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HEADNOTES
Art.
36 para. 1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Basic Freedoms,
similarly as Art. 6 para. 1 of the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, construct a fundamental right to
the judicial protection of actual, and not hypothetical rights, or they
guarantee everyone judicial protection from actual, and not merely
theoretical, infringements of their rights. To the extent that, in
actuality, no dispute exists between the complainants and the secondary
parties, no intrusion into the right, under Art. 36 para. 1 of the
Charter, to judicial and other legal protection could have occurred.
The constitutional complaint is not an ordinary legal remedy to cure
formal errors by courts which practically do not affect the sphere of
the rights and obligations of the parties.
CZECH REPUBLIC
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
JUDGMENT
IN THE NAME OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC
The Constitutional Court, in a panel composed of JUDr. Dagmar Lastovecká, its Chairperson, and Justices JUDr. Jiří Nykodým and JUDr. Pavel Rychetský, on the constitutional complaint of complainants V.J. and S.J. . . . against the 19 August 2002 ruling of the Regional Court in Pilsen, file no. 56 Co 172/2002, in which it decided the appeal against the 11 July 2002 ruling of the District Court in Karlsbad, file no. 19 C 138/2002-8, with the participation of the Regional Court in Pilsen as a party to the proceeding, the District Court in Karlsbad as a secondary part to the proceeding and V.J. and Z.J. . . . as secondary parties to the proceeding, decided as follows:
The constitutional complaint is rejected on the merits.
REASONING
I.
In
its constitutional compliant, the complainant sought the issuance of a
judgment quashing the 19 August 2002 ruling of the Regional Court in
Pilsen, file no. 56 Co 172/2002 (hereinafter „contested ruling“).
In
the first point of the 11 July 2002 ruling of the District Court in
Karlsbad, file no. 19 C 138/2002-8, the proceeding was dismissed as
regards the plaintiffs‘ (now complainants‘), Vá.J. and S.J., claim
against the defendants (now secondary parties), Vl.J. and Z.J., for the
payment of money owed for rent. The proceeding was dismissed due to the
fact that the plaintiffs withdrew their action, as the defendants had,
already before the beginning of the court hearing in the matter, paid in
full the sum they owed. In the ruling’s second point, the district
court decided that the defendants are obliged to compensate the
plaintiffs, in the amount of 10 928,- Kč for the costs of the
proceeding.
The defendants
(secondary parties) submitted an appeal against the second point of this
ruling, proposing that the first instance court’s ruling be modified in
the contested part, to the effect that none of the parties had a claim
to the reimbursement of the costs of the proceeding before the first
instance court, due to the fact that, prior to 3 July 2002, that is,
before the first instance ruling was handed down, they had already paid
the plaintiffs (complainants) this amount for the costs of the
proceeding.
In its contested
ruling on the appeal against point II of the first instance court’s
ruling, the Regional Court in Pilsen modified the ruling such that it
did not impose upon the defendants the duty to reimburse the plaintiffs
for the costs of the proceeding. In its reasoning it asserted that, if
at the time that the first instance court decided the matter the
defendants had already paid the demanded reimbursement for the costs of
the proceeding pursuant to the demand made by the plaintiffs‘ legal
representative, there were no grounds for imposing upon the defendants,
in the form of a judicial decision, a duty which they had already
previously voluntarily fulfilled.
The
complainants submitted this constitutional complaint against this
ruling. They stated that, as is clear from the Civil Procedure Code (§
151 para. 1), each court decision (apart from some statutory exceptions)
must contain a statement concerning the costs of proceeding. In their
view, however, the wording of the point of the contested ruling
concerning the costs of the proceeding did not correspond to the
provisions of the Civil Procedure Code; the law does not provide for a
statement on the „non-imposition of the duty to reimburse the costs of
the proceeding“ and further, as a result of the appellate court’s
modification to the ruling, the first instance court had not, as the law
obliges it to do, made a decision concerning the costs of the
proceeding. That is, to the extent that the defendants had paid the
plaintiffs the costs of the proceeding already prior to the court’s
decision, then they did so without any legal grounds therefor, as the
claim for the reimbursement of the costs of proceeding is a procedural
law claim, the establishment and maturity of which is laid down only by
decision of a court. The defendants‘ duty to reimburse the
plaintiffs‘costs of proceeding and the plaintiffs‘ right to demand the
reimbursement of the costs of the proceeding only come into being once
the first instance court’s decision becomes final and enforceable.
The
complainants see in the appellate court’s manner of proceeding an
infringement of the right to fair process under Art. 36 para. 1 of the
Charter of Fundamental Rights and Basic Freedoms (hereinafter „Charter“)
and Art. 90 of the Constitution of the Czech Republic. In their view,
the defendants could, in consequence of the contested ruling taken ad
absurdum, demand back the amount paid for the costs of proceeding, since
their payment of it lacked any legal grounds. The contested ruling
denied the parties to the proceeding their legal certainty.
II.
The
Constitutional Court called upon the parties and secondary parties to
give their views on the matter and requested the judicial file, 19 C
138/2002.
In its 5 January
2004 statement of views, the District Court in Karlsbad asserted that it
is possible to accept the grounds of the constitutional complaint,
namely that, in consequence of the appellate court modifying its ruling,
the first instance court had not yet ruled on the costs of the
proceedings, as the law obliges it to do. In that court’s view,
however, it is not possible to accept the argument that the ruling is
not in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, since
it relates the formal and substantive enforceability of the contested
point of the ruling concerning the costs of the proceeding and that
point is formally and substantively enforceable, as it precisely defines
the rights and duties of the parties as relates to the costs of the
proceeding.
In its statement
of view of 30 January 2004, the Regional Court in Pilsen merely
referred to its reasoning in the contested ruling.
