant on
a point of law thus does not learn, even if briefly, why the Supreme
Court did not consider the question presented to it in the appeal on a
point of law to be one of fundamental legal significance, why it
considered the appeal on a point of law to be clearly groundless. In
this regard, the Supreme Court’s decision is thus non-reviewable, which
could perhaps stand if the Supreme Court really were the last body of a
judicial type which could consider the matter. However, in view of the
position of the Constitutional Court, as well as of the European Court
of Human Rights, the absence of any reasoning makes it impossible to
review, even roughly, the reasons for the decision, and in the event
that the matter is presented to these bodies there will still be an
obligation on the Supreme Court to give reasons for its decisions
(supplementally).
In the
case law of the European Court of Human Rights, it is up to each state
how to arrange its court system and the relationships between its
individuals levels. If so-called extraordinary means of redress were not
permitted at all, no doubt such a framework should stand from that
point of view, and from the point of view of constitutional law. On the
other hand, if such means are permitted, in a state governed by the rule
of law their framework should be fundamentally identical for all types
of court proceedings, or differ only if there are reasonable grounds for
it. However, a comparison of the requirements which must be contained
in a decision on an appeal on a point of law in civil and criminal
proceedings, or the requirements which the Administrative Procedure Code
requires for decisions on a cassation complaint, shows significant
differences, and their rationale is not clear to the Constitutional
Court.
If the Supreme
Court denies an appeal on a point of law in criminal proceedings, it is
required by law to briefly state the reason for the denial, with a
reference to the circumstance relating to the statutory grounds for
denial(§ 265i par. 2 of the Criminal Procedure Code). The commentary to
the Criminal Procedure Code says that the defining element – brevity –
will necessary be affected by the grounds for the denial. More extensive
explanations of reasons are required, according to the commentary, for
grounds listed in § 265i par. 1 let. b),c), and particularly f), that
is, if it is to be explained why a particular question is not of
fundamental legal significance. Thus, a comparison of the requirements
for providing a reasoning in a decision on an appeal on a point of law
in civil proceedings indicates that, in terms of the requirements for
the reasons for its decision, the Supreme Court can decide quite
differently on matters of basically the same character. Comparing these
different requirements for reasons in decisions on appeals on points of
law with the requirements for a decision by the Supreme Administrative
Court on a cassation complaint shows that § 55 par. 4 of the
Administrative Procedure Code permits omitting reasons only in a
decision which does not terminate the proceedings and which does not
impose obligations on anyone. It does not permit a verdict without
reasons (§ 54). In view of the fact that under § 120 of the
Administrative Procedure Code the provisions of part three chapter one
of the Administrative Procedure Code are applied commensurately to
proceedings on a cassation complaint, one can conclude that the Supreme
Administrative Court must always give reasons for a decision on a
cassation complaint.
It is
evident from the foregoing that in various proceedings before courts of
the same state, in a procedural situation which is, if not identical,
very similar (the party to the proceedings seeks the annulment of an
effective court decision on grounds of incorrect legal evaluation, or
asks the highest body in the court system to address a question which
the party to the proceedings considers to be fundamental and as yet
unresolved) the party to the proceedings can not be treated differently
unless reasonable grounds for such action are evident.
The Constitutional Court believes that the argument that denying an appeal on a point of law in civil court proceedings without giving reasons will contribute to courts making decisions in an appropriate time (which is undoubtedly a legitimate aim) will also not stand. Limiting the right of a party in appellate proceedings on a point of law in civil matters to learn the reason why the Supreme Court decided as it did can only minimally serve the declared aim (if at all). Stating brief reasons on which the Supreme Court based its denial decision (e.g. citations of the Court’s cases which address the matter and which the court found no reason to change or deviate from) can not significantly burden the Supreme Court, and thus they can not significantly influence the overall length of court proceedings; thus limiting the rights of a party to appellate proceedings on a point of law appears to be clearly disproportionate to the aim pursued. In this regard we can also point to the opinion expressed in the decision by the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Delcourt (1970 A 11, § 25), that in a democratic society, the right to a fair administration of justice holds such a prominent place, that it can not be sacrificed for convenience. Justice must not only be done, it must also be seen to be done.
For
the foregoing reasons the Plenum of the Constitutional Court decided to
annul § 243c par. 2 of the CPC due to its inconsistency with the
principles of a state governed by the rule of law (Art. 1 of the
Constitution), as well as with the principle of equality (Art. 1 of the
Charter), as the Constitutional Court has interpreted these principles
in its existing case law; it did not find grounds to delay the
enforceability of this decision.The Constitutional Court believes that the argument that denying an appeal on a point of law in civil court proceedings without giving reasons will contribute to courts making decisions in an appropriate time (which is undoubtedly a legitimate aim) will also not stand. Limiting the right of a party in appellate proceedings on a point of law in civil matters to learn the reason why the Supreme Court decided as it did can only minimally serve the declared aim (if at all). Stating brief reasons on which the Supreme Court based its denial decision (e.g. citations of the Court’s cases which address the matter and which the court found no reason to change or deviate from) can not significantly burden the Supreme Court, and thus they can not significantly influence the overall length of court proceedings; thus limiting the rights of a party to appellate proceedings on a point of law appears to be clearly disproportionate to the aim pursued. In this regard we can also point to the opinion expressed in the decision by the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Delcourt (1970 A 11, § 25), that in a democratic society, the right to a fair administration of justice holds such a prominent place, that it can not be sacrificed for convenience. Justice must not only be done, it must also be seen to be done.
Notice: Decisions of the Constitutional Court can not be appealed.
Brno, 11 February 2004