At
the Constitutional Court’s instigation, the complainants informed it in
their 6 January 2004 memorandum that, as of yet, the defendants have
not requested the amount paid out for expenses of the proceeding;
nonetheless, the deadline for its return has still not passed and the
defendants‘ claim therefore is not time-barred.
In
their 18 May 2004 statement, secondary parties Vl.J. and Z.J. indicated
that the complainants had not been injured by the infringement of their
right to fair process. They asserted that, at the request of the
complainants‘ legal representative, they had paid the demanded costs of
the court proceeding and that they have never requested the return of
the costs of the proceeding they had paid out. Therefore, they believe
that the complainants‘ claims were not unfairly harmed in the proceeding
before the Regional Court in Pilsen and that their fundamental rights
had not been affected. They propose that the constitutional complaint
be rejected.
Prior to
deciding on the constitutional complaint, the Constitutional Court made
the above-cited views of the parties and secondaring parties available
to the complainants. In view of the fact that all parties and secondary
parties consented to dispensing with an oral hearing in the matter, one
was not held (§ 44 para. 2 of the Act on the Constitutional Court).
III.
The
Constitutional Court found that the timely submitted constitutional
complaint met all the formal requirements laid down in law, so that
there is nothing to impede a hearing and decision on the merits in the
matter.
According to Art. 36
para. 1 of the Charter, everyone has the right to judicial and other
legal protection, everyone may assert, through the legally prescribed
procedure, his rights before an independent and impartial court.
Similarly Art. 6 para. 1 of the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter „Convention“) guarantees to
everyone the right to fair process, that is, among other things, the
right of everyone to a fair hearing in his matter by an independent and
impartial tribunal established by law, which determines his civil rights
and obligations.
It is
evident that both of these provisions construct a fundamental right to
the judicial protection of actual, and not hypothetical rights, or they
guarantee everyone judicial protection from actual, and not merely
theoretical, infringements of their rights. As follows even from the
case law of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, a
complainant seeking the protection under Art. 6 para. 1 of the
Convention, must first of all be capable of substantiating that the
given case concerns (concerned) an actual, and not merely a
hypothetical, dispute relating to civil rights and obligations (compare
the words, „contestations sur ses droits et obligation de caractère
civile“ in the authentic French text of the Convention or the words,
„determination of his civil rights and obligations“ in the authentic
English text of the Convention). The European Court gave a detailed
explanation of this requirement in its decision in the matter of Le
Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere versus Belgium of 23 June 1981, A.43,
§§ 45 – 48. The Court interpreted the requirement that an actual
dispute exist such that civil rights and obligations must be the subject
of the dispute between the parties and that the result of the judicial
proceeding must have a directly decisive impact on the disputed right.
Analogous
procedural institutes can be found even in other legal orders,
institutes which should, among other things, prevent the courts from
dealing with fictitious disputes and in that way dissipating their time
and considerable resources to the detriment of actual disputes [compare,
for example, the American law doctrine limiting judicial competence to
„Cases and Controversies“ (Art. III 2 para. 1 of the Constitution of the
United States of America) and the rule of ripeness derived therefrom,
according to which the detriment with which the plaintiff is threatened
must be actual and immediate, and not putative, speculative,
hypothetical or remote].
The
Constitutional Court affirms that the parties and the secondary parties
do not dispute that the complainants demanded the reimbursement of the
costs of the proceeding and the secondary parties voluntarily paid in
full the amount demanded even prior to the first-instance court’s
decision to dismiss the proceeding. Even after the modification of the
ruling in the point concerning the costs of the proceeding, the
secondary parties have not demanded the return of the amount paid for
the costs of the proceeding. Thus, in actuality, no dispute exists
between the complainants and the secondary parties concerning the
reimbursement of the costs of a proceeding, therefore, no intrusion into
the right, under Art. 36 para. 1 of the Charter, to judicial and other
legal protection could have occurred.
The
complainants make reference to the legal uncertainty into which the
contested decision has thrown them, since the secondary parties
allegedly could demand back the reimbursement paid for the costs of the
proceeding. In this sense, however, it is a hypothetical dispute on
individual rights. The Constitutional Court is not prepared at this
juncture to speculate as to how the ordinary courts would adjudge a
prospective claim submitted by the secondary parties for the return of
the amount voluntarily paid the complainants in reimbursement of the
costs incurred in connection with the assertion of the debt.
Nevertheless, it is possible to consider even other interpretational
variants which would lead to a just outcome consisting, for example, in
the conclusion that this matter concerned a voluntary performance on the
basis either of a nominate or innominate agreement of the parties with
relatively clear cause („causa“). The dispute between the complainants
and the secondary parties certainly was not the first, and will not be
the last, dispute which ended in dismissal of the proceeding after an
out-of-court settlement; therefore, it can be presumed that cases of
voluntary settlement of the costs connected with the assertion of rights
are not a rarity.
The
complainants and the first instance court are of the view that it is
possible to accept the grounds of the constitutional complaint, namely
that, in consequence of the appellate court modifying its ruling, the
first instance court had not yet ruled on the costs of the proceedings,
as the law obliges it to do. Even should the Constitutional Court
concur with that view, that would not, in and of itself, be a reason for
such a serious intervention as a cassational judgment. The
constitutional complaint is not an ordinary legal remedy to cure formal
errors by courts, which practically do not affect the sphere of the
rights and obligations of the parties.
In
view of what has been stated above, pursuant to § 82 para. 1 of the Act
on the Constitutional Court, the Constitutional Court rejects the
complaint as unfounded.
Notice: Decisions of the Constitutional Court cannot be appealed.
Brno, 10 August 2004
Notice: Decisions of the Constitutional Court cannot be appealed.
Brno, 10 August 2